Key Reflections
* The coup in Niger was fuelled by a group within the military who were in dispute with President Mohamed Bazoum’s governance.
* The populations of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, want to reinvent their country’s relationship with external forces.
* Russia is not perceived as the saviour in West Africa, but has instead branded itself as being anti-West, exploiting ideas on the moral, ideological, and political levels.
* Jihadist groups in the Sahel are not just military actors, they behave as shadow governments dealing with issues pertaining to justice and education. However, this comes at the cost of local communities who are experiencing dire humanitarian challenges.
* Sub-Saharan Africa requires more global attention and respect. It is a region with a considerable amount of natural resources, technological and educational capacity, and great importance demographically, with one of the youngest populations on earth.
* Africa has been the priority for ISIS especially Mozambique, the DRC, northern Nigeria, and the Sahel. They are interconnected and extremely powerful on a technological, financial, and personal level. It is possible that these groups will conduct attacks further away from these territories.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
GSM: Guillaume Soto-Mayor
SG: Welcome to the NATO DEEP Dive podcast, I’m your host Dr. Sajjan Gohel and in this episode I talk to Guillaume Soto-Mayor, a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute, who is based in Senegal.
I discuss with Guillaume the insecurity in Niger and the wider picture in West Africa and the Sahel, as well as the role of the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group.
Guillaume Soto-Mayor, warm welcome to NATO Deep Dive.
GSM: Thank you, Dr. Gohel
SG: We’re going to talk a lot about events in West Africa today. Let’s start with Niger. Perhaps the most obvious question is why has there been a coup in Niger?
GSM: Thank you, Dr. Gohel. The question and the response to that question is multiple and I think it’s multi-dimensional. The first thing I want to highlight here is that there are, of course, a number of elements that have led to the coup that are interpersonal and interinstitutional, that are connected to networks of power within the Niger states. And I would say [there was] like a clan within the army, within the top brass, that were quite angry and quite distant from the Bazoum way of ruling and also fearful that he would try to oust them from their positions. And they were quite critical to its counterterrorism strategy as well, notably the liberation of a number of jihadists in the attempts that Bazoum was having to obtain a ceasefire with the Islamic State [ISIS].
And the second dimension, which I think is the most important one, is that following the coup, the essential element is the popular support for it. And what we noticed, to the surprise of many, is that the popular support for the coup was quite immediate and quite strong throughout the country, and not only in the army or the capital where there is a tradition of political opposition towards the main political power. And why is that? Mainly because people are tired, people are tired of the kleptocratic, nepotistic, corrupted governance system, which was incarnated by the main political party called the PMDS, which was Bazoum’ and the former president’s political party, who had a grasp—a hold—on the entire economy, political administrative system. And I think that people now aspire for freedom, for another perspective, for another [form of] governance. They want something new, and it is to these aspirations that the coup leaders actually responded. So, those two factors: interpersonal and I would say a tiredness towards the governance system that, in my view, were the main push factors, which allowed the success of this coup in Niger.
SG: So, if we factor in those push factors that you mentioned, why have there also been coups previously in Burkina Faso and Mali as well? Are there common traits or are there differences in those countries?
GSM: Yeah, I think that the two elements I just mentioned, with respect to both networks of power, some political, some criminal sometimes, and sometimes the ways of governing become so criminal that the two are intrinsically linked, I would say. And second, again, an aspiration from the population for anything else than what has been proposed to them. And anything else can be a religious governing system; it can be an external governing system; it can be a Pan-African governing system. Very often right now, it is a mix of all of this that transpires.
And what is actually also the truth is that there’s been, again, a tiredness in terms of the security situation in most of these countries. Populations are tired of seeing that actually what has been presented to them as the solution to their personal and family security issues that they would experience in northern Mali or in northern Burkina Faso, or in southeast Burkina Faso would be an external military intervention, namely a French military intervention or a UN peacekeeping mission. Well, those, in 10 or 12 years of presence, have failed to restore security. And naturally, the states of Burkina Faso and of Mali have failed also in that regard, but the population now wants again something new, they want to try an alternative. And I think there are definitely common traits behind the success of these coups in these three countries.
SG: How does this relate to these countries requesting French forces to leave their respective nations? Is there a dynamic that’s connected to all of this? Is this based on personal issues by the coup leaders? What are the reasons?
GSM: Naturally, this is a very complex issue, which traces back to the post-colonial times and the military and political agreements that were signed between the French political power at the time with the newly independent states. And those agreements have rules and decided over the presence and gave legitimacy to the presence of French military forces in this region, to guarantee a form of political stability and security for the populations all over the region.
Well, in that regard, the French security forces were quite naturally cold in 2013 with the Serval operation to deploy and stop the jihadist expansion in Mali. And this intervention was quite well perceived at the time, because it was seen as kind of the rational and the natural security guarantee for the region and for the population. Well, this presence right now again, has failed in its objectives, despite what Barkhane or the French military are trying to push in terms of narratives. They were promising, to the population and to the states in this region, to stop the expansion and they failed to do so and it’s not only their responsibility, obviously.
So, again, the presence has been long, and the cooperation hasn’t been ideal, not always. Populations again, have been extremely angry, and this is critically important to understand, in what they perceive as being a lack of transparency and honesty in the communication of the French politics or the French army with respect to their presence and with respect also to their military results or their sense of military results. And I think that this communication and the absence of an efficient line of communication between the population and the French army and the French diplomatic system has been the critical issue here, because they haven’t seen that the population was just exhausted, and again, waiting for any occasion to try something new. It’s not that they want Russia, or that they want China, or Türkiye, or anyone else. They just want to try something new to enhance their living conditions and this is something that I think we should understand.
SG: Sure, well, I want to come back a little later to the role of some countries in events in West Africa. But before I do that, if we look at it from a multilateral level, is there anything that ECOWAS, or the African Union, or the Organisation for Islamic Countries can do in terms of resolving the tensions in the region that have been built up following the coup in Niger, but then also, with the fact that countries like Burkina Faso and Mali have also threatened action in case there’s any intervention, so can, from a multilateral level, anything be done to alleviate the tensions?
GSM: I would be very rich if I could answer this question. My point here is twofold. First, we need to listen to the populations. We need to understand that they are new driving forces, that they are new elements that we need to respect. We need to understand that they want again, mostly, kind of a revolution in a sense, they want to reinvent the relationship of their own countries with external forces, deeming the fact not only that these external presences from the UN, European Union, even Russia, the United States or France, haven’t been able to improve their living conditions, so that they also have a responsibility in terms of their own governing structures being inefficient and unable to provide public services. So, they look into external presence through this lens. The fact that, thanks to a certain economic or political support or geopolitical support, or military support, their own inefficient rulers have been able to stay and to continue to embezzle public resources and to live on their backs basically.
And so right now, there is not only an anger there is also a hope there is a hope of something new. And any counter reaction to that, any reaction that would actually criticise them for these aspirations, would be very harshly felt naturally. And so, we see a lot of reactions in terms of whenever the junta or the immediate coup leaders are being criticised, people actually feel that their aspirations are also being criticised. So, I think that right now, there is a question of analytical metrics, there is a language, there is a diplomatic approach that needs to be renewed. So, right now, job number one from external forces, from any international institutions or bilateral partners, is a really strong introspection. And from that, after this thorough introspection, start to build a new relationship from scratch. And I think that right now is actually the only way forward.
And the second element naturally is to try to alleviate or at least to lower the diplomatic rivalries that we’re seeing throughout the region and between the main geopolitical actors present in this region, which I think are actually increasing the tensions rather than lowering them in this region.
SG: So, you talked about geopolitical rivalries and actors in the region. This brings me to my next question, which is that there’s been a lot of talk about the role of the Russian private military company, the Wagner group. They are active in a lot of these countries that we have been discussing. How much of a role does the Wagner group play when it comes to these military coups? And in connection to that, how important is the Russian angle?
GSM: Thank you. I think you are making critically important points here. First, because we actually talk too much about the Wagner Group. We put too much emphasis on their importance. It doesn’t mean that they are insignificant, naturally. It doesn’t mean that Russia isn’t an active presence in this region. It doesn’t mean that Russia, which I think it did, exploited brilliantly the weaknesses of their geopolitical rivals’ presence, and what is perceived as being the absence of results, and that they manipulated wonderfully or exploited rather wonderfully the anger, the political distress, and the political void that was in front of them. And so, I think Russia isn’t perceived as the saviour, Russia is perceived as an alternative and it managed to introduce itself as an alternative on, not only a military level, and this is critically important, it also managed to introduce itself as an alternative on a moral, ideological, and political level.
So, it also branded itself as an anti-Western, [anti-]democracies, [anti-]Western values, [anti-]Western ethics and political priorities force, in the sense that it is also anti-gender policies, to give a concrete example, that it is anti-LGBTQ+ policies, that it is also anti-external military interventions in its tradition, etc. That is also a paternalistic regime. And so, it created many bonds on several levels, and it was extremely clever in the way it did so. So, they just reinvented the relationship. And in that sense, I wouldn’t say that Russia was, as it was presented sometime, the instigator of the coups, this is absolutely wrong, and I think it is also diminishing what is actually going on in West African societies and in this population, in terms of political consciousness, of social engagement, etc.
By putting the primary responsibility on Russia, we are actually being lazy in trying to understand what is really going on in these societies. It is very easy to put all the blame on Russia and actually they’re responsible for many things and they put fuel on the fire on many occasions, but they’re not primarily responsible. And so, I think we should be again quite nuanced here. And I think that by putting an over focus on Russia, we are paradoxically giving legitimacy to many of the coup supporters in their narratives. Because actually by putting this emphasis, we are saying to them, ‘well, whenever you actually choose to be independent, whenever you choose a partner, we are actually going to fight it with every means at our disposal. So, when you are being truly independent, we are actually going to push against it for, naturally, what is perceived as being Western interests.’
So, I think this is the wrong strategy on every account. And I think we should be very cautious in the way we put, again, another emphasis on Russia’s presence, which is real and they’re conducting a lot of terrible military operations and massacres, and they are increasing inter-ethnic, inter-community tensions in the region, and they are embezzling natural resources and conducting criminal activities, etc. But again, they are not the reason why we’re here today.
SG: In our discussion, it’s becoming quite clear that you are talking about understanding the ground realities and by not understanding it, it can actually be counterproductive and that if one doesn’t understand the ground realities, then it could actually conversely become very negative and it can then be exploited by other countries who may not necessarily have instigated it, but then benefit from the falling out of the situation, like Russia and the Wagner Group that you mentioned. If we look at another country that has been active and present in West Africa: China. Where does China stand when it comes to all these events in West Africa?
GSM: China is brilliantly silent when it comes to all of these events. They are in their traditional diplomatic stance against an external military intervention, but they are brilliantly silent as is Türkiye, as are also Gulf States and also, India or Brazil, other large external powers that are increasingly present across the African continent. And what we can see here is, again, the reinvention of geopolitical struggles and attitudes towards Africa, and towards several different regions of Africa. And I think that China, as we discussed, over and over with the Russian presence and the Wagner presence, is pushing its agenda, is present, is extremely efficient on all accounts, as are many other actors that are just mentioned, as is India, as is Brazil, or Türkiye. And so, again, I think we are not looking right at the situation and we need to understand that, as any other continent around the globe, we are seeing the presence and the influence of many different actors, and we need to take into consideration all of it and not just the ones that actually matter to us.
SG: If we address the role of non-state actors. One of the challenges that often gets neglected is the fact that you have both al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates that operate in West Africa, which has been one of the reasons why there’s been so much international troop presence there in terms of it being advisors working in the background, helping frontline operations. Do the military coups that have taken place contribute to the instability in the region, which then aids entities, such as groups tied to ISIS, tied to al-Qaeda, to the jihadist entities benefit from the melee that these coups produce?
GSM: Yeah, most definitely. I think that they will benefit jihadist groups on many, many accounts, on many levels. The first, naturally, is that despite all the criticisms that we can have against them, the French military troops, or the Americans and the other partners, have been by far the most efficient in fighting these jihadi groups on the ground; killing some of their leaders on several accounts, affecting their financial resources, their recruiting patterns, and so, of course, the absence of French military troops, or the retreat of the UN, or many other external military presences, will have an effect on the capacity of these jihadi groups to expand. We have seen that already in the Gao and Ménaka region, which are in the north east of Mali, when the French departed, these regions, which had been cleared, partly at least, of jihadi presence for some time, have been reconquered by the Islamic State [ISIS] in the Sahel in six months. And it’s not the only factor, naturally, but it is among those that would facilitate their expansion.
The second element, naturally, is that the more those countries are unstable the more they actually suffer from the absence of external aid, for instance. The more dissensions there are between several parts of the country, at the political or social level, the more that the jihadist alternative ideological offer, and this is really important, they are not only military actors, these non-state actors are governing actors, right? They propose, they offer to the population an alternative governing system, an alternative justice system, an alternative security system or education system very often. So, they will be considered as being the stability. They will actually be the most secure option for many populations, for many communities across the region. And in that regard, the more unstable the political and social situation is, the more room they will have to diffuse their narrative and to legitimise their governing proposition, the governing offer to the population.
I think that yes it will, on all of these accounts, lead to these jihadi groups’ expansion in Niger and Burkina Faso and in Mali. Actually, in Mali and Burkina Faso 60%, two thirds of the territory, is already under their control. So, the situation is dire in that regard and the humanitarian situation even more so because at the end of the day, it is the communities that suffer from it and not the governing structures.
SG: Interesting that you mentioned the fact that a lot of these jihadist entities operate almost as protostates in the areas that they influence and control. In many ways that’s part of the safe bases strategy that the last leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had advocated, which was building local ties, marrying into families, earning trust, and then using that as an important asset to enhance their roots in these places. So, that’s only going to continue potentially if there’s more instability.
A final question, Guillaume, a lot of this, you’ve been talking about in our discussion, and some of this we were also having a chat offline as well, but I wanted to bring it into our discussion right now. Why should events in West Africa matter to us? Very often, many people talk about a situation in the Middle East, or North Africa, or Afghanistan Pakistan. Events in Sub-Saharan Africa, from the Sahel, Western Africa, don’t necessarily get as much attention and sometimes there is a perception, and it’s a wrong perception, that it doesn’t concern us, it’s not going to necessarily impact on us. But clearly, it does have knock on effects. Could you explain and expand on why this is so important for us to be paying attention to?
GSM: Again, this question is great because I actually would like to highlight here several things that truly matter to me even on personal levels. I’ve been living in this region for almost 10 years now, back and forth and working in this region. And I think first that we are not understanding how—of course my first answer to you would be how this region is important on an economical level, this is the obvious reason. It has a considerable amount of natural resources, it has a considerable amount of innovation capacity on a technological level, on educational level. It is the place where I think the world of tomorrow will be invented, if I’m being honest with you. It is naturally important on a demographic level, because it is one of the youngest populations on Earth and in that regard, again, this is where the world of tomorrow might be invented. And if this population continues suffering so much from, again, a large flurry of political and social struggles, the more it will impact us, and the natural link that people could see between this region and Europe, or even the United States more and more actually, is immigration.
And, and of course, with respect to the incapacity of many Western societies to integrate, but also to welcome asylum seekers and refugees and migrants in respectful manners, and all of the political tensions that are linked to it, we can see how much also the situation in West Africa impacts Europe, on again, an internal political dimension. And we see that backwards, because years after years the European Union, for instance, has been increasingly spending money on trying to alleviate or to reduce migration flows originating from West and Central Africa to Europe, right? And that money actually, in my view, could be quite criticised in the way it has been spent. Because again, as [with] most of the international aid money we’ve been spending in this region in some regards, we could be doubtful of the actual effect and impact it [has] had to enhance the living conditions of the population, whereas, actually, it might have quite strongly benefited a small political and social elite in this population. And that, I think, is the last dimension I would like to highlight.
I could highlight to you how much also this region means on security matters, because as we know, Africa is the new priority for the Islamic State [ISIS] for quite some time now. It is the continent where they’re being the most active, being in Mozambique, in the Congo, in northern Nigeria, especially, and now in the Sahel as well. And it is a place where they are naturally interconnected, extremely powerful on a technological, financial, and personal levels. And it is very likely that at some point, they will use these bases to conduct action a little bit further than these territories, right? Al-Qaeda has been present in this region for 20 years. They’ve been anchored again, as you mentioned, a very important point, they’ve been anchored socially following al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda leaders’ instructions, they’ve been really melted and embedded within local societies and so it would be very difficult to actually force them out.
And actually, also we could speak on criminal levels, because organised crime in this region is exploding and is thriving. We can see, naturally drug trafficking, but not only [that], natural resources trafficking is huge, cigarette trafficking, counterfeit medicine, and those have a massive impact on local populations. But the more these criminal networks are being reinforced, the more they are actually also powerful in South America, in Europe, or in Asia, right? Because it is one of the places where they will get resources from. So, naturally, all of this is interconnected.
But the last point I would like to mention here is highly political. In Africa, West Africa especially, has been very often, in my view, kind of a premonition of what would come to other places. It is a place on earth, for at least the last 30 years, which has seen such a rapid evolution of their political systems; liberalisation in the 90s of its political and media and of its societies; a massive economic development, but it also has been suffering the consequences of the structural adjustment programmes in the 80s and the 90s, stronger than any region on Earth. It is a place where a lot of things are being reinvented. It is a place where, again, traditional lines; tribal, family, clan solidarities, and lines and comprehension of society do still matter a lot. Where religion is key, where people are highly capitalistic in many ways. There are a lot of dimensions that are again, Pan-African, but also sometimes very nationalistic.
What I mean with all of this is that these societies are being reinvented in front of our own eyes. It is both the end of a certain, in my view, of a certain ruling system that people are absolutely tired of, and also the reinvention of a new one that could emerge from it. Either we are going to be out of it, or we are going to be supporting it, or part of the story. But I think there is hardly going to be a way in between. And I think that right now, a lot of researchers as well should understand that the institutional lens isn’t the only one. We shouldn’t always look at societies in the way government’s function, or talking only to the ruling party or the opposition party, right? I think that right now, what matters is that again societies are being completely reinvented.
So, we need also to reinvent the way we understand them, and talk to them, and try to cooperate with them, and support them in whatever they want to do. And it is the same for the military presence, actually. Military cooperation, and this is pretty much what all of the juntas have been saying, they want to reinvent military cooperation. They don’t want to stop the cooperation with the French, or to stop the cooperation with the Americans. They just want to build another balance. And I think that right now, this is why this region is so interesting, and so important. It’s because I think a lot of what’s going to come is going to be decided there and invented there.
SG: These are such important dimensions that you’ve brought in, and you’ve really provided a tour de force of the ground realities of what has been taking place in West Africa. So, let me just thank you, again, Guillaume for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive and hope to have you back in the future to provide us with more updates as to what is transpiring in that region.
GSM: Thank you very much. It was my honour and my pleasure.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of NATO DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). My producers are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the NATO DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.