Key Reflections
* Both al-Qaeda and ISIS have strong representation through their affiliates in the Sahel region, West Africa, as well as the Horn of Africa and East Africa.
* There are concerns about terrorist travel in the post-pandemic era. Terrorists may find it easier to travel to places for training, recruitment, funding, and propaganda.
* An Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban has the potential to become a safe haven for terrorists once again. There are a number of terrorist entities operating there which include al-Qaeda, the ISIS Khorasan branch, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
* Cocaine trafficking routes between Latin America and the Middle East have fuelled the drug trade expansion and could converge with the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
* There remains an ongoing challenge in the prevention of the procurement of arms and explosives by terrorists. In addition, a terrorist organisation’s’ level of operational success can be quantified with data including casualty rates.
* Neo-Nazi extremist groups are very active on social media and use digital platforms and encrypted messaging channels to spread their conspiracy theories as a call for violence.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
MC: Mahmut Cengiz
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
In this episode, we speak with Mahmut Cengiz, an associate professor with the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. He also teaches courses on terrorism, American security policy and narco-terrorism. Mahmut has international field experience where he has delivered capacity building and training assistance to international partners in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Cengiz regularly publishes books, articles, and op-eds on terrorism and transnational crime. His 2019 book The Illicit Economy in Turkey: How Criminals, Terrorists, and the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Economies analyses the role of criminals, money launderers, and discusses the involvement of ISIS and al-Qaeda in illicit economies.
Mahmut Cengiz, warm welcome to NATO DEEP Dive.
MC: Thank you. Thanks for inviting me.
SG: It’s our pleasure. There are several things that I want to talk to you about in our podcast. I think perhaps the most important dynamic that we’re seeing now emerge is the potential regrowth of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Africa.
Let’s deal firstly with ISIS. Where are we at when it comes to their movement in Africa, both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa?
MC: It’s a question for all of us, whether ISIS and al-Qaeda have been defeated. Because both organisations have lost their leaders. ISIS in 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and in 2021, Ibrahim al-Qurashi. They all got killed in military operations. Also, just two months ago, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s leader, lost his life in a military drone attack in Afghanistan.
But then, we began to discuss whether these organisations have been defeated or not, but what have we seen in the most recent trends? These organisations are spreading their influence in Africa. And for example, now al-Qaeda has a strong representation in the Sahel region by JNIM, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin group; and al-Shabaab in Somalia is also a growing and emerging threat; and then another group, Ansaru in Nigeria. But I can tell you that ISIS is the most active when we compare it with al-Qaeda. ISIS is now active in more than 10 countries, and some of its regional affiliates, like ISIS in the Greater Sahara, or ISIS West Africa in Nigeria, or ISIS DRC in Congo and also Uganda, also ISIS Mozambique, in Tanzania and Mozambique. These groups are the most active ones. Also, they are listed as some of the deadliest organisations in terrorism databases.
SG: In terms of the ISIS franchises in Africa, how much of a command and control do they have that is independent from ISIS core in Syria and Iraq? Do these franchises operate independently? Or is there a sense of respect and obedience to the ISIS leadership in Syria and Iraq?
MC: We need some evidence to talk about whether organisations are independent of or dependent on ISIS core. But what we know is that these organisations are ideologically under the influence of ISIS, and also, they are networked with each other for logistics, for some transferring of weapons or explosives, also for providing some training programmes for each other. And mostly they prefer to use the name of ISIS because they know well that if they are a local jihadist group, no one would know about these organisations, and for example, in the last five or six years, these organisations began to compete with each other, just to be under the banner of ISIS.
Let me give you two examples in Mozambique and in Congo. For example, in 2017, Ansar Al-Sunna group in Mozambique pledged allegiance to ISIS. Until that time, no one knew about this local jihadist groups fighting for some Muslim grievances in northern Cabo Delgado. And in 2018, Allied Defence Forces in Congo, again, declared loyalty to ISIS core, and then this group also became popular. I think in 2021, both ISIS DRC and ISIS Mozambique branches have been designated as terrorist organisations, by the U.S. State Department. And today, after pledging allegiance to ISIS, after beginning to use the name of ISIS, now both organisations are more popular, and then they can get more funding, and also, they can get more and more recruits.
SG: In terms of the al-Qaeda factions in Africa, you mentioned earlier about Ayman al-Zawahiri being killed in a U.S. operation in Afghanistan. How have the al-Qaeda franchises reacted to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s death? Because if we look at the other franchises, such as AQAP and AQIS, they’ve been remarkably quiet. Does the same apply to the al-Qaeda franchises in Africa?
MC: I think first, we need to talk about the killing of the leaders of these organisations, whether ISIS or al-Qaeda, because it is more common for the Western world to use and to apply the word ‘decapitation,’ which is specifically targeting the leader. But what we have seen in the responses or some impacts over these regional affiliates, is that it is just taking several hours for al-Qaeda or ISIS groups to replace their leadership. So, that’s why we cannot see some big impacts over these al-Qaeda regional affiliate groups. But I can see that JNIM; and also, Ansaru; and also, al-Shabaab again, they were quiet, but in terms of its impact on their operational capacity, I don’t think that there have been some impacts on their capacity.
SG: In the environment that we’re speaking about, there are concerns about the potential of terrorist travel in the now post-pandemic era. We’ve had that problem—for all of us—the fact that during the COVID-19 pandemic, we’ve not been able to travel, not been able to move, our lives have been confined, but increasingly now the ability to move and travel across the world is becoming easier. Does that also mean that for terrorists it will become all the more easy to travel to places for training, recruitment, funding, propaganda? Or have terrorists not really been impacted by the pandemic?
MC: When we look at the data, in 2019 and 2020—when we compare data just to see the impacts of COVID-19 on all terrorist organisations, and, as you said, our lives were all confined under during lockdown—but in 2019, according to one database, the number of terrorist attacks tremendously decreased in metropolitan and urban areas with some increases—slight increases—in conflict zones. But when we look at the U.S. State Department annex counterterrorism report in 2020, I think there was a 13% increase in terrorist instances, and also a 12% increase in the number of fatalities.
So, this data is showing that when we were all in our homes, terrorist organisations were outside, and they just continued to maintain their operational capacity. Also, for example, its more specific when we look at how COVID-19 impacted terrorist organisations or terrorist ideologies. For example, revolutionary groups took advantage of the worsening economy and weak government responses, and for example, they were telling their fighters that the governments are presenting opportunities for only wealthy people and ignoring again the poor people.
So, the second category I can talk about are the far-right extremist groups. Also, we all know that current extremist groups were very active on social media. So, they used digital platforms such as unregulated image board sites or censorship-free discussion platforms or encrypted messaging channels, just to spread their debunked conspiracy theories as a call for violence. Also, in their ideologies on social media, they were saying that democracy is a failed system. But when it comes to jihadist organisations…these jihadist groups are using a divisive version of the Quran and Islam. For example, ISIS core was saying that COVID-19 is God’s wrath upon the West and also [that the] disease is the soldier of Allah.
And for example, when we look at this Uyghur- and al-Qaeda-linked organisation in Syria, the Turkistan Islamic party, they were saying that the outbreak of COVID-19 in China was a punishment for the Chinese government, who is still repressing the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Another example, al-Shabaab was saying to its followers that this disease, COVID-19, has been spread internationally by Crusaders.
So, based on the pillars of their ideologies, terrorist organisations used and then just exploited this pandemic. But as I said in the beginning, data shows that there was no impact on terrorist organisations, so they did maintain their operational capacity.
SG: Speaking about the pandemic and how terrorist organisations have been using it and manipulating it for propaganda, we also know the situation that has unfolded in Afghanistan subsequently, with the return of the Taliban taking over—the fact that, as we’ve been discussing, Ayman al-Zawahiri was found in a house inside the centre of the capital Kabul—where are we at now when it comes to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda? Is Afghanistan potentially going to become a safe haven for terrorists once again, with the example of al-Zawahiri perhaps being a disturbing demonstration of what could unfold?
MC: It has been another question for us, whether Afghanistan again would be a safe haven for al-Qaeda after the Taliban’s takeover. Of course, there were some questions about ISIS Khorasan branch; it is the most active ISIS organisation, and as far as I know, ISIS-K is one of the deadliest organisations in terms of the number of fatalities in the 2020 U.S. State Department annex report. And since the Taliban’s takeover, not only terrorism, but also in all other areas, we can see the failures of the Taliban. For example, Afghanistan’s economy has shrunk 20 or 30%. Also, women are still oppressed, and activists are still being targeted and killed by the Taliban regime. Also, there are human rights violations happening again under the Taliban’s leadership.
Of course, another question was about ethnic tension. And also, so far, we have seen that the Taliban government have failed to unify the country. I think in some regions, especially in northern states in Afghanistan, the ethnic groups, ongoing clashes, I think their numbers have outnumbered the Taliban forces in northern states in Afghanistan. But more specifically when it comes to terrorism, I think in a country where the leader of the Haqqani Network is the Minister of Interior, I don’t think that we can see some effective fight against al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is just enjoying the Taliban’s leadership because Zawahiri, during the takeover, was praising the Taliban’s takeover. And also, he was seeing it like a victory against the Western world. I think also, Zawahiri’s killing is an indicator for us showing how the Taliban is turning a blind eye to al-Qaeda.
And also secondly, I think we need to talk about ISIS-K because the group has increased its capacity and are mostly targeting the Hazara Shias and also targeting Hazara gatherings or maybe their schools. And also, we have seen the spread of ISIS-K and its influence in Tajikistan, in Uzbekistan, also in Pakistan. I think last year, just a few months ago, we saw some attacks by ISIS-K in Uzbekistan and also in Tajikistan. I think also we need to keep our eyes on the TTP, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, also recently in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, we saw this group taking advantage of some security vacuums, left by the Taliban in the country. So now the Taliban again is [offering] a safe haven for al-Qaeda, but the Taliban’s incapacity or security vacuums is really beneficial for ISIS-K, which is now in the world media as one of the deadliest terrorist organisations.
SG: With Afghanistan, there are so many different challenges that exist, which you have identified. Now, one of the other challenges is the narcotics. The Taliban are known notoriously for churning out heroin from the country, which provides a huge amount of financial resource for their agenda. Increasingly, we’re seeing more methamphetamines being produced by the Taliban. You’ve done a lot of research where you have looked at the cocaine trafficking routes between Latin America and the Middle East that have fuelled the drug trade expansion. Do you think it’s conceivable that what you were looking at in Latin America and the Middle East could potentially converge with what is happening in Afghanistan and potentially Pakistan and Central Asia as well?
MC: Latin American drug cartels have inundated the United States and with tonnes of cocaine since the late 1970s and also, they added the European Union market to their drug trade. But then these organisations have been very resourceful, so they began to search for and also prefer less risky routes. And in the last two years, what we have seen when we look at the seizures by law enforcement in Colombia, in Panama, and Brazil—we can talk about an active cocaine drug trafficking route between Latin America and the Middle East. Also, more specifically, when we look at the groups, I can say Hezbollah, and also Sinaloa cartel in Mexico, have some strong linkages with drug trafficking organisations in the Middle East.
So how can it converge with Afghanistan? As you know, Afghanistan has been a production country for heroin. As far as I know, more than 90% of heroin consumed in the Western world, in EU countries, has been transferred from Afghanistan. So [there] was another question for us [about] the Taliban’s capacity to fight against heroin and the drug trafficking. We saw some Taliban bans on poppy cultivation last April. Also, we saw another Taliban ban on the production of methamphetamines. But consider the Taliban government’s capacity, also seeing well-developed networks, criminal networks in the country, also with other organisations, maybe on drug trafficking routes. Also, consider ongoing economic issues, because the Taliban government needs some cash money. So even though there are some bans, we don’t think that the Taliban will be effectively fighting against heroin or methamphetamine. And so far, we haven’t seen any networking between Latin America and Afghanistan, but I think in the short-term, it wouldn’t be wrong to say that we will see increasing poppy cultivation and also heroin or methamphetamine trafficking in Afghanistan, because of, again, the Taliban’s incapacity, or again because of the Taliban maybe needing some cash money.
SG: It’s worth me mentioning here that as part of a DEEP research project, a publication called Narco-Insecurity, Inc. was published which actually looks at those different networks of narcotics that go around the world, including to Europe, which you were mentioning, and also how it fuels the firearms trade as well for the different criminal groups that associate with the Taliban. And that brings me to the other issue I wanted to talk to you about, which is that you’ve done extensive analysis on the prevention of the procurement of arms and explosives by terrorists. How is that changing in the last few years? Or does that stay the same? Are there new, disturbing trends that you’re witnessing, or are the challenges still the same?
MC: When we look at data about terrorist organisations’ attacks, I think very consistently, in the last five years, terrorism databases are recording around eight or nine thousand terrorist incidents. So, we cannot see any tremendous drops in the number of terrorist attacks. Also, when we look at how deadly they are, how brutal they are, terrorism databases are recording more and more casualties and fatalities. This is sending a message that terrorist organisations are now able to procure weapons and explosives, so there is no change. But I want to give you some data showing terrorist organisations’ capacity in procuring arms and weapons or explosives or using them in their attacks. I think in 2020, according to a U.S. State Department annex report, just 13% of the incidents recorded one or two people killed, which meant that just in one terrorist attack, there were at least one or two people killed. But around 70% of the incidents recorded the killing of more than three people in these attacks. So, when we look at the casualty rate, [this is] a number dividing the total number of casualties by the total number of terrorist attacks by a specific organisation. So, these casualty rates are showing us how deadly these organisations are, again, thanks to their capacity using arms and explosives. For example, ISIS-K was a leading organisation with a 15.4 casualty rate, followed by ISIS West Africa at 14.3, and also al-Qaeda [former] group HTS was a third leading organisation with a 7.5 casualty rate. When we look at also the weapon type, this is another indicator of their capacity, arms and explosives capacity. And now they’re able to use biological agents and also some chemical weapons, also some medium-range weapons, which are automatic weapons, rocket launchers, and military grade explosives. Also, they’re able to use these low-range weapons, which are homemade, which are improvised explosive devices, and which are IEDs. So, when I look at, again, their capacity to use various types of highly advanced technological weapons and also the casualty rate and also the terrorist attacks, I can say that we haven’t seen any change in the recent trends on the procurement of arms and explosives of terrorist organisations.
SG: As a final question, we enter the last quarter of 2022; what concerns you in terms of international security, defence, the challenges that exist? What worries you about 2023 that we need to take notice of and be more cautious about?
MC: In terms of terrorism, I would say I think we need to give our attention to ISIS-K after seeing the group’s capacity and the attacks in Afghanistan and how it’s spreading its influence in neighbouring countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Also, I would say we need to look at the Sahel region. Again, ISIS groups, ISIS in the Greater Sahara and the JNIM al-Qaeda group. They are splitting their influence. For example, just in this year, we saw the spread of their terrorist attacks in Togo and Benin, and also in Asia as well by this ISIS and al-Qaeda groups. Also, I think we need to give our focus to far-right extremist and right-wing extremist groups. So recently, we have seen that they are very capable of doing attacks in EU countries, in the U.S., and in Canada. So, in 2023, my expectation would be to look more at two types of terrorism, which is jihadist groups and secondly far-right extremist groups.
SG: Well, these are very important points that you bring to the table for the discussion. Very grateful to you, Mahmut, for providing so much perspective, and with data as well. I think it’s always important to see, statistically, the challenges that exist and to what level they are. So very grateful that you were able to spend the time with us, and let me just thank you again, Associate Professor Mahmut Cengiz. Thank you so much for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive.
MC: My pleasure. Thanks for having me.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.