Key Reflections
* State actors like Iran have exploited tensions in the Middle East whilst promoting their agenda. Non-state actors like ISIS and al-Qaeda have utilised the events to radicalise and recruit individuals to their causes.
* Questions surround IS-KP’s claim of responsibility for the twin blasts in Kerman, Iran.
* Iran-backed militia groups will continue to carry out more attacks as they are emboldened by the current crisis.
* The Houthis have successfully held territory in Yemen and using that foothold to attack cargo vessels in the Red Sea.
* Al-Qaeda’s global affiliates remain active, with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel, and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also increasing its online propaganda campaigns.
* Fentanyl is another major threat to life. In the U.S. over 100,000 deaths from overdoses of the synthetic drug were recorded in 2023. Fentanyl precursors are often imported from China to Mexico before being used to create the drug and smuggled into the U.S.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
MC: Mahmut Cengiz
SG: Welcome to the NATO DEEP Dive podcast. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel, and in this episode, I speak with the noted academic Mahmut Cengiz about the various geopolitical challenges that have erupted across the Middle East and Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Mahmut is an associate professor with the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Mahmut is also the author of The Illicit Economy in Turkey: How Criminals, Terrorists, and the Syrian Conflict Fuel Underground Economies.
Mahmut Cengiz, warm welcome back to NATO DEEP Dive.
MC: Thanks for having me.
SG: It’s great to have you again. In light of the Hamas October 7, 2023, operation in Israel and the subsequent fallout across the Middle East, we’ve seen two distinct narratives being pushed out. One is from state actors, such as Iran, that has seen itself pushing the so-called Axis of Resistance. The other is from non-state actors, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. What are your thoughts on this in terms of these two very contrasting narratives?
MC: The conflict in Palestine and Israel always has been seen as a reference case for jihadist terrorist organisations. Of course, after this attack, we have debated who are the winners and who are the losers, or who can exploit these attacks in the world. And we saw, for example, Iran is maybe aiming to again exploit these attacks, and show that this is a war between the West and the East. So, Iran is in a position of trying to represent the Islamic world, so this is their ideology. When it comes to non-state actors, of course, ISIS and al-Qaeda have used the conflict in Palestine as a reference case. Of course, there are some other ones in Jammu and Kashmir in India, and also in Africa, so whenever they saw the persecution of Muslim communities, like some overreactions from the state actors, they created some stories, and they just began to exploit these stories, and because they aim to radicalise more people, because if more people become radicalised, it means that they can recruit more and more people.
So, after the Hamas attacks now, it has gone beyond being a regional conflict, because in some platforms, it is seen as the war, again, between the West and the Islamic world. I think, for the Western world, there are some lessons similar to the 9/11 attacks, because we should not really confine this conflict to one group, because Hamas acted like ISIS or al-Qaeda, because Hamas acted and did a terrorist attack in the region. But when it comes to its results and its unintended consequences, the state and non-state actors always position themselves to benefit from and to exploit these conflicts. So far, what happened in the region, al-Qaeda and ISIS are now again showing this is a ‘conflict against Islam.’ Of course, again, Iran is aiming to get another leading position for the Islamic world.
SG: These are really important points that you’re covering here. If we stick to Iran for a second, so IS-KP—the regional affiliate of ISIS, Islamic State-Khorasan Province—they claimed responsibility for the twin blasts on January 4, 2024 that killed 84 people and wounded scores of others, which was near the memorial of the former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Qasem Soleimani. That was in Kerman in Iran. What are your thoughts of that attack? What does this tell us about what is unfolding?
MC: In my recent article, I tried to ask the question about who is the perpetrator, because ISIS was one of the most reliable organisations in its early years, in 2014-2015, when it comes to claiming responsibility. But then when ISIS began to lose power, the organisation jumped to claim every notable attack, even criminal ones, and showed that they are the perpetrators. So, it’s a big question, how much we can rely on the claim of responsibility by ISIS. There are even some discrepancies in ISIS’ statement, because ISIS was saying that in the early hours, 300 people were killed by two suicide bombers. But when we look at the details of this attack, we saw that just 80 people lost their lives, and also there were remotely controlled explosives used in this attack. So, these big discrepancies are creating some questions around whether ISIS really is the perpetrator. Of course, on the other hand, why ISIS is claiming responsibility may be because it created a chance and an opportunity for ISIS to be a popular organisation again because these organisations are always seeking such popularity. They know well that it means more recruiting, more funding for these organisations.
And for Iran again, it’s a question, because Iran blamed the Western world, Israel and the US, for masterminding these attacks in the region. And it is a little bit complex, very confusing. But on the other hand, ISIS maybe? IS K-P, they target civilians and crowds. We saw in previous years how ISIS targeted and did some attacks in Afghanistan, like targeting mosques or some religious gatherings. So, in terms of the tactics, yes, it is fitting well with IS-KP’s tactics and their target types. But when it comes to what’s happening in the region, in Iran, also these complex relationships in the region, don’t think that we will learn in the future who is the real perpetrator behind these attacks in the region.
SG: Yes, as you say, it is very complex. And if we keep that complexity in mind, so back in January of 2024, we’ve seen that Iranian militias, or Iranian-backed militias, I should say, have carried out attacks across Syria and Iraq on US installations, military installations, and one in particular was an attack on a US military base in Jordan, Tower 22, as it’s called. So, we’ve seen that Shia militia groups that have targeted the US in Iraq and Syria, but this was the first time that it happened in Jordan. What does this tell us about the agenda of these Iranian-backed Shia militia groups? And is this something that is going to continue? Or is this perhaps an aberration of what happened in Jordan?
MC: We have discussed some of the consequences of Hamas’ October 7 attacks. Also, I think another consequence is that now the world is aware of these existing militia groups in almost every country in the Middle East. So even these militia groups in Iraq and in Syria, they are more threatening than ISIS and al-Qaeda because these militia groups targeted American bases and facilities more than ISIS and al-Qaeda. So, these groups are active in several Middle Eastern countries. For example, in Iraq, the Popular Mobilisation Forces, it was a big umbrella group, consisting of more than 100 Iran-backed militia groups. We saw several of them are really active, Hezbollah, and also some others as well. So in Syria, again, there is a strong presence of these Iran-backed militia groups, partly composed of Afghan Shias, and they were trained and then transferred from IRGC to Syria, just to fight for Bashar al-Assad, because Iran is taking the side of the al-Assad regime and aiming to keep Bashar al-Assad in his position. So, there was another well-known and popular group in Syria, they are the Pakistani Shias, again, the same method by IRGC, training and transferring them to Syria, to fight against ISIS, al-Qaeda, or another group targeting Bashar al-Assad’s group.
So, when we look at Yemen, there are the Houthis, but after Hamas’ October 7 attacks, these militia groups came together, six of them, and they created an umbrella organisation, which is the Islamic Resistance in Iraq group. So, this group was the perpetrator of the attack in Jordan targeting US forces. So, for your question, considering their current operational capacity in the region, it wouldn’t be wrong to say that in the long-term, these groups will keep attacking Western forces, including US forces, because they aim to drive these forces out of the Middle East. And also, we are aware of this ongoing and current regional-level cold war between the Saudis and Iranians, so they just target each other to be the regional hegemon. And so far, Iran seems to be the winner. They’re really active and dominant. Also, in some cases, they’re using these militia groups as part of their strategy. So, in the future, we will see more attacks and more threats, especially coming from these Iran-backed militia groups.
By the way, also in terrorism databases, in the last two years, 6% of terrorist attacks globally were committed by Iran-backed militia groups, which accounted for 500 or 600 attacks every year. But this year, after Hamas’ attacks, I believe it will be much higher, because Hamas and Hezbollah also are really very active this year after Hamas’ attacks, so including Iran’s linkages with the groups in Palestine, and also Hezbollah and some other regional and local level militia groups, it wouldn’t be wrong to say that we will see increasing numbers of attacks by these Iran-backed militia groups in the Middle East.
SG: One of the entities that’s getting more and more attention is this Iran-backed Shia militia group known as Kata’ib Hezbollah, who were considered to be part of the movement that targeted Tower 22 in Jordan. What do we know about this group? Are they similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon? They seem to certainly model themselves on that. Are there any differences that we should be aware of?
MC: They are really similar because Iran is using the same model. Hezbollah is seen like a success model for Iran, because it was formed in 1982, and today, Hezbollah is a global organisation, according to some people, they are a political organisation, but we have seen their strong involvement in criminal activities. So, you can see how Hezbollah is part of global networks, I think in Latin America, like in cocaine and cigarette trafficking or drug trafficking.
Also, on the other hand, they are based in Lebanon. So, Hezbollah, for example, after Hamas’ attacks, terrorism databases recorded 238 attacks from Hezbollah, but it was like 10 or eight, before October 7 attacks. But then the world saw how this organisation is capable of doing attacks in the region. So, just copying this successful model Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi branch—of course, it’s another question to see how Iran is influential on Iraqi politics after the U.S. invasion, after 2003. So, we saw increasingly how Iran has become influential and today, Iran is influential on the government, and also there are these militia groups, and then also, the PMF, Popular Mobilisation Forces—actually PMF got some sympathy when they’re fighting against ISIS, but then Kata’ib Hezbollah and some others left from PMF, and today, they operate independently. So, in the future, I believe, there will be another Hezbollah, mostly operating and based in Iraq.
SG: We’re having quite a detailed discussion on all the entities that Iran is supporting by proxy. So, if we continue that discussion, another group is, of course, the Houthis that are based in Yemen. They seem to have been very effective in hurting global trade, especially the vessels that travelled through the Red Sea. What can be done, Mahmut to deal with that? Can countries like China that have good ties with Iran help to resolve that? Or is this something that the Houthis have now realised is a successful tactic to hurt the global economy and use it for their own propaganda purposes also?
MC: Yeah, Houthis are also successfully operating in Yemen, because they seized the capital Sana’a in Yemen in 2014, but after that, Houthis [have been] able to control territory in Yemen. So, there are Saudi-led coalition forces, I think composed of more than 10 states, but they all failed to fight against Houthis in the region. So, recently, as you just mentioned, they targeted the commercial ships on the Red Sea. So, then there have been some debates in the United States about whether to designate the Houthis again as a terrorist organisation. Also, they are another group controlled and directed by Iran, so mostly serving the interests of Iran in the region. I don’t think that in the short term, we will see effective results to fight against or to stop their fighting or their targeting in Yemen or in the Middle East.
So, recently, the US government put Houthis in the list of specifically designated terrorist organisations. So, we will see, again, some sanctions over the Houthis. But when it comes to fighting against Houthis, I don’t think that in the near future, we will see some effective fight against Houthis.
SG: This is obviously going to be another ongoing problem and challenge. You’ve also written on al-Qaeda’s affiliates, [saying] that they are growing, they are potentially causing global challenges in terms of their agenda. We’ve seen that AQAP in Yemen, another faction, a non-state actor, although this is a Sunni jihadist group based in Yemen, that is seeking to cause disruption in the light of everything that’s happening in the Middle East. They’ve restarted the Inspire series of online guidance to terrorism and propaganda, which is of concern. Which of al-Qaeda’s affiliates are concerning you and why do you think they’ve become so emboldened?
MC: Yeah, actually, in the Western world, there is a common belief about jihadist organisations. So, ISIS and al-Qaeda, they are defeated organisations, so they’re not [a threat] any more to the Western world. But when looking at terrorism databases, every year more than 1,300 terrorist attacks were committed by ISIS and its affiliated organisations. So, every year more than 800 terrorism incidents were committed, again, by al-Qaeda and its affiliated organisations. So, when it comes to answering your question, what al-Qaeda groups? Of course, before that there are currently al-Qaeda affiliates operating in many regions. So, there is one in Syria HTS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, actually al-Qaeda used more localization policies, and then merged local jihadist organisations and created umbrella organisations to fight for al-Qaeda’s ideology in many regions. So, HTS is one example, merged by jihadist organisations, more than 10 groups came together that created HTS in Syria.
We’re looking at databases. So, we can see every year that HTS are the perpetrators of more than 200 cases. Even today, HTS is able to control territory in Idlib in Syria, but last year, what we saw was some fragmentation from HTS. Several of its militants left the organisation, then began to operate independently. So, we should be giving our focus and attention to HTS in Syria. There’s another one in the Sahel. Of course, it is more related to grievances of the Muslim communities in Africa. Of course, it’s related to the impacts of post-military coups in some Sahel countries. So, we saw how these issues are creating some security vacuums, and then how immediately these organisations are filling in these vacuums and operating in this region.
So, for the Sahel, for Africa, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the acronym JNIM, is really very active. So, recently, for example, this group spread its operational capacity to neighbouring countries of the Sahel, like Togo and Benin. And also, increasingly we saw JNIM’s attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger as well. So, we should be focusing on JNIM as well. And there’s another one, al-Shabaab in Somalia. So, this is another top terrorist organisation, every year they are one of the top groups with the most terrorist incidents, even though there have been some decreases in the number of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab, but when we look at its tactics, you can see more complex tactics have been used by these organisations like vehicle borne IEDs, or suicide bombings, again, were used by al-Shabaab. So, complexities of tactics, and also the spreading of JNIM in Africa, I can tell that we should give our focus to al-Qaeda groups in Africa.
And on the other hand, AQAP is another one. I think this group was active, doing several hundred attacks in 2016 or 2017. But in terrorism databases, today, this organisation is the perpetrator of several 10s of incidents. But as you mentioned, like online propaganda, and then we saw again, there are some increasing activities of AQAP. Maybe the last point is in Asia, in Africa, in Afghanistan/Pakistan, because I think we should talk about maybe Lashkar-e-Taiba or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). So, they are, again, two active organisations which we need to look at, again, these two groups as well in Pakistan.
SG: So, these are important regions that you’re identifying where non-state actors affiliated to al-Qaeda continue to operate with impunity and pose major challenges, not just locally, regionally, but maybe transnationally as well. Talking about transnational, so another thing, Mahmut that you’ve been covering and analysing is the whole fentanyl smuggling challenge and crisis that exists. Now, fentanyl being a narcotic, of course, what can be done about it? And what are the current developments in trying to stop the proliferation and smuggling of fentanyl? And are there any particular countries/regions that concern you about where the fentanyl is moving around and how it’s being trafficked?
MC: Yeah, I think sometimes we’re all focused on terrorism and terrorism cases, we are recording every attack and the 25,000 people killed. But we look at fentanyl and the drug issue in the world. Just in the U.S. last year, more than 100,000 people lost their lives because of overdoses of fentanyl. So, who is bringing this fentanyl, in the U.S. case, you can see the Mexican cartels are blamed, because from the southern border, these Mexican cartels, they traffic and transfer this fentanyl from Mexico to the U.S.
So, what other states are involved, and therefore precursors of fentanyl? We know that China is a source country. So, these precursors have been transferred to Mexico, then in primitive labs in Mexico, they are produced and then transferred to the U.S. So, when it comes to how we can prevent this really complex issue, because we need multi-perspective approaches, like protecting the borders, of course fighting against transnational criminal organisations, global cooperation between the states, but considering current politics in the world, so it is not likely to see effective cooperation between U.S. and China. The U.S. is a destination country, but China is a source country. So, these challenges are just creating more and more opportunities for criminal organisations, so, that’s why they just enjoy transferring these materials and then killing people, but on the other end, making millions of dollars from this type of trafficking,
SG: And contributing to global misery as well. So, this has been a very sobering discussion that we’ve been having on a wide range of security issues from terrorism, state actors, non-state actors, and of course, narcotics. Mahmut, let me thank you again for providing this very important and timely analysis and continue to read all your articles and important research and look forward to what you’ll be doing in the future as well.
MC: My pleasure, thanks for inviting me.
SG: It’s been our pleasure.
Thank you for listening to this episode of NATO DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). My producers are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
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This transcript has been edited for clarity.