Key Reflections
* While military grade drones are expensive and most often used by state actors, off-the-shelf drones are comparatively cheap and easy to use and access and are therefore a primary concern in the field of counter-terrorism.
* People are quickly learning how to make drones illicitly there is a need to be cognisant of the threat posed by returning foreign fighters who have learned these skills and may try to pass them on.
* The online space and the dark web greatly exacerbate the threat of drones and these elements are something hostile states and terrorist groups are actively exploiting to rapidly develop their drone capabilities.
* Psychological disruption is often one of the primary objectives when hostile state actors make drone incursions across borders.
* Situational awareness is key to countering threats from drones. Authorities need to be able to identify the threat and intervene quickly and leverage technology and artificial intelligence while also introducing tighter regulations.
* Drones also have positive uses in a wide range of fields. They can be employed for emergency response, search and rescue operations, mapping crime scenes, suspect tracking, and security for major events by providing camera feeds.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
ATD: Alex Townsend-Drake
SG: Welcome to the NATO DEEP Dive podcast. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel, and in this episode, I speak with Alex Townsend-Drake, Head of the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN).
As the head of the CTPN, Alex provides expertise in international security, crisis management, and is responsible for overseeing network coordination and deliverables, as well as leading on international initiatives and agreements.
Alex Townsend-Drake, warm welcome to NATO Deep Dive.
ATD: It’s good to be here, Sajjan. Thanks for having me.
SG: It’s our pleasure. Let’s talk about the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network. When was that established and what is its role?
ATD: So, the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network, known as CTPN, was formed at the end of 2017.We’re an international collaboration, public sector, operating across Europe and North America with federal partners in Australia and New Zealand. And we also work with, obviously, relevant national and international organisations as well. But our focus is very much about protection and preparedness, particularly the preparedness of cities in response to the whole range of terrorist threats that we face today.
SG: This is a very unique organisation in terms of its collaborative spirit and its coordinated multilateralism.
CTPN produced a report on preparing for hostile drones in urban environments, which people can find online and a link will be available for that. Why have drones become a serious counter-terrorism and national security concern and what factors do you think drive this?
ATD: Yes, you’re right. A couple of years ago, we did produce a report focused on the potential threat of drones. We do look at all different threats from terrorist actors, but this for us has become quite topical for a number of reasons. And I’ll go into those reasons, but I must emphasise, first and foremost, that the threat of drones is still considered to be relatively low.
We still expect acts of terrorism to be more focused around hostile vehicles, blunt and bladed weapons, firearms and explosive devices, potentially, those less sophisticated modes of attacks. They’re still the most likely modes that we would expect to see. But the landscape in terms of drones has shifted and is shifting significantly.
So we’ve had a lot of discussions around this. Obviously, drones have been around for decades. But in recent years, they’ve become increasingly visible globally through the world’s media. We have seen their use in terms of global conflict on a daily basis really over the last few years. But in addition to that, we’re seeing real generational shifts in terms of the acquisition of drones and the use of drones. So drones today are much more accessible than they were in the past.
There are much lower barriers to access, they can literally be purchased online or in the shops by whoever wants to use them, hobbyists all the way through to malicious actors. And the sheer availability and utility of FPV drones, first person view drones, is the core concern for us in terms of a CT context. And drones have even been described as the most concerning tactical development since the rise of the improvised explosive device.
So all these factors combined have really made us start to think about the potential threat drones a lot more.
SG: You mentioned about malicious actors using them. If we look specifically with terrorist groups to start with, which terrorist groups are using these drones and for what purposes?
ATD: Terrorists have actually been using drones for years in the Middle East to conduct physical attacks, to guide attacks on the ground, to carry out hostile reconnaissance.
We’ve seen the Houthis using drones on the Red Sea to attack ships. And recently, notably in West Africa, there has been quite a significant increase in the use of drones by al-Qaeda affiliates and IS affiliates. I think around 69 have been reported, drone attacks from the last couple of years in that region.
The most recent to my knowledge being in January, just a few weeks ago in Nigeria, which was an armed drone attack on a military base. Now clearly the context in that region is very different to the context in Europe and North America. But the big question here is how does that translate across to Western society, Europe, North America.
And there are a few indicators, I suppose, of the intent from would-be terrorists. And we can refer to October 2022, where there was a planned attack on the Nou Camp Stadium in Barcelona by a self-taught drone pilot who assembled a drone and had planned to use it to carry out a physical attack. Fast forward to September 2023, there was an ISIS affiliated PhD student in Birmingham in the UK who had built a drone from scratch with the intent of using that to conduct an attack. And thankfully that was intervened, but it was deemed to be a credible threat.
But really the main threat for us at this stage across Europe and North America is more to do with the use of drones for propaganda, intelligence, hostile reconnaissance, but there are signs they could start to be used even more maliciously by certain actors. And indeed spanning back out to a global level, the Hamas attacks of October 2023 also involved the use of drones.
So the question is at what point do these types of tactics start to affect us domestically?
SG: It’s really concerning, this sort of dynamic and evolution that you’re talking about. And to that point, how much of the threat comes from highly modified platforms versus commercially available off-the-shelf drones?
ATD: Yeah, I mean, there’s two strands really. There’s the military grade drones, which are very expensive, highly advanced pieces of equipment, which can be used by states.
And off-the-shelf drones, which are commercially available, relatively cheap, accessible, as I say, by shops, the internet, 3D printing, the self-assembly of different component parts. So the off-the-shelf drones are much easier to access, they’re easy to learn how to use, and they’re easy to modify. So for us, from a counter-terrorism perspective, it’s the off-the-shelf drones which are a primary concern.
SG: You’ve got a lot of experience with the CTPN, working with cities for their safety, their security, critical national infrastructure. What lessons should Western cities and NATO partners be drawing from how drones are being used in contemporary conflicts?
ATD: Yeah, I mean, it’s a good question, because we absolutely should be learning from how they are being used globally at the moment. And I think for me, there’s probably two main strands.
First is intelligence. Secondly is how we can counter the potential threat of drones.
So to focus on the intelligence piece, given the geopolitical climate and given the conflicts that we’re currently seeing and the use of drones in those settings, we can obviously use that as a way to understand much better how drones are being developed, modified, and deployed, and the tactics around that. We can better understand the speed and precision of attacks and the impacts that they can have on critical infrastructure. Likewise, we can think more broadly around the subsequent threats, as and when the conflict hopefully finishes.
There will be a fallout. There will be consequences from that, that we will need to think about how we manage that. And really, that’s in relation to returning foreign fighters, those who may have had particular experiences, including learning how to build and use drones, and those which may then, for whatever reason, through whichever affiliation, decide to use them maliciously.
And then the second pillar around understanding how to counter the threat of drones is looking at what countermeasures are being used in conflict settings. So how hostile drones are being taken down, how they’re being mitigated, what works, what doesn’t, where the gaps are, where we need to be focusing our energy. And learning from military plans, resources and technologies, we need to be understanding how the military approaches this as well. And of course, how drones themselves can be used for the purposes of security.
SG: Most definitely. Are we entering an era where state actors might use drones for deniable grey zone operations against, say, urban infrastructure?
ATD: There is certainly a significant increase in state threats and grey zone and hybrid operation activity. And all of this encompasses the technological arena from cyberspace, to artificial intelligence, and how that impacts missing disinformation, for example, all the way through to drones.
So personally, I would say, yes, we are entering that era. And the MI5 Director General himself has openly said that we face the most complex and interconnected threat environment we have ever seen. And if we kind of just take a moment to think about what that looks like, we’ve got hostile state activity, we’ve got terrorist groups, and also individual or alone/self initiated terrorists.
We have what’s now being referred to as non-ideologically motivated violent extremists. So those who essentially commit violent acts, which in themselves seem very similar to terrorism, but they don’t carry a particular ideological cause or affiliation with a particular political terrorist group. And then of course, we’ve got the criminals, networks, and proxy groups as well, which can be used as actors to conduct attacks or malicious acts on behalf of those I’ve just mentioned.
So, the expanding threat landscape is a big challenge. And it’s compounded, I think, by the online space and the dark web, which really connects all these elements together. And terrorists, just like hostile states, are exploiting that.
And going back to your point around are we in an era where hostile states are using drones in the grey zone to conduct these types of activities? I mean, we’ve seen it, drone incursions in Europe, which even if they’re not carrying out physical attacks, it’s a power play, it is an incursion into sovereign borders. So we are absolutely entering into that space in one way, shape or form.
SG: Yes and we’ve seen Russia do that, unfortunately, all too regularly. Even when drones cause limited physical damage, is psychological and economic disruption one of the primary objectives?
ATD: Yes, I think it is one of the objectives. I think it relates to the former point in a way, because the psychological strand is an interesting one, because drones, they hover above us, they’re operated remotely by unknown pilots, they have high definition camera capability, they are by their nature quite invasive. And they have this kind of weird robotic power about them.
So, I think when we think about hostile state activity, which we touched upon a moment ago, and the drone incursions across borders, that at this stage, at least, is very much psychological. It is that look what we can do, look what we could do. And there’s a big psychological element to that.
And, the economic side, I mean, that has been widely evidenced already, we’ve seen the economic impacts on major events. We’ve seen economic impacts on airports. Gatwick in 2018, the total costs and losses in relation to that exceeded 50 million pounds or so. And that’s just a drone disrupting airport operations for a relatively short period of time.
So, there are multiple motivating factors, they’ve got the physical attack, you’ve got the psychological, we’ve got the economic, and of course, you’ve got disruption just to general operations. So all of those elements could be employed for malicious means.
SG: You mentioned the drone that disrupted Gatwick Airport quite significantly a few years ago. Can drone misuse be deterred in the same way as traditional terrorism, the type of terrorism that we’ve seen in the last two decades, or does that accessibility fundamentally alter deterrence?
ATD: Yes, that’s an interesting question because when we think of deterrence and protective security at a ground level, we have quite a lot of tried and tested procedures in place. But just from a few feet in the air, the dynamics of that do change, of course.
So there is a different dynamic when we think of the potential threat of drones. But to me, the core principle of deterrence still stands strong. It’s about clear rules and regulations, it’s about having the laws in place, simple steps like signage and building in layer protective security and having clear public communications, all these different elements, among others, are absolutely key.
And thankfully, the UK National Protective Security Authority, for example, are doing a lot of work in this space and offer guidance around this sort of thing. The problem, of course, is that when we’re dealing with an airborne threat, it does have different implications. And the reality is that a hostile actor, a terrorist with intent, likely won’t be deterred.
If they want to do a particular act, wherever that might be, the likelihood is they will try and do it anyhow. They won’t register a drone, for example, they’re going to buy it illegally, or they’re going to find a way to assemble a drone themselves. So they’re going to try and reduce the traces around it. And they’re going to regardless of deterrence, they will likely try and find a way to carry out the act. So to me, that really leads us into what can we do to better protect ourselves and prepare in case something does happen?
SG: Well, let’s build on that. So what do we need to do to counter and prepare for the potential threat of drones?
ATD: Well, I’ll start by saying there’s a lot that’s already being done. There are lead agencies doing excellent work in this space, there are strong capabilities in place. But there’s always more that can be done because the threat is moving quickly, technology is moving quickly. So we do need to invest in counter drone solutions.
Now the market is seemingly saturated with counter drone options. Which ones work, which ones don’t can be sometimes quite hard to tell. I mean, I supported a live exercise, a red/blue teaming exercise, fairly recently, where we had some drones posing as hostiles. And we had a number of counter drone solutions set up. And honestly, the number of drones which are able to bypass the counter drone solutions was quite astonishing.
Yeah, I mean, yes, it depends on the technology of the drone, it depends on the skill of the pilots. But it also depends on how effective the counter drone solution is, how it’s installed, where it’s installed, because they can be affected quite significantly by the terrain, the weather, all different types of conditions can affect how they work.
So, unfortunately, we need to think beyond what counter drone solutions offer. And to me, this is about what are our multi agency arrangements? What specialist capabilities do we have now? And what might we need for the future?
The other piece is situational awareness. Do we have true 24/7 situational awareness 365 days per year, where we can monitor potential threats and impacts for cities, our nations, etc, across all multi agency partners? And this is in the context of drones, you could argue this is even more key, because the speed of an attack from a drone is quite astonishing.
So for example, if we had a drone that was about one kilometre away from its target and was travelling at 10 metres per second, it would take approximately one minute 40 seconds to reach his target. Now that is quick. And that’s without considering all the potential targets on its route. So the speed of identification and intervention has to be rapid.
And this is what we grapple with, in terms of the potential threat posed by drones. And ironically, we really do need to be harnessing technology and artificial intelligence in order to help us manage and counter that threat. In addition, we need tighter regulations on drones, we need a clear mandate and joint approach. And we need to be increasingly proactive to stay ahead of the curve.We need to be thinking, 5, 10, 15 years ahead in reality.
SG: So being proactive, if one was to look five years ahead, and I appreciate it’s a difficult question, what drone related capability should worry us the most, or are there several?
ATD: That is a difficult question. And I think I would say several, I mean, I personally wouldn’t want to pinpoint a particular capability. For me, it’s more the combination of technological advancements and the speed with which they are advancing, how they can apply to drones and how they could be used in the wrong hands.
We’re already seeing the carrying capabilities of drones increasing significantly. Facial recognition already exists. Drones are already able to carry out autonomous flights. And the advent of 5G means that they can actually hop longer distances using the 5G network.
So they are a real prime example of how the digital world is fusing with the physical. And how we manage that and understand that is still really to be diffused and mapped out properly, I would say.
SG: So final question, then, Alex. Technology, as we’ve been discussing, is effectively considered a double-edged sword, there are benefits to it, there are also potential threats that come from it. Do you see any benefits offered by drones, for, say, NATO, for allied partners, and also for the purposes of counter-terrorism?
ATD: Absolutely. Yes, it’s good to end on a positive. We’ve seen clear evidence of how drones are being used successfully in emergency response, search and rescue, mapping crime scenes, tracking suspects. They have a lot of really beneficial uses that can be applied in both emergency response and also security, camera feeds, they’re able to provide camera feeds, in security of major events, for example, they can deliver supplies. And we’ve seen them already being used in industry, agriculture, deliveries, and there were even, I think, taxi trials by way of drone in Singapore. I’m not sure I would get in one of those taxis, but there were at least drone taxi trials.
So lots of positive uses and potential uses. I think, what it boils down to is how do we harness the opportunities that they offer, whilst mitigating and countering the threats they pose? And it’s a really delicate balance to achieve.
SG: Well, it’s good that we can try and end at least on a positive note and see the potential benefits that the drones offer and will hopefully continue to offer. It’s been great to talk to you, Alex. Thank you for providing all this very valuable input and hope to have you back on the podcast again in the future.
ATD: Thank you so much, Sajjan. It was good to be with you.
SG: It’s been our pleasure.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of NATO DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). My producers are Marcus Andreopoulos, Victoria Jones, Eve Register, and Henry McCabe. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
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This transcript has been edited for clarity