Key Reflections
* The gathering and data flow of signal (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) have been impeded by the pandemic and emerging technology used by hostile actors.
* Canada has three primary investigative priorities: counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and counter-proliferation. Within this, foreign interference is playing a more prominent role.
* Intelligence agencies and law enforcement need more resources to deal with the multiplicity of threats ranging from violent ideological movements to state-sponsored clandestine activity.
* China is getting more attention in the West especially over issues pertaining to their actions against Taiwan, the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and those from Hong Kong.
* The threat from al-Qaeda, ISIS, and affiliates has not disappeared in the West. Plots continue to be detected and foiled.
* The repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their wives and children from camps in Syria is a massive dilemma with no obvious solution. Security concerns remain. Prosecution of those behind the most egregious actions should be pursued in Syria and Iraq.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
PG: Phil Gurski
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
In this episode, we speak with Phil Gurski, the President and CEO of Borealis Threat and Risk Consulting. Phil worked as a senior strategic analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) specialising in Al Qaeda and ISIS-inspired violent extremism and radicalisation. Prior to that Phil served as a senior multilingual analyst at the Communications Security Establishment. He was also a senior special advisor in the National Security Directorate at Public Safety Canada. Phil is the author of several books including The Threat from Within: Recognizing Al Qaeda-inspired Radicalization and Terrorism in the West and Western Foreign Fighters: the threat to homeland and international security.
Phil Gurski, welcome to NATO DEEP Dive.
PG: Thank you, Sajjan. It’s a real honour and pleasure to be with you on this podcast.
SG: It’s great to have you with us. You’ve got a wealth of knowledge on so many security-related issues. You’ve written multiple books, and you keep providing perspective on the most topical challenges that exist globally. One of the things I wanted to start by asking you are the challenges when it comes to collecting intelligence, both against terrorist groups and hostile state actors during the pandemic. What were those challenges? And do some of those problems still exist?
PG: It’s a great question. And I do think so, despite the fact that it’s been seven, almost eight years now that I’ve retired from the intelligence community, I did spend 32 years in SIGINT and in HUMINT, and so I have an understanding of how intelligence is collected, how it’s processed, how its analysed, and how it’s distributed to clients. I think there are a couple of things, Sajjan, that happened during COVID. First of all was obviously the Canadian government, like many other Canadian government departments, and even private sector, engaged in a period where people weren’t going to work. They were working from home. We all, I think, had far too many Zoom meetings over the past couple of years, or Microsoft Teams, and clearly you can’t do that in intelligence, for the simple reason that you’re dealing with information that is extremely sensitive in nature, including in terms of the sources that you collect. And so, sitting from your home and talking about human sources or SIGINT sources isn’t going to cut it because of the technology—you couldn’t be assured that your conversations aren’t being interrupted, intercepted, and that your secrets would be out there. Of course, there’s nothing more sacrosanct than sources. We say in intelligence that we can talk about many things, but we don’t talk about sources or methods.
So, I certainly think that the pandemic certainly put a crimp in how these organisations operated, even here in Canada. Secondly, obviously, if you’re meeting with human sources during a pandemic like COVID, you have to take certain precautions. You have to mask up, you have to maintain a certain distance. So, I think all of these things were extremely—they hampered, to some extent, the collection of intelligence.
I would also add that an ongoing issue—it affects SIGINT agencies, it affects all kinds of intelligence agencies—is simply the incredible speed of technological development. Now, when I worked in SIGINT in the ‘80s and ‘90s…telex was the sort of the technology du jour for many years in the ‘60, ‘70s, and ‘80s. Well, telex of course died out. Remember when fax machines came out, and we had to adjust to, how do you intercept a fax? How do you decompress it? How do you break it out? And since that time, I’m not a technological guru, but I’m sure your listeners are well-aware that the number of platforms that are out there, in terms of being able to collect the information, has expanded exponentially, and as an intelligence service, you have to have the technological wherewithal to deal with that.
The second thing I would argue, which is only getting worse, is the volume. And towards the end of my career in SIGINT, I was actually in charge of collection and data flow. And my data flow specialists were telling me that they couldn’t keep up with the volume. And the analogy they used was like it was drinking from a firehose—that was in 1998-1999. A similar analogy now would be like drinking from Niagara Falls. The volumes of information are just so incredibly high. The amount of data that’s being sent back and forth around the world is almost immeasurable. And then of course, most of that data is garbage, from an intelligence perspective. So, the old analogy of finding a needle in a haystack, the haystack keeps getting bigger, but the needle’s not getting any bigger. So, I think there’s a lot of challenges for security intelligence and law enforcement agencies to keep up with technological development, to keep up with advances and to figure out how do we work in a new environment. As you’re probably well-aware, many industries, including the Canadian government. It looks like this working from home is going to become a semi-permanent solution. You work from home three days a week, you come into the office two days a week. You can’t do that in intelligence. So, I think there are a lot of challenges going forward in terms of what the pandemic illustrated that we were facing, and I can’t see the situation getting any easier for those agencies in the foreseeable future.
SG: And that’s raised a lot of thoughts in my mind as to the different dynamics that unfold from this. You used the analogy of needle in the haystack. So, one thing that came to mind—I know you’ve researched this—we’re currently dealing with Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine. The UK has had to experience Russian activity on its soil, with Russian spies carrying out clandestine activities, including poisoning people. You’ve researched the fact that there have been Russian spies within our own respective countries across the West. How does one deal with that in this environment, as you mentioned, with the technology gap becoming all that more complicated?
PG: I think the point you’re making here is that things have gotten so much more complicated. So again, if I go back to my early career, I started during the Cold War, back in 1983. We knew who the enemy was—that was the Soviet Union and its allies. That was our focus. That’s what drew our attention. All of our efforts were basically directed against that particular nation [and] its activities—largely military, but also economic and political. And as a consequence, it helps you to focus your attention. I remember that when I was hired back in ‘83, I was one of 12 people, recent university graduates, and they called us ‘the rest of the world.’ So, we did everything else but the Soviet Union. Out of an operation of 1,000 people, there were 12 of us that looked at the rest of the world. In some ways, it would be nice to go back to those days—not the threat of nuclear war and the constant sort of sabre-rattling of the West and East back then, but today, we’re faced with, as you mentioned, not just Russian activities throughout NATO countries, Chinese activities throughout NATO countries as well. There has been recent reporting in Canadian media that China has set up police stations across Canada, which they say is simply to help people with their passports and information, but no, it’s that they collect intelligence on Chinese-Canadians and put pressure on them to not criticise China in Canada. Then there’s the terrorist threat be it the far-right or the far-left.
It worries me that intelligence agencies and law enforcement are not necessarily getting any bigger in terms of their resources. And as a consequence, you’re being asked to do more with less. And what you try to do is prioritise where the biggest threat is, but how do you measure the threat from, let’s say, Russian trolls or Russian cyberattacks versus possible terrorist attacks? How do you make that calculus that this threat somehow merits more attention than that threat? I would not want to be necessarily back in intelligence, although I miss it terribly. It would be a really difficult set of decisions to make on where to allocate your investigations. You only have so many surveillance teams, for example, only so many intercept capabilities. You only have so many investigators to recruit human sources. So, I think we’re faced with a situation right now where the multiplicity of threats, and I’ve only touched on a couple of them, seems to be growing greater than our agencies’ ability to monitor them effectively. Not to say they’re not going to do the job—I think they are doing their job—but they’re being forced to do a heck of a lot more than perhaps their resource allocation, in a perfect world, should allow them to do.
SG: You said, ‘multiplicity of threats.’ From a Canadian perspective, what is the current priority? Does it continue to be transnational terrorism, or has it increasingly become state actors? You mentioned Chinese presence in Canada—that’s interesting, I wasn’t aware of the case study you mentioned—and then you were also talking about Russia. What tends to weigh heavily on the minds of decision-makers in Ottawa?
PG: China is getting a lot of attention. We in the security intelligence realm, we’ve been warning about China for 40 years now—that China is not an ally, they’re not a friend. They are engaged in technological theft. We believe that many Canadian companies basically had their ideas stolen by the Chinese. They’re engaging in the monitoring and putting pressure on Canadian citizens of Chinese extraction to force them to shut up when it comes to criticism of China. And the Canadian government finally seems to be getting the message. A minister just recently said that we have to reassess our China policy. So, Canada for the longest time was happy to trade with China, and they realised that if we trade with China, we can’t upset them by calling into question their government and criticising them for their actions abroad, or their actions against the Uyghurs, the Tibetans, the people in Hong Kong, etc. That is definitely a priority from a security service perspective.
So just to give your listeners a sense, the security service—the CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service—has three primary investigative priorities: counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and counter-proliferation. We also throw foreign interference in there, which is kind of a subset of counter-intelligence. And you have to allocate resources to address all those. Counter-terrorism ruled the roost for the past two decades. In the post-9/11 period, from an operational tempo perspective, most of the resources were dedicated to counter-terrorism, for obvious reasons. We’d just seen the single greatest attack in history—3,000 dead in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. We detected a lot of plots here in Canada that were Islamist extremist in nature. We foiled them, thanks to great intelligence and law enforcement. But even there, we’re seeing a bit of a shift. Over the past, I’d say, five to six years, the far-right, however you define it—white supremacist, white nationalist neo-Nazi, the list goes on and on—has risen in terms of its threat level. And this is a bit of a change for us. Because we did look at the far-right quite extensively in the 1990s, and in all honesty, to quote a good friend of mine, ‘These guys couldn’t make a cheese sandwich.’ They were incapable; they had no intention of doing anything in Canada; and as a consequence, they weren’t seen as a priority.
That has changed. We had a significant right-wing terrorist attack in a mosque in Quebec City in January of 2017, so five and a half years ago, and there has been a reallocation of resources away from Islamist terrorism towards the far-right. What worries me though is that the jihadi threat hasn’t gone away, certainly not in the United Kingdom, through Western Europe, we’re still seeing plots that have been detected and foiled. We’re seeing the odd attack here and there of course globally. Islamist extremism represents by far the single greatest terrorist threat on Earth; it kills thousands of people a year, whereas the far-right is nowhere near that.
SG: You mentioned that the jihadist threat hasn’t gone away. We know that there remains this problem that is challenging and difficult to address, and that is the repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters—FTFs—and their wives and children, who are now young adults effectively, because they’ve been living in all of these camps inside Syria, and that status quo effectively remains as a status quo. What do we do about those FTFs and their families, Phil? Is it just that they stay in Syria or that there’s an actual practical way to bring them back, prosecute them, or for those that may not be radical, potentially reintegrate them?
PG: Well, how much time do we have? I actually wrote a whole book, Western Foreign Fighters, back in 2017 that was published by Rowman and Littlefield in the United States to talk about this issue. But in brief, from a NATO perspective, we’ve seen a real variety of responses. Some countries have repatriated women and children, even men. Some countries want nothing to do with them. France has been a holdout for the longest time. Canada, typical Canadian sort of sitting on the fence, sometimes we do, sometimes we don’t. We have brought a few home. The problem is, if you do bring them home, how do you prosecute them, based on what? Because the evidence and the witnesses are all in Syria and Iraq. And you’re not going to fly the witnesses—the Yazidis and the women who were raped and the children who were abused—you’re not going to fly the back of Canada or England or France for trial. So, we did try to put one person on trial, and it ended up being a complete failure, and the person was exonerated. Gathering the evidence to stand the test of a Western court, as opposed to a Syrian or Iraqi court, is going to be difficult.
I have always advocated that the trial should be held in situ, in Syria and Iraq. That’s where the crimes were committed, the Syrian and Iraqi people and the Yazidis, I would say, and the Kurds have a right to see justice done for crimes committed against them and their families and their communities. The problem, of course, is that Iraqi and Syrian justice isn’t quite the same as Western justice. There’s capital punishment, for example, allegations of torture, no true defence of the people on trial, so that’s problematic. As a consequence, most Western countries have sat on their hands. Now, the exception I do make, Sajjan, is I think the children should be repatriated as soon as possible. And I would even go further; the children should be repatriated and removed from their parents, because the parents brought them to Islamic State. The children didn’t choose to go there. Some were born under the caliphate, for example. The parents were the ones that made a conscious decision, fully aware of the consequences of joining a heinous terrorist group like Islamic State. I would argue that makes them unfit parents, and many people have been very critical of me in this regard, but I have seen instances of other countries—in Central Asia, for example—that have repatriated children, put them with extended family, or worst-case scenario, state care.
This issue is not going away. There are those that say “we have to bring them home because we have an obligation”—I only have to cite the Shamima Begum case in the United Kingdom, which is one that seems to be never going away right now—“that we owe it to them”, and that “they have to be seen to have served justice,” and more importantly, “if we leave them in the camps like al-Hol and other camps in Syria they’ll radicalise further and they’ll become a terrorist threat down the road.” That is possible.
However, if you put your security hat on, if somebody is sitting in a camp in al-Hol, they’re not posing a threat to London, or Manchester, or Paris, or Toronto, because they’re too far away. Secondly, if you do repatriate them you have to monitor them. You have to investigate them. Are they still radicalised? Do they still hue to the Islamic State ideology? Do they pose a threat to national security? And we did have a case back in 2018 of an ISIS wannabe, who got as far as Turkey, was turned back, and when she came home, she carried out a terrorist attack in a hardware store. Now luckily, she wasn’t very competent, she didn’t really injure anybody, but she well could have, and we have seen attacks by returnees in other countries throughout the NATO alliance.
So, it’s a very tricky question to which there is no single answer. And I think that if you’re a politician in a Western country, standing up and saying, “let’s bring back the ISIS terrorist” is, as one person said, “political suicide.” The public don’t want them back. And if, heaven forbid, you have a terrorist attack carried out on your soil by a returnee, the public wants to know why did you bring them back? If you’d left them there eight people wouldn’t have died in Manchester or Leeds or whatever. So, I think it’s a very delicate political question and as a consequence, most countries have just basically punted this ball down the field. They want nothing to do with it and so, I would expect more dithering in the months and years to come.
SG: You mentioned the fact that the young children should potentially be brought back to their respective countries because they’re innocent, they’re not the ones that made that choice. I guess the dilemma that exists is that some of these young children, as I was mentioning earlier, they’ve now become young adults, and they have seen awful things that none of us have been exposed to. They were part of ISIS propaganda videos; they were forced to carry out executions. There’s this concern in some circles that it would be very hard to reintegrate them because of the mental scars that they carry, but still feel that there is a more viable way to bring them back into society.
PG: I think so. I’m not a child psychologist. But I do know that children are more—the younger you are the more resilient you’re psychologically and mentally. I saw a heart-breaking video, Sajjan, a couple of weeks ago about a young boy in Iraq or Syria, whose parents fought for the caliphate, and I believe his parents—maybe his mother’s alive, his father died. And he basically was a mini-ISIS terrorists at the age of six. He was constantly angry, he would pretend to shoot people, he pretended to put IEDs in the middle of the road. This kid is six years old. And the ones that are older than that, the 12-year-olds, the 13- and 15-year-olds, we have a real problem because we have seen terrorist attacks that have been planned by people in their middle teens.
So, they become subject to an investigation by MI5, or CSIS, or the FBI, or whatever. And we in the West, rightfully, I think, look upon young offenders, i.e., those under the age of 18 in most of our countries, as being treated separately. For lack of maturity, your mind hasn’t developed fully as a human etc., but if you do pose a serious threat to national security, a 15-year-old can do a lot of damage. A 15-year-old can get a gun, or a knife, or whatever, or build a bomb and carry out an attack.
So, it’s very, very tricky, but I do think that if there’s any hope for any kind of rehabilitation to get them off this pathway, it’s a much greater chance to work the younger you are, whereas the people in their 20s, 30s, and 40s—yes, there are deradicalization programmes, I’m aware of them. But I keep telling people the lesson for all of us is the Fishmonger Hall Attack back in 2019, where somebody who had graduated from a prison deradicalization programme was lying and he killed two social workers before he himself was killed.
You know, Sajjan, when you’re working in security intelligence, you live by a motto that’s not fair, but it’s true. “You’re only as good as your last failure.” Nobody really cares when you get it right. Everybody points fingers when you get it wrong. So, again, if you were to bring back a 15 year old and say, “we want to rescue this child, we want to rehabilitate them, reintegrate them into society” and that 15 year old takes out a knife and stabs two people to death on the metro or on the tube, and then essentially commits acts of terrorism, people want to say, “well, why didn’t you leave that person in a camp in Iraq?” It’s not fair, but that’s the nature of public opinion, that’s the nature of what happens the aftermath of a terrorist attack.
SG: Sure, and speaking of teenagers, we’re talking about people that left as young children, uprooted, they get radicalised, they’re exposed to the propaganda of ISIS. And then on the other side, you have this new—not new movement—but an emerging, growing movement of incels. Where you’ve got these teenagers—incels being ‘involuntary celibates’—people who are increasingly getting radicalised online, their hatred of women [and] misogynistic doctrine tends to dominate their lives. Is the incel movement a major concern that we should be prioritising on? I ask this because there have been examples in Canada of incel terrorist attacks.
PG: Great question and a very contentious one. So, the Canadian government has classified violent incels as terrorists, I disagree 100% with that classification. First of all, most incels are not violent, I wouldn’t even call it a movement, it’s a gathering of people who happen to share their grief that they can’t form meaningful relationships with members of the opposite sex for a whole host of reasons, and some of them blame themselves, some of them blame society. There’s all kinds of [reasons].
I just had a podcast with journalists on this, that’s on my website that goes into details. To me, if an incel is violent and actually kills a woman, I’ll get back to that in a second, that to me is a case of violent misogyny not a case of terrorism. I don’t classify incels as terrorists because ‘incelism’ is not an ideology, it’s not a political system. And under Canadian law, and I think under many laws of NATO countries, terrorism has to be either ideological, political, or religious in nature. That’s what the Canadian criminal code says. I don’t see ‘incelism’ as an ideology. Many people disagree with me. Now there have been incels that have adopted far right ideology, such as white supremacism, male supremacism, etc. Maybe that’s a little bit different.
But there have been cases in Canada, as you know, but the problem is that these cases don’t really support the notion that this is terrorism. So, the most famous case is a man called Alek Minassian, who, back in 2018, drove a van down a major thoroughfare in Toronto killing 11 people and wounding 20. He was found guilty, not of terrorism but of first-degree murder and attempted murder. And in her ruling, the judge, quite categorically stated—Alek Minassian claimed he was doing it in honour of Elliot Rodger, who was the individual in San Diego that carried out an attack in 2013—the judge found that Alec Minassian was not an incel, he lied. He lied because he wanted more notoriety. Alek Minassian was just a terribly mixed-up young man who decided to kill people, whether or not it’s because he couldn’t get a relationship is rather irrelevant at this point. But the judge found he was not an incel.
Then we had an attack in Toronto in 2020. The trial has actually just finished now. Where the young man killed a massage parlour therapist and injured two others, he pleaded guilty to first degree murder. But the Crown Prosecution of Canada says, “we’re going to retry him on terrorism.” Which begs the question why? He’s already pleaded guilty to first degree murder. He’ll already get the maximum sentence under Canadian law; you don’t get more years for being a terrorist than being a murderer.
So, I have pushed back against this notion that violent incels are terrorism. In terms of whether it should be prioritised, yes, insofar as you’ve got that sort of mixing of a very, very small number of violent incels who also hold right wing extremists’ Ideological views. In that case, it would be part and parcel of your right-wing investigations. You don’t need a separate incel desk dealing with the incels, at least based on what I’ve seen. And I do think that a lot of attention has been paid to this. I think too much attention has been paid to it. But again, you’ve had some very high-profile murders in this country and as a consequence, the government is waking up and saying we should do something about this. But what it should do, going back to my earlier point Sajjan, how many resources do you have? You’ve got finite resources and if the government keeps piling on do this, do this, do this. You start spreading very thin, whereby you get to be a kilometre wide and a centimetre deep, and that’s never good when you work in security intelligence.
SG: Well, the challenge of course, is, as you mentioned, the resources. I think with the incel movement, it is very multifaceted. I also don’t think it necessarily will apply to one particular ideology, because you see people that are misogynistic that are tied to ISIS and al-Qaeda as well, and they’re not necessarily got much in common with say the people who carried out those attacks in California and Toronto, other than their hatred for women, which is an odd commonality that they seem to share when it comes to radicalization.
PG: But there’s also, sorry Sajjan one small point, there’s also incels who are far left, they believe in far-left causes and again, for your listeners, they may not know that the term incel is actually a Canadian term. And it was invented by a Canadian woman back in the 1990s. She said, “I’m not happy I’m not in a relationship I’m involuntarily celibate.” So, it was a Canadian woman who had nothing to do with terrorism that invented the term of the 1990s.
SG: So, the angles that we’re looking at seem to be very multi-pronged, in the sense that we’re looking at the challenges of individuals. We’re looking at transnational terrorist groups, and we’ve also been talking about state actors as well. As a final question to throw at you, you mentioned China a few times in our discussion. Just now, the 20th Party Congress took place in Beijing, where Xi Jinping was given a third term, as the paramount leader of China. Where does that situate China in terms of its relationship with the West? Do we expect anything to change? Could things be more positive? Or should we expect more challenges with China to come in the next five years?
PG: Definitely very much the latter. Xi Jinping has essentially tried to recast himself as the new Mao Zedong, as the paramount leader in China. They’ve been very aggressive, of course against Taiwan. They’ve put a million Uyghurs in concentration camps in Xinjiang province, which they call re-education centres. They’re putting pressure on Tibetans; I was reading some interesting articles in The Economist about this. The whole Belt and Road Initiative is a very worrisome initiative from a Western perspective because it’s gaining influence in much of South Asia and Africa.
The bottom line is China was never really our friend to begin with. We certainly had a very robust economic relationship with China, which is neither good nor bad depending on how you want to see it. Factories closed in North America and Europe and went to China. So, we lost jobs, but we got cheaper products. So, maybe it was a bit of a trade-off. It seems that we’re on the verge of an even more aggressive Chinese government, now that Xi Jinping has got his third term. I’m guessing that security, intelligence, and militaries, so we’re talking about NATO partners, are going to see China more from the threat lens than from the international alliance trend going forward. Depending on what China does with Russia, of course, they’ve been rather supportive of the Putin invasion of Ukraine to date, we’ve seen China’s relations with the Iranians improving and with the Saudis. To me, we’re going to have to beef up our resources looking at China because I don’t see their relationship getting better anytime soon. The same time, whether or not China will eventually invade Taiwan to bring it back into the sort of bosom of the Chinese state, I don’t know. But it seems to me that we’re going to be speaking of China more from a rival perspective, rather than an ally or a friend perspective going forward. And that’s going to have the concomitant demands on resources we’ve already talked about several times in this podcast.
I don’t see a silver lining in this cloud going forward. And as I mentioned earlier, even my government, which has been rather reticent when it comes to being critical of China, is finally standing up and saying, “yes, what China represents is not in Canada’s interest, we want to join the international community in condemning the situation Xinjiang etc, etc.” So, I think we’re in for some rough waters ahead when it comes to the relationship with the PRC.
SG: Well, you certainly laid out a lot of the problems and challenges, and resources that are going to get stretched right across the board. But it’s been fascinating to have this conversation with you, I’ve known you for a long time. So, I’m really glad that we’ve had this opportunity to look at so many different facets of international security. Well, let me just thank you again, Phil Gurski, it’s been a pleasure to have you on NATO DEEP Dive.
PG: It’s been an honour as well, Sajjan. I’m sorry, I was so negative, but I tried to be a realist as opposed to somebody who believes in unicorns and rainbows, but no, it was a great conversation and I really do value you reaching out to me to be part of this. I’ve listened to some of your guests before and it really is an honour to be in the same ballpark as some of the guests you’ve had on your podcast so far.
SG: Well, we’re very humbled to have you as well as a key part of providing the perspectives that we need to hear even if they’re not all unicorns and rainbows.
PG: Thank you.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.