Key Reflections
* Iran benefitted tactically from Hamas’ attack on Israel, however, it has been more cautious in its strategic approach, opting against attacking Israel directly itself. This is due to a lack of widespread domestic support, Israel’s military readiness, and China and Russia’s uncommitted stance on the current conflict.
* In the aftermath of the Hamas operation, Iran has taken the advantage to drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia and Israel, who were on the path to diplomatic normalisation prior to 7 October 2023.
* The U.S. needs to send a message to the Houthis and other regional militias that it will not tolerate attacks on its military bases, personnel, or interests in the Middle East.
* Great power competition is not just limited to the Asia-Pacific. It takes place all over the world, particularly in the Middle East which has been at the centre of competition between great powers since the Cold War.
* The Doha deal with the Taliban in February 2020 is when the eventual collapse of Kabul actually began. This agreement undermined the confidence of the Afghan military and government who could see that the U.S. would soon withdraw from the country.
* Terrorist groups morph, grow, and evolve over time, especially without constant pressure from forces like the U.S. military. This pressure is present in Iraq and Syria with ISIS but is absent in Afghanistan regarding al-Qaeda.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
JV: Joseph Votel
SG: Welcome to the NATO DEEP Dive podcast, I’m your host Dr. Sajjan Gohel and in this episode I speak with General Joseph Votel, the former commander of the United States Central Command and Special Operations Command.
In my discussion with the four-star general we talk about the current challenges in the Middle East and Afghanistan, losing focus on the conflict in Ukraine and how to handle the growing influence of artificial intelligence.
Please note that this podcast was recorded before the U.S. and U.K. conducted airstrikes against Houthi militia-controlled areas in Yemen and before the drone attack on a U.S. military outpost in Jordan by an Iranian-backed militia group.
General Joseph Votel, a warm welcome to NATO DEEP Dive.
JV: I’m glad to be with you. Thanks for the invitation.
SG: It’s a huge honour for us. As we begin this discussion, how do we evaluate Iran’s strategic and tactical role in the Hamas attack on Israel that occurred on 7 October 2023?
JV: Yeah, I think that’s a great question. And I think it’s an important point to pay attention to. I think, from a tactical point, we see Iran taking advantage and providing support to Hamas and for their broader resistance network around this. I mean, we saw them actually orchestrate an attack in support of some of the things that have happened in the Red Sea; we’ve seen them do a lot of work in the information space; we’ve seen them welcome Hamas leaders and other resistance leaders and be at the forefront with all of that; and, of course, we’ve seen them supporting the militias, which are very closely aligned to them in Iraq and Syria, principally against U.S. influence and locations.
So, I think we’ve seen a lot on the tactical side. I think they see the advantage of what has taken place here as a way to pursue some of the longer-term goals that they’ve had for the region through some, what I would consider to be some, tactical kind of activities, like we just described.
I think the strategic aspect of this is a little bit more nuanced. And just having done a lot of reading here recently and looking back at this relationship between Iran and Hamas. Hamas is not analogous to Hezbollah; the relationship is not the same as Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah. But there clearly is an alignment here. But the relationship is not the same. And I think that that impacts some of the strategic approaches that Iran takes. And I think as a result, they’ve been more cautious in terms of their overall strategic approach to this.
There was some discussion about whether Iran would use this as the precipitating event for a broader attack on Israel, and really, across the region. Of course, we haven’t seen that, I think there’s a variety of reasons for that. One, I don’t know that they necessarily think they can rally their own nation behind this. They have challenges internally with their own people. So, I think they have to keep that in mind when they think about things more strategically.
The Hamas success, I think, does not necessarily open the way for them to actually apply a lot of the key capabilities that Iran has. So, because Hamas has been successful or was successful at surprising Israel doesn’t necessarily mean that Israel will be susceptible to some of the ways that Iran would actually attack them, which, of course, would be through a large part of their missile capability that they’ve built up over the last number of years. I think they’re closely watching China and Russia, and how they react to this. I think it’s important for Iran to maintain long term relationships with them, they clearly value that, they derive a lot of benefit and strengthen that. But neither of those two countries have really, substantially come off the fence in this particular conflict. And I think as a result, they’re watching very, very closely.
So, I guess what I’m trying to paint for you here is that there’s a variety of reasons why strategically, Iran would be more cautious in their approaches, then they might be tactically, in terms of doing things that aren’t necessarily going to precipitate things. There are things that we would expect Iran to do, be active in the information environment, be provocative, push red lines in places like Iraq and Syria. So, that’s how I’m thinking about this right now.
SG: You do a very good job in contrasting the strategic and the tactical nature of Iran’s intentions. When we look at it further as to what Iran was potentially wanting to achieve from the chaos, there has been some belief that it’s connected to the potential of the Saudi Arabian diplomatic strategy with Israel, and that they were hoping to form diplomatic ties down the road. And now in the aftermath of the Hamas operation that looks largely to have been scuppered. Is that now derailed, do you think, long term? Is that an objective that Iran was hoping to achieve?
JV: Yes, I think that that it was, now whether it was actually an objective that Iran had, pre-emptively with this Hamas attack, I don’t know if I can say that. But I definitely feel that in the aftermath of the Hamas attacks on October 7, they definitely saw the benefits of this, of really putting a wedge in this potential relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia. So, I think they definitely saw the advantage of that and, of course, have used a lot of their tactical tools and other things like this to continue to keep this in the forefront as time has gone on. So, I think there are some concerns about that. I think it’s important to appreciate that Iran has long standing goals and objectives for the region, one of which is they want to expel the United States and Western powers from this, and I think they would lump Israel clearly into that. And so, they’ve had these objectives for quite some time as they’ve done this, and the Hamas attack also gave them some potential for doing that.
As to whether the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia is scuppered. I don’t know, it’s certainly, I think it’s fair to say, it’s on a little bit of a hiatus right now. But whether that will be a long-term state I think is to be determined here. But my personal view is I don’t necessarily think it’s in Saudi Arabia’s interest for this to go away. I don’t think it’s in the interests of any of the Gulf Arab states for these relationships, these budding relationships, to dissolve. I think they all see economic, diplomatic, [and] informational advantages to more normalisation with Israel. So, I don’t know that they necessarily see these going away.
I think that there is, of course, the whole Palestinian aspect of this, which is something that I think has to be calculated. And this is one of the underlying reasons why Saudi Arabia hasn’t been very deliberate in terms of doing this because of these types of situations. So, I think they’re going to continue to be very, very cautious and deliberate as they move forward. I don’t know that it’s completely scuppered. But Iran sees blood in the water and is looking for an opportunity to really drive more of a permanent wedge in there in terms of that initiative.
SG: When you say Iran sees blood in the water, we also have seen that Iranian backed groups, and militias have launched multiple attacks on U.S. military installations in both Iraq and Syria, which you were mentioning earlier in our discussion. Do you see this continuing in 2024? And what options does the U.S. have to counter this?
JV: Well, I do see it continuing in 2024. And I think I see it continuing until the United States and or Iraq, or any of our Western partners that are there, can apply enough pressure onto these groups to convince them that the cost of orchestrating these attacks exceeds the benefit that they derive from it. I just don’t think we have been able to do that yet. And while I’m glad that we have struck back, these still are largely defensive measures and I do think we need to be a little bit more offensive in terms of this. And so, I think that we have got to be willing to go after those that are perpetrating these attacks. I’m not necessarily saying that our response should be extended to Iran, that’s a different deal there. But clearly, we have the ability to understand how networks operate, to attack networks, and I think we ought to apply some of these techniques we’ve learned in the current terrorism fight to this right here and go after these networks that are orchestrating these attacks.
They haven’t been all that effective. We’ve obviously absorbed some casualties and I’m certainly not minimising any of that. But they certainly could have been worse, and we only need one of these attacks to be successful and we’re in a different place, frankly. So, I am concerned. I think we definitely have to take more direct action and we have to put more pressure on the Iraqi government to do their job with us. I think that’s important, as well. And I think we have to make sure to remove uncertainty from the situation. I think right now, a lot of these groups don’t know exactly where our red lines are and so they’re going to continue to push until they actually find out what those are.
We saw that a little bit last week when one of our service members was very severely wounded, and we responded very, very quickly and very decisively in terms of that. But that’s got to be the norm in terms of how we get after this. I would just say this, I think the situation in Iraq is really—there’s an excellent article that came out in the Westpoint, Combating Terrorism Centre Monthly Sentinel that basically goes through and talks about how Iran has played a role in Iraq in strengthening the hand of the militias through things like lawfare and other things like this, they really created a situation here, where the militias have the upper hand. So, it’s a very difficult situation for the Iraqi government to deal with. They’re not strong, they are weak, and they’re they obviously live in a difficult neighbourhood, and they’re trying to balance their interests between really two competing parties, the United States and in the coalition that is there for the defeat ISIS mission and Iran, who is their very capable partner and the neighbour in the East, so it is a difficult situation in Iraq.
SG: Difficult situation, which is also having further ramifications with other aspects of Iran’s affiliates. The relentless Houthi attacks on merchant vessels and commercial boats has pushed several of the world’s largest shipping companies to cancel transit through the Red Sea. This seems to be a really big problem, especially when it comes to supply chains, the economic impact, what can be done to deal with this?
JV: Well, I think the United States and some of the coalition partners they’ve worked with are beginning to do some of the right things. The establishment of this task force in the last couple of weeks, I think, is an important step. That’s a proven method that we’ve used in the waters of the Middle East and other places here to help address specific problems, whether it’s trafficking, whether it’s terrorism, whether it’s piracy. We’ve been successful with this in the past, and I think that’s a key piece of it. And, of course, the work that some of our U.S. naval vessels and some of the other coalition vessels have been doing lately in terms of shooting down missiles or drones and in the case of the United States, destroying three of the Houthi fast boats that were attempting to encroach on them, I think, are good steps. But these are all largely defensive measures. And again, I know I seem like I’m a little bit mongering here, but we do have to send a very clear message to this, there are vulnerabilities in our coastal defence radars, in our coastal defence missile systems, there are command and control facilities that could be very vulnerable.
So, again, we need to send a very clear message to the Houthis, that this is not acceptable behaviour, and it will be met with force. And in addition to all of that, both in Iraq and here down in the Red Sea, we also have to leverage all the other elements of power that we have, I mean, the diplomatic power, we’ve got to put pressure on others here to push on the Houthis, we’ve got to use the information space, we’ve got to use economic power where we can to augment some of our military power, there really needs to be a full effect here for what we’re trying to achieve. But I think we do have to be a little more forceful. My assessment is I think our administration is concerned about expanding the span of the conflict, I think that’s a fair concern, but the fact of the matter is now when we see big companies like Maersk and Hapag and all these others pulling back, this is pretty significant. I mean, 30% of the world’s container traffic goes through the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb, that’s significant. A significant amount of oil, natural gas products go through here, and some 25,000 ships a year go through this particular waterway. So, it’s not an insignificant location. And by the way, the free flow of commerce and navigation through the global commons are long standing U.S. interests. And so, we have to take measures to protect and preserve those interests long term.
SG: Very important aspects that you bring up. I remember when we’d had a conversation a little while back, you spoke about the fact that the Middle East is in many ways the centre of what should be looked at as great power competition. So, prior to all these events that we’ve been talking about, there was a perception that the Middle East was less of a priority for policymakers in the West, and yet we saw China and Russia expand their role in the region. Tracking back to that earlier discussion that we once had, surely the Middle East needs to be factored in as part of the great power competition? And if so, how does the West try and redress that now?
JV: Yes, I think this is a really critical point and one that I know we’ve talked about, and I’ve talked about with a variety of others, and many others are talking about this as well. The Middle East is and has been, for a long period of time, an area of competition. Between the United States and the Soviet Union back in the 70s and into the 80s, this was a this was a place where things played out, and we’ve built alliances and relationships and fought for and supported our objectives, just like the Soviets were trying to do with theirs and so, I do think it’s important. I think there’s a couple of things that I would really highlight, I think it’s important that one of the things we need to do is we need to reconcile our strategy, I think, from the United States standpoint we need to look at our overall strategy, there’s no doubt that China is the pacing threat for us that this could be existential.
Even as a former CENTCOM commander, I have testified to that fact and I certainly understand that. But this idea of competition is not something that is just limited to the Asia-Pacific, it takes place all over. And what we find when we step back from locations is that the Russians, and more prominently, the Chinese, will fill in and will step in and fill those voids. And the cost for doing that is relationships, and trust, and reassurance around our own national security objectives in different parts of the world. So, I think we have to look at our overall strategy and we have to take a more comprehensive look at not just how we are trying to maintain our competitive edge against China in the Pacific, but how we do that on a more global aspect.
I think we have to get to a point also in the Middle East where we have a sustainable force presence. This has been a little bit of a whipsaw here for a while, we’ve had hundreds of thousands of troops and then over the last couple of years, we drew that down to a very, very moderate, very low number. And now of course, with the Gaza thing, we’ve moved a whole bunch of resources back in there. I think what is important for our partners in the region, I think important for the U.S. military is to is to identify what that sustainable level of force that we are willing to commit to this area, that can help working with the other elements of power, can help look at how we preserve our interests in the area, and it doesn’t necessarily need to be tens or hundreds of thousands of troops.
There does need to be a maritime presence, it does need to be ground presence, it needs to be air presence, soft presence. But these can be done in more economical ways, and we’re relying on surging capacity right now. The long-term impacts of moving two carrier groups and a bunch of fighter squadrons and troops on the ground really is very significant for the U.S. military because at some point that has to be reconciled. It has to be recovered and it makes it very, very difficult. So, the more we can get into a sustainable approach, I think it’s important.
The last piece I would just say on this is I would agree that the Middle East, and the threats we face there, are pale in comparison to what we are dealing with China. And so, we do have to dedicate more of our military resources to that part of the world. But I think what that does is also puts a premium on our diplomatic efforts as well. And I think one of the areas where we could make a lot of progress is really by making sure that our country teams, our ambassadors, others out there are well resourced, well set up to do the missions that they’ve been established to do. We’ve been sometimes slow in confirming ambassadors.
I can’t think of a more direct negative message to a partner than the fact that we can’t confirm an ambassador to get into their country. And well, resourced country teams are incredibly powerful tools. And really, I think that really helped leverage all the unique capabilities of the U.S. government, in protecting our interests, to include the military, which plays a supporting role in all that. So, I think we have to look at the diplomatic aspect of this as well to make sure that we are well postured in that regard.
SG: Building on that dynamic of diplomatic and military support and having a positive influence within the Middle East itself. Conversely, will events in the Middle East impact negatively on the war in Ukraine? Are there factors that are now taking place that could impact on the West’s ability to continue supporting the Kyiv administration?
JV: Well, yes, I guess it’s a good question. I mean, to some extent, I think they probably are. Now, obviously, we’ve been sending a lot of military aid to the Ukrainians, and we’ve been sending military aid to the Israelis, as has been announced, in our media environment. For the most part, I think those things are not necessarily competing, what we’re sending to the Israelis is probably different than what we’re sending to the Ukrainians. So, they’re not necessarily directly competing for similar resources going to all those. But I think the bigger challenge is that the authority and the money that goes along with doing all that, as you move up the chain, particularly when you get into Congress, becomes a little more fuzzy. And so, as you’re seeing in our country, right now, there’s a significant debate about continued funding for Ukraine, at the same time, we’re trying to fund Israel. So, I think that could certainly have an impact, I think as to the support of this. And then, of course, when you throw in other contingencies that may emerge here, then this puts more pressure on the system. And I think that does make it more difficult, and it will impact what we want to try to do there.
I also think that some of what we’ve been talking about, some of the things we talked about in the Red Sea, exacerbates some of the supply chain problems that have actually resulted from the Ukrainian-Russian war. So, in my view, and my assessment is that is actually making it worse, the difficulty of moving supplies around the world, the fact that you can’t go through the Red Sea that you have to go around the Cape of Good Hope, combined with literally the world’s breadbasket, green basket, really having difficulty getting their stuff out of there. I think it does add a lot of pressure onto this and makes the situation worse.
And then finally, I think just the diplomatic efforts that are necessary in both these cases. I think we’ve seen very heavy U.S. government diplomatic efforts in both of these places. I mean, we saw streams and streams of U.S. officials going to Ukraine, U.S. officials going to Israel, being able to sustain that and look at other things that are ongoing, I think these are things we have to take into consideration as well. And I do fear that we will have to choose to prioritise one over the other as we move forward. Well, both of them are pretty darn important.
SG: We shift from one country that’s facing inherent problems to another one, namely, Afghanistan. I remember very vividly a conversation that we had back in June of 2021, you expressed serious concerns that the Taliban could take over Afghanistan quite quickly, once the West withdrew, and tragically, it proved to be the case. How could an infrastructure collapse so quickly, especially as many nations gave blood, sweat and tears to building Afghanistan across two decades? It’s sometimes hard to fathom just how quickly it fell. And what lessons can we learn from this?
JV: Well, I think what I think what led to the rapid collapse, particularly in those real difficult days in August of 2021, when that actually kind of came apart there in Kabul, is that we fundamentally undermined the confidence of the of the Afghan military leadership, and those who were doing a lot of the fighting and dying. And so, when we made agreements with the Taliban in February of 2020, with one administration that was passed on to the Biden administration, and then kind of extended a little bit longer.
I actually think that when that agreement was put in place in 2020 was actually when the eventual fall of Kabul actually began. And that was because those that we had worked with so closely, could clearly see the writing on the wall that we were going to leave. And they, at that point, went more into self-preservation mode and did things that they needed to do to protect themselves and their families, and made deals and other things with the Taliban that would ultimately play out in the last few weeks there. And so, there was this loss of confidence that can’t be made up in military aid, can’t be made up in training, can’t be made up in informational support, ‘try fight harder’ kind of stuff. We undermined this basic tenant of this confidence and trust. And that’s what led to the rapid collapse. And I think it explains why after billions of dollars and decades of time here, we were not more successful in this endeavour than we all had hoped we would be.
SG: Certainly, it’s a very depressing situation that unfolded. And we still don’t even know the full ramifications of that and that leads me to my next question. We’ve seen that there’s been a difference of assessment as to what is unfolding in Afghanistan currently. So, for example, the UN sanctions monitoring team has spoken about the fact that al-Qaeda and its affiliate AQIS, although had been weakened, due to counterterrorism operations in the past, they are showing signs of some regrowth, that they are being protected by the Taliban, they are able to operate in various provinces, and that’s even after Ayman al-Zawahiri, the last leader of al-Qaeda was found in a palatial residence in Kabul, which I mentioned in my book.
Conversely, you’ve got the U.S. National Security Council, which has taken a different point of view in that they believe that al-Qaeda is not really growing, and that the Taliban could actually be potentially cooperative when it comes to counter-terrorism. So, we have two very differing perspectives and where do you stand on this? How do we untangle this disconnect?
JV: Well, I think where I stand on this is I would probably be more aligned with the UN monitoring missions assessment of this than I might be with our own government’s assessment of this, and I don’t say that lightly. I mean, I have extraordinary respect for the U.S. intelligence community, I think they’re one of the jewels in our crown right here and I think they are trying to make the best assessments they can. But my experience working with terrorist organisations are really informed by what we just saw in October here in Israel. It just tells me that these organisations, they morph, they change, they innovate, they take their time, they’re patient, in terms of trying to recover and look for new ways of coming back onto the scene, and I just think that that is what is likely to take place here.
We have found when we have not maintained pressure on these organisations that they have found ways to come back. I mean, this is the importance of the mission that we’re doing in Iraq right now. In Iraq and Syria with both the Iraqi Security Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, [there] is, again, a small nominal number of troops on the ground there for the specific purpose of helping our partners keep pressure on these networks. And frankly, it’s working, it demonstrates that it works. While ISIS is still present there, they have not been able to rise to a level where they pose a threat. And most of the challenge can be handled largely by the partner forces. And that’s, to me, the lesson that I learned out of this, that you have to keep pressure on these organisations, they are extraordinarily resilient, they are looking for ways to come back onto the scene and they’re patient in terms of doing it.
So, I am concerned about what happens in the places where we can’t. I don’t know everything that’s taking place, there is probably a lot that I don’t know, I hope that I’m wrong in terms of this, I hope that our assessments are more accurate, and that our insight into this in an informed way is better than I may give credit for. But I am very concerned about these organisations. For example, I would just remind you that we still have displaced fighters, we have foreign fighter camps in Syria. I know that’s not Afghanistan, but the point is that this is where the seeds of the next violent extremist group comes from. So, I mean, all of these elements remain in place in these countries, and we have to pay attention to all that.
SG: The point that you raised, has made me think of just how complicated and challenging the whole Afghanistan, Pakistan, Middle East, North Africa situation is. You were the former CENTCOM commander, you were in charge during a very important time where you directly led to degrading ISIS’ operational capability. If we see what’s unfolding with the Hamas operation, the Houthi militias carrying out operations on the Red Sea, targeting cargo vessels, and attacks on US installations in Syria and Iraq. We’ve also seen al-Qaeda potential regrowth in Afghanistan, the TTP, the Pakistan Taliban, asserting itself in Pakistan, all the way from Israel to Pakistan, there are now major security challenges that are emerging. They’re not necessarily always interconnected, but it forms a very problematic picture. Where do you see this unfolding throughout 2024?
JV: Well, I mean, I think you painted a very good but dire picture of the region that I would largely agree with. I think this is an area that has always been challenged with very deep underlying tensions that have not been adequately addressed. And so, I think going forward, I think we’re going to see more of these playing out. Just look at what is playing out right now in terms of the war in Gaza, fundamentally this is an issue over the Palestinian question, so to speak, how we resolve that and—during my time in CENTCOM, while that was a very present thing, it was being managed, it seemed to be in a controlled place, and we were we were, I don’t want to say comfortable, but we categorised that into the moderate risk area here and allowed us to focus on other things that we needed to do. But it is these underlying tensions that often erupt and cause problems in the region.
I think we’re going to continue to see this for the long term. I think it’s in our interest, it’s in the interest of other countries to try to help these countries in this part of the world to work through some of these issues. And I think it’s important for us, I think we have to look at what our interests are in this area, and then take the measures to preserve those interests as we move forward. So, I think 2024 is going to be another difficult year for the Middle East.
SG: A final question to do with what we may see unfold in 2024. And building on the momentum of 2023 is the geopolitics of artificial intelligence. Governments may seek to regulate AI but also simultaneously choose to force domestic AI innovation to compete geopolitically. It’s inevitable that AI is going to be a central dynamic in the U.S.-China relationship. What is your take on the phenomenon of artificial intelligence? And does any of it concern you? From my perspective, it frightens me.
JV: Well, yes, there are certain aspects of this that I am concerned about. But I think in the overall look at it, I think that artificial intelligence can do a lot for us. And so, I’m generally an advocate for this type of technology and moving forward with it. Again, this is a very difficult one, it’s very hard for a lot of people to understand and appreciate, it’s not like other innovations that we’ve had in the past. So, I do get the level of uncertainty, the level of mystery around all of this, I think, does make it difficult for people to get their heads around. And it does lead to a lot of concerns on this, but I do see a lot of opportunities where AI can help. I mean, whether it’s leveraging it for back office functions or making better decisions, or in the medical arena or other things right here, I think it can certainly help us in great ways, sifting through the mass amounts of data that we are generating in today’s kind of digital economy here and understand that better. So, I think there are some really positive things that can come from this.
But as you raise, I mean, I think there are some, there are some challenges going forward. I actually think the conversation that is ongoing about this is a healthy one, in many different places, in Europe and the United States and other places, I think that is a healthy one. I know, in our own U.S. Congress, there’s actually a lot of discussion about this, and people have taken positions on it, and actually, Congress has enabled a couple of important pieces of legislation that are really focused on artificial intelligence to better understand it to help with the responsible creation of it, I think those are those are important things to do.
I am concerned about AI, particularly generative AI that can really pose a significant concern. I would share with it that I’m also concerned about trying to overregulate this kind of stuff and making it a commodity that entices groups to go after this and use it in much more nefarious ways.
I guess I look at this a little bit like manned flight, for example. When aeroplanes first came onto the scene, there was a lot of proliferation, there were airlines standing up, there were people flying and stuff like that. And then eventually after we got the lay of the land, then we instituted things like the Federal Aviation Administration and rules for regulation of this where it is viewed as something positive, that enhances our lives and enhances the mobility of our citizens, both in the United States and globally here. So, I do think that there will need to be some kind of regulation of this at some particular point.
My approach would be less is more at this particular point until we fully understand what needs to be regulated in this as we move forward. It’s an extraordinarily interesting and topical area obviously here but I think it has the potential for being a good game changer for us down the line, but I do acknowledge there are some concerns that will have to be watched and addressed as we move forward.
SG: Certainly, does have a lot of positive potentials, hopefully it won’t end up being like Skynet in The Terminator!
JV: I know I think that’s again our desire to watch Hollywood and see things and try to understand them always, I think does feed a little bit into that. And again, I share the concern about artificial intelligence and cutting humans out of the loop. As a commander, there is no replacement for human judgement and while it appears that some quarters of artificial intelligence, we may be getting close to that, the connection to a soul to a heart or brain I think is very, very important in all this. And so, we do have to make sure that as we design decision loops and other things like this, that we are not losing the human aspect of decision making.
SG: Well, General Votel, you’ve been very kind with your time, as you mentioned, soul, heart and brain. Your knowledge throughout all the topics we’ve covered is always so prescient, and you are very much always able to forecast some of the challenges ahead as you have done in the past. So, very grateful that you could spend the time on NATO DEEP Dive and hope you can join us again in the future.
JV: Thanks very much. I appreciate it. As a NATO officer, I always kind of characterise myself that way, having served at the headquarters down in Naples, Italy, and working with a lot of our NATO partners throughout my military career, I’m very proud to have that relationship and I’m really glad to be able to participate and contribute in this podcast. Thanks for inviting me.
SG: It’s been a huge honour for us.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of NATO DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). My producers are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the NATO DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.