Key Reflections
* The gas leaks on the Nord Stream pipeline are due to deliberate sabotage, with Russia being the most likely suspect.
* The Kremlin feels that it might lose the war in Ukraine and has resorted to military conscription to reinforce their positions along the frontlines. This has led to Russians fleeing the country, demonstrating the unpopularity of Putin’s mobilisation drive.
* Russia is using private military companies like the Wagner Group and recruiting people from prisons. However, this is not an unusual strategy for Moscow who have utilised this strategy for other conflicts in the Middle East and Africa.
* As winter approaches, it will become harder for Russia and Ukraine to continue fighting as the terrain and conditions become more difficult to navigate.
* The protests in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini, at the hands of the regime’s Guidance Patrol, has created a spark that is now spiralling across Iran with mass protests by men and women. This is emboldening Iran’s civil society.
* Calls to impose tough sanctions on Iran because of the violent tactics used by the Iranian authorities against protesters may not bring about direct change or end the theocratic regime.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
DS: Diana Soller
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
In this episode we speak to Diana Soller, a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations at NOVA University Lisbon. She is also a columnist on global affairs for the newspaper Observer, amongst others, and is the author of numerous articles in specialist journals and book chapters related to international politics. Previously, Diana was also an advisor at the National Defence Institute.
Diana Soller, very warm welcome to NATO DEEP Dive.
DS: Thank you, I’m very happy to be here with you.
SG: Let’s look at several developments that are happening right now in Europe in particular. On the 26th of September 2022, there were four gas leaks on to Nord Stream pipelines that have been reported to have actually occurred because of blasts that were detected. Sabotage is strongly suspected. Nord Stream one and Nord Stream two pipelines were damaged. And it comes at a time when Nord Stream has been at the centre of an energy clash between Europe and Russia, since the invasion of Ukraine in late February. Do you believe that there was deliberate sabotage in these pipelines? And if so, who could the culprit be?
DS: Well, I believe that there is no other possibility than sabotage. The sort of damage that the pipelines have gone through, it’s impossible that it was just an accident. All experts are saying so. I think it’s sabotage, it’s almost impossible not to have been. If so, we have to ask first, who is the loser of this sabotage, and I think that the loser is Europe. Although many analysts say that it will be easier to just turn off the pipelines now there is no such issue anymore, and any gas coming from Russia cannot come anymore.
So, heading to this, this kind of sabotage is not possible by a small power, by someone that does not have high-tech submarines or equipment to do something like that. So, the possible suspects, let’s put it this way, are, in my perspective, the most probable Russia. Although many people say that Russia is jeopardising itself by doing something like this. I also believe that this is an act of war. With a sort of MO of other acts of sabotage that Russia has done throughout its history. Russia is the type of country that prefers to lose rather than to be defeated. And so, I think this is the sort of thing that Russia would do in a moment of despair. And I think Russia is at the point where it feels encircled, and it has difficulties to get off this encirclement. So, I think this might have been an act of despair from Russia.
SG: You mentioned that Russia is in a moment of despair. We know that right now Russian men are facing potential military conscription, and a lot have now fled Russia, in the wake of President Vladimir Putin’s partial military mobilisation order. The exodus has signalled the unpopularity of that order to the extent that people are willing to leave the country to avoid being sent to fight in Ukraine, and it’s believed that as many as 300,000 could be called up to service. Do you think that Putin’s move is an act of desperation, as the botched invasion now reaches the seven-month mark, and that the Ukrainian military has, in recent weeks, regained swathes of territory and seized the momentum?
DS: I’m not sure if this is exactly a call of desperation. What I really think is that Russia feels that the Kremlin feels that, at this point, at least conventionally, it might lose the war, which is something that the Kremlin will try to avoid in any way possible. So, I think we should see this mobilisation as something that is seen as really necessary, because although the Russians are known to be patriotic and supportive of the Kremlin’s wars, this is the first time since putting become president of Russia that common people, although with military training or some military relationship with the state in the past, are called to wage war.
So, this is an unpopular measure. I would not make a correlation between the support of the Russian people for the war and the possibility of conscription and mobilisation, but I think this is the kind of measure that Putin would not want to impose. And by imposing it, it shows that, at least, the Kremlin feels that the odds are against them so they resort to this, which would be a last resort measure. And as you said, the official order that was issued by President Putin foresees the possibility of increasing the mobilisation or even reaching conscription, which would be, I would say, despair. For now, I would say it’s a measure that shows that Russia feels the odds are against Russia in this war, at least in conventional terms.
SG: There are also reports that Russia is using private military companies like the Wagner Group, to recruit people from prisons, and also hire mercenaries. What does this tell us?
DS: It tells us two things. The first is precisely what I said in the last answer, that Putin didn’t want to resort to mobilisation. The second thing is this Wagner Group, and the way it recruits, is something that is not alien to the Kremlin or previous wars that Russia fought. So, I’m not tremendously surprised. Russians have a way of waging wars, and this is something that we have known since World War Two, that implies and contemplates the use of mercenaries, especially violent ones, to actually play an important part in Russia’s wars. So, this is not absolutely surprising. But it’s not positive either.
SG: Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has addressed both houses of Russia’s Parliament, and he’s announced the annexation of four regions in Ukraine, that Russian troops have been occupying, and he’s justified it by claiming that the referendums that were held in Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk regions support this. NATO countries have said that they will not recognise the results of the referendum. What is your take on those referendums? And what happens next in terms of Russia’s occupation of Ukraine? Is this Putin drawing a line or is this conflict going to continue?
DS: I’m not sure how the Ukrainians are going to react to this. First, I would like to say something which I think has not been emphasised, and I think it’s important. In Luhansk and Donetsk, the referendums covered the entire provinces. It’s not the case, neither in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. So, for people to understand, we’re not talking about entire provinces, but just little parts in them.
I think it’s Putin drawing a line, a juridical slash political line, which makes these territories part of Russia’s jurisprudence, territories that belong to Russia and that are Russian territory. The immediate consequence of this is that if Ukraine tries to seize back these territories that internationally, not only NATO, but internationally are not recognised as Russian territories, Russia might respond with the degree of commitment that it has been using for its territory. Meaning that if Ukraine tries to seize them back, Russia has legitimacy, from a Russian perspective, of using other sorts of wars, other sorts of weapons other than conventional. That means that chemical or biological weapons can be used, and tactical military weapons can be used, because any attack by Ukraine will be seen as an attack on Russian territory. So, actually, what changes is the commitment of the Russian doctrine towards these territories.
And now, it depends on two things. The first is how the Ukrainians are going to react to this red line that Russia has drawn around those territories that are legally Ukrainian in the light of international law. And the other thing is how the providers of military equipment for Ukraine are going to see and to interpret this new political reality. If they decide that Russia is not entitled to those territories, and Ukraine has the right to claim them back militarily, Russia has a free hand to use other sorts of weapons, and then the choice goes to Russia. And this leads us to a point where we are entering the most dangerous moment of this conflict. Decisions now are very difficult to guess, because what’s at stake is really, really dangerous. So, we’ll have to wait and see.
There are two possibilities regarding timing of these decisions. As everyone knows, winter is coming, probably there’s a window of three weeks to one month to fight before winter settles, and it’s almost impossible for each side to continue conventional warfare. So, there is a choice between not choosing until spring comes or choosing right now and creating a chain reaction, that may be very dangerous. Prudence will be to stop at this point, the seizing of territory from Russia. We will see what the decision of Ukrainians and its allies will be.
SG: Some NATO countries have imposed sanctions on the people that were involved in organising the so-called flawed referendums that were taken in the provinces now occupied by Russian troops in Ukraine. We know that there have been a raft of other sanctions imposed on Russia since the start of the war itself. Do those sanctions stem Russia’s aggression in Ukraine? Do they have any impact?
DS: First of all, I think what we should say is that I’ve never seen any war won by waging sanctions. The other thing is that sanctions have evolved since the beginning until now, in their spirit. In the beginning, there were ways that the European Union, especially the European countries, found to try to stop and dissuade Russia from continuing to wage the war, by inflicting, I would say, suffering to the common people, and tried to make them hold the government accountable in one hand, and on the other hand, to try to deny Russia, some vital elements to keep on waging the war and make it difficult, more difficult to wage the war.
I think they evolved since then, and I think now they are mainly punitive sanctions. They want to punish Russia for what it is doing. The last package of sanctions that the EU is trying to approve, because of the speech of Putin a few days ago, saying that it will increase the degree of threat, that he will escalate the war. So, this is a direct response to that. And then the second speech about the sanctions is about punishing Russia for the referendums. So, I think there is a change in the spirit of the sanctions since they started. I don’t think that their outcome has been very hurtful for Russia so far, in the political sense, in the sense that the regime has been standing despite the political sanctions. It did not break the will of the regime to keep on waging the war. It might have hurt the people, but we don’t have the actual numbers and the actual impact on the Russian economy of these sanctions. So, we can only guess that it hasn’t been hurtful enough for people to question the government in a very systematic way so far.
Additionally, we have a problem with the setback of the sanctions, which means that the European economy—and the American economy also—are suffering a lot from what is going on. And although the inflation rates were mounting since—and are still a result of—the COVID-19 extraordinary measures, they are also part of the war effort that Europe has to make, and the US have to make to try to maintain the level of sanctions toward Russia. Obviously, the rise of the price of energy is a direct consequence of the sanctions. So, I think we have here a deadlock. NATO countries and the United States and Europe jointly have, I would say, waged economic war towards Russia. And I think it’s too late to step back. And an increase of the sanctions would mean that the economic war has not been successful from the part of Europe and the US, so the Ukrainian allies. So, I don’t think they can actually step back, but I don’t think, at the same time, that they are getting the results they really want to get. So, I think that this will go on for political reasons. I don’t think this has the positive sort of impact that they were expecting it to have.
SG: Speaking about sanctions, let’s pivot to Iran, as I know you look at that issue in detail as well. And this is largely because of the ongoing series of protests and civil unrest against the regime in Iran that began in Tehran on the 16th of September 2022. The protests were a reaction to the death of Mahsa Amini, who was a 22-year-old Iranian woman who died whilst in police custody. She was beaten by the so-called Guidance Patrol, also known as the morality police of Iran, who accused her of wearing an improper hijab in violation of Iran’s mandatory hijab law. That incident created a spark that is now spiralling across Iran with mass protests by men and women. How significant are these protests?
DS: In terms of the maintenance of the regime, again, I never saw a regime, especially one like this, falling due to sanctions because of [opposition to] women’s rights protests. However, in terms of its impact in the international community, I think they are very important for a matter of awareness. Although women’s rights are something that, especially in Muslim countries, and especially in a country like Iran, which is a theocracy, are not going to change from one day to another, this awareness precludes something that happens in Europe and the United States very often, which is cultural relativism, something that I think is unacceptable. So, my hope, once I believe that this is not going to influence the course of the Iranian regime, is the rise of awareness with consequences, especially in the civil society. I also don’t believe in a world civil society sort of idea. But I think that individual NGOs, women’s rights watches, and these sorts of international political actors should use this unfortunate event to raise awareness.
SG: These are important points that you make. In terms of a final question on what we’re talking about, some European Union nations want the EU to impose sanctions on Iran following the tragic death of Mahsa Amini. The bloc that has been responsible in terms of dealing with Iran when it comes to safeguarding nuclear issues that are of concern—some are concerned that if sanctions are put in, that that could further ostracise Iran, that they could become more rogue, more unpredictable. And then there are others that believe that it’s now time to impose tougher, stricter sanctions because of the fact that there are very aggressive and violent tactics being used by the Iranian police on the streets. We know that hundreds of civilians have been killed and injured as a result of these protests. Where do you stand on the sanctions for Iran? I know you feel that they don’t necessarily bring change to the situation and, as you mentioned about Russia, that wars are not won based on sanctions, regimes are not brought down because of sanctions. But is it viable to have them in this instance? Or would that be counterproductive?
DS: I think you already guessed my answer, which is, I don’t think sanctioning regimes this way actually helps to heal whatever is wrong with them. Again, these sanctions would be limited. And I don’t really think that these sorts of sanctions actually help to change anything. I think they end up backfiring on the people who already have so many difficulties. What I think that Europe, Great Britain, United States—when I say Europe, I’m always counting the United Kingdom, although I know it doesn’t belong to the EU anymore, I’m speaking of broader Europe—what they should do is try to engage with the Iranian regime. I mean, do it the old-fashioned way, with carrots and sticks. That’s the way that’s the way it works. That’s the way it always works in the sense of real change. So, what I think is that partners who are actually willing to introduce changes in Iran, rather, to stop or to dissuade it from using or creating a nuclear weapons programme, either of protecting human rights, they have to use the old-fashioned sort of approach, which is dialoguing, but dialoguing using very strong dissuasion sort of measures. And, again, I don’t think sanctions are the kind of dissuasion that changes the sort of governments and these sorts of regimes.
So, please deal with Iran—but please deal with Iran and deal with Russia in a language that they do understand and in a language that they do respond to. And many times I feel a bit frustrated because I think we’re talking about two different worlds—a world made of countries like Iran and Russia, where they actually only respond to force or the threat of force, and countries like the European countries who think they can dissuade a country from doing something by waging economic sanctions, by publicly scolding them, by calling their attention for respect of human rights. That’s not the way the world works. It never was. And I think Europe, especially Europe, because I think the UK and the US have known this for a long time, but Europe has to understand.
And now I’m going to use a metaphor that is very Portuguese. I mean, the Carnation Revolution, the one that created the conditions for our transition from dictatorship to democracy, it was a very peaceful revolution. There were no comebacks. And the symbol of our revolution is a little boy putting a carnation in a gun, in a machine gun. And I think somehow this is very symbolic for all Europe. But this was actually a very specific and unlikely sort of revolution because the dictatorship government was already falling, so the only thing that was needed was a little push, which made our revolution very peaceful. But this idea of putting flowers in guns, it’s just doesn’t work. It only works when you have a very powerful state behind you, like the United States, and the United States is no longer the sole superpower that can do everything it wants. So, the world has changed, Europe has to change accordingly, and what has not changed is the way that countries like Iran and Russia see the world and act in the world. The one that has to adapt is Europe. The ones that have to adapt are Europeans and not the ones like Iran or Russia that are actually acting as they always did.
SG: Well, you’ve provided a lot of interesting perspective and food for thought, and we’re very grateful that you could join us. Diana Soller, thank you again for being on NATO DEEP Dive.
DS: Thank you so much for inviting me. It was a pleasure.
SG: It’s been our pleasure.
Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.