Key Reflections
* Captagon was originally a licit pharmaceutical drug mostly used for attention deficit disorders until the 1980s. In the 1990s and 2000s, it began to trickle into the black market.
* Today, the drug has made its way to the Levant, where actors aligned with the Assad regime in Syria have benefitted from involvement in the Captagon trade.
* It was thought that normalising relations with Syria could help stem the flow of Captagon, but this has not necessarily proven to be the case.
* Captagon labs and networks have been uncovered in parts of Europe as well now, such as in Germany and Austria.
* Between 2018 and 2021, captagon smugglers used commercial maritime shipping methods to traffic the drug. After that, routes became more localised, with the product being moved in trucks and civilian vehicles across borders. Smugglers sometimes even engage in risky behaviour including attacks against military actors like the Jordanian Armed Forces.
* Captagon has also contributed to food insecurity in parts of the Levant, which does not get enough attention. Therefore, counter-narcotics needs to factor that aspect into future initiatives.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
CR: Caroline Rose
SG: Welcome to the NATO DEEP Dive podcast, I’m your host Dr. Sajjan Gohel, and in this episode, I talk with Caroline Rose, the Director of the Strategic Blind Spots Portfolio at the New Lines Institute.
I discuss with Caroline her research on the Captagon narcotics trade as well as the intersection of defence, security, and geopolitics from Europe to North Africa and the Middle East to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Caroline Rose, thank you for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive.
CR: Thank you so much for having me. It’s great to be here.
SG: It’s our pleasure. Let’s start with a broad brush. Talk to me about how serious, currently, the challenges are with the intersection of illicit economies, armed conflict, and insecurity.
CR: Absolutely. So, I think that this is a very unique challenge that is emerging in the 21st century. With the doubling down and the acceleration of globalisation, along with blurred lines in active and latent conflict zones, illicit economies are beginning to embed themselves very deeply into governance networks, into local security landscapes. And they’re doing an excellent job by undermining governance, exacerbating corruption, and using illicit economies as alternative revenue sources that allow them to accrue power, but then also, over time, degrade human security. A lot of these actors are armed actors, and once they accrue political influence, they also broaden their access to arms and pursue violence against local communities or forces of government. And because of that, this is really an emerging challenge. You have, of course, organised crime, but you also have armed groups that are becoming very intimately embedded and intertwined with illicit economies.
SG: So, I want to delve deeper into this. And in particular, one aspect that you’ve been researching in great detail, you even testified to the UK Parliament about it, and that is that there has been a great concern over the dangerous impact of the drug Captagon. Now not everyone knows about this narcotic. Can you firstly explain what it is and then also talk about its proliferation?
CR: Absolutely. So Captagon was actually first introduced to the licit pharmaceutical market in the 1960s by a German pharmaceutical company named Degussa AG. And it was essentially produced for a variety of different needs, the first and foremost being ADHD, attention deficit disorders. It would be occasionally or reportedly used for weight loss as well, but primarily used for attention deficit disorders. And in the 1960s, when it was introduced on the pharmaceutical market, it had a very brief tenure there until the mid-1980s when it was scheduled by the World Health Organization and then incrementally taken off the licit market. In the 1990s to the early 2000s, that’s when we started to see Captagon trickle into the black market, where it was proliferated by organised criminal groups in the Balkans, and it slowly migrated and made its way into Turkey and then eventually into the Levant in Syria and Lebanon, where a variety of non-state actors began to produce Captagon in very small amounts.
The reason why we think that Captagon became popular in the early 2000s to mid-2010s in the Middle East was because it used to be a licit pharmaceutical substance that would require prescription, and it was used for productivity. And because of that the taboo of drug use was lessened. The taboo of using Captagon was deemed less societally shameful, and because of that, Captagon became a very popular substance. It also became a useful substance for those facing food insecurity, those working multiple shifts that needed something to get them through the day.
SG: Let’s look at one in particular, which is its negative impact on the Syrian civil war. Who is benefiting the most from this illicit trade?
CR: Without a doubt, actors that are closely aligned with the Syrian regime. In the mid-2010s, you saw a dramatic shift from small-scale production to large-scale, industrial-size production around 2018 to 2019, where we began to see Captagon seized in millions of pills. Incredible industrial-scale capacity for both production and smuggling, where only a state actor that had access to Mediterranean ports like the Port of Latakia as well as commercial vessels and the industrial-scale packaging that it required to be shipped in such large amounts. And because of that, even today, we still see the Syrian regime benefiting from the Captagon trade because they control the checkpoints for taxing Captagon tablets and shipments. They control the border hubs and cross-border trafficking nodes.
This has also allowed them to have leverage in negotiations for normalisation discussions. And then of course, the elephant in the room is that Captagon has become a very lucrative illicit trade that has allowed the regime to reap what we estimate to be billions of dollars per year, roughly two to three billion dollars annually. And that’s just regime actors. Of course, there are non-state actors, there continue to be communities involved in the opposition and lone wolves and criminal networks that are actively involved in Captagon production that are not affiliated with the Syrian regime. However, the Syrian regime network is the most extensive and by far produces the great majority of Captagon stemming from Syria.
SG: I find it mind-boggling, the figures you were talking about, just billions that the regime has made within the chaos of the civil war and the misery that so many millions have felt inside the country. So the Assad regime is somewhat being rehabilitated within the Arab world. How do we address the fact that the Captagon trade is still growing in the midst of the multiple Arab nations that are taking steps towards normalising the relationship with Syria?
CR: Well, certainly. I think that it’s notable when you look at the statistics, and you look at arrests and seizure data from countries, Captagon is not growing to the extent that it did between 2020 and 2021. It’s still steadily growing in the region, but not at such a rate that this constitutes a crisis for anti-narcotics and law enforcement agencies. That being said, we are seeing an uptick in reports, particularly amongst transit countries like Jordan and more frequent reports of Captagon seizures, which shows that law enforcement agencies are getting smarter about detecting Captagon shipments. They’re also communicating a lot better amongst themselves and amongst other law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies. That being said, now there’s a discussion about bringing Syria into the fold and involving them in that conversation and even allowing them to contribute to ongoing investigations into networks inside of Syria, identifying who was involved in the Captagon trade from both a production standpoint and a trafficking standpoint.
By allowing and bringing Damascus into that conversation, giving them agency about who they can approve or deny…I think, is extremely premature, just given that the regime does have extensive networks and connections to large-scale Captagon production and trafficking networks. That being said, it does seem like the region is starting to slow down with particular normalisation efforts, especially after admitting them into the Arab League. It didn’t necessarily yield the results they wish to see on counter-narcotics. There was this big belief that the flow of Captagon would dramatically be reduced after Syria was admitted, believing that…as a move and confidence-building measure that would somehow translate to a reduction in flow. And we have not seen that. In fact, this past summer, we’ve seen a dramatic rise in Captagon laboratory seizures, Captagon shipments, seizures, and arrests across the region. So, because of that, I think that many of Syria’s neighbours are recognising that direct collaboration with the Syrian regime may not necessarily be the most strategic or successful move and decision that they can make when it comes to stemming the flow of Captagon.
SG: Talking about stemming the flow, could the Captagon trade potentially expand well beyond the Middle East? I’m thinking of places like Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, which have had challenges of narcotics such as opium, heroin, methamphetamines, but also through the Balkans, which I recall you did mention a little earlier.
CR: Absolutely. I think that in the Middle East, it’s reached its limit to where it’s an extremely popular substance. There’s now a very large-scale law enforcement campaign across states, an intra-regional counter-narcotics campaign that is concentrated on Captagon. And because of that, we’re starting to see trafficking networks get creative and identify new potential consumption markets outside of the region. The reason why Captagon can be competitive within new markets is because Captagon has so many uses. Captagon can be used for productivity, but also it can be used for food insecurity, it can be used to work a second or third shift, it can be used recreationally. And because of that, it is kind of this multi-use drug. It’s an amphetamine-type stimulant. It’s addictive for sure, and it has many health concerns associated with it. But that being said, it’s still not perceived as this hard drug like, for example, heroin and cocaine would be. And because of that, I think it can be extremely competitive in other markets outside of the Middle East. We’ve already started to see trends that indicate that Captagon is moving into Iraq very steadily as a both transit and destination market.
We’ve already started to see labs seized in Iraq, which we’ve never seen before this past summer. In terms of Iran, where there is a high methamphetamine use and heroin use as well, Captagon certainly could be a competitive substance. But I think the biggest trend that we’re starting to see is Captagon move in across the Mediterranean, through the Balkans, and into Europe. We have already seen it this past July; a Captagon laboratory was seized in Regensburg in Bavaria, Germany. We’ve also seen various Captagon smuggling networks busted across Europe, primarily in Austria of all places, as well as networks that have helped with trafficking operations in Italy as well. So, it looks like they’re trying to plant roots across Europe, as well as Africa, and that’s the last potential transit and destination market. We’ve seen Captagon be trafficked to transit ports and transit routes within Africa, particularly in Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, and various other countries. And we also have heard reports of militants being attracted to Captagon just because it supposedly boosts their performance on the battlefield.
SG: So, it is spreading quite substantially, and as you gave the examples of Germany and Austria, it is already now in continental Europe, so that is deeply concerning. Building on that, what are the routes, the methods for the narcotics to move across countries? Is it with couriers? Is it through human trafficking? How is it being shipped around?
CR: So, from 2018 to 2021, I would say that the most popular way was through commercial maritime shipping. You would see overland smuggling, and certainly overland smuggling didn’t disappear during that time period, but maritime smuggling through proven existing commercial shipping routes and shipping lanes, that was a very popular way to transport industrial-size Captagon shipments. But after, in 2021, there was a severe uptick in the attention and concern and study and examination of Captagon trafficking, because it really did explode in the region.
The sizes of shipments were just astronomical, I mean they were in the millions of pills. After that happened, you saw smugglers shift their tactics. They then sought to exploit reopened smuggling routes, for example, the Jaber-Nasib border crossing between Syria and Jordan, and also rely on overland smuggling. So you had smaller shipments, they were not in the millions of pills, but they were in the thousands, and it relied upon a broader network of local communities, local tribes that were recruited to essentially smuggle Captagon in backpacks or even in some cases in convoys, in trucks, in civilian cars and civilian vehicles across the border. And that’s why we’ve seen a severe uptick in Captagon smuggling along the Syrian-Jordanian border. Some smuggling operations have been militarised as well.
We’ve seen some smugglers kind of accept very risky behaviour by firing on Jordanian Armed Forces and participating in armed clashes with Jordanian Armed Forces. We’ve also seen an uptick in smuggling efforts along the Saudi-Jordanian border as well, particularly a lot of attempts at the Al-Haditha port. And then also we’ve started to see smuggling from Iraq into Kuwait, from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They are really identifying new overland routes to transport Captagon in smaller sizes, but in more frequent bursts.
SG: Well I’m very glad that you helped lay out the methods of how it moves around because it’s very important, especially for a practitioner to understand themselves and a lot of them that we interact with, as part of the work for NATO’s train the trainer programme, including the Jordanian Armed Forces. So, the example that you brought up with what they’re having to encounter is really, really important there. You mentioned earlier that Captagon is not viewed as a hard drug. Is that ever going to change? What would it take for that to be elevated, and are there countries, or at a multilateral level, [are there] desires to make it viewed as a hard drug?
CR: I think that when it comes to Captagon, one of the trickiest elements—and for me as a researcher and analyst, one of the most concerning elements —about Captagon is that we really don’t know what’s in it anymore. So, I mentioned in the 1960s, this was a licit pharmaceutical product, and there was a formula, it followed the fenethylline formula, and because of that, there was a definition of what Captagon was. But now…its chemical evolution has changed so much…. There are very few laboratory analyses that show the chemical composition, but the few that do show that Captagon does not whatsoever resemble the fenethylline formula of the 1960s to 1980s. Instead, it actually is nothing like it. Sometimes it has little to no amphetamine at all, or sometimes up to 47% of amphetamine metabolised inside the pill, along with a variety of cutting agents that range between quinine, caffeine, and a number of other substances that can be either harmful or not harmful to the user. And really, it shows that these smuggling networks and these producers, they’re kind of making Captagon whatever they want it to be. There’s no formula; there’s no set guideline or procedure that these producers are following when it comes to the manufacturing process of Captagon.
Because of that, coming back to your question of “will this be considered with more stigma or perceived with more stigma as it expands to new markets?” I think it’s entirely possible, but what would require that is more frequent and sustained testing. So, law enforcement in the Middle East that do seize Captagon pills being able to send it to laboratories for consistent testing, identify that chemical composition of that batch of Captagon, and make it publicly available and compare it with other seized shipments that are also chemically analysed. That would make a big difference for researchers but then also, of course, the public perception of what Captagon really is. As of now, it’s an amphetamine-type stimulant, an ATS, which I would also say overall is not perceived with much stigma as, for example, other harder substances, heroin, cocaine, etc.
SG: So that’s very interesting. I wanted to segue a little because the other big development that is happening in the region in the Middle East has been the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Was this down to great power competition, thanks to say countries like China’s involvement, or as others have suggested, are there more immediate practical concerns such as for example the trafficking of Captagon?
CR: I think that the Iranian-Saudi Arabian rapprochement process had a lot to do with the rapprochement process between Syria and its Arab neighbours. I really do believe that that normalisation process sparked another and that when it came to Iranian expectations and demands, that was a hidden concession that was not on paper, but it was an expectation that regional players would test this out. And that’s why we also saw the urgency and the immediacy. The Iranian-Saudi Arabian rapprochement process, that was in March, and in April and May, we saw a huge rush to roll out the red or white carpet for President Bashar al-Assad. We saw the string of regional visits, and really, I think that that had a lot to do with the timing.
That being said, of course, the earthquake as well really did change the tide for normalisation with the Syrian regime. A lot of countries were already toying with the idea of normalisation. Some have tried and failed, for example, I think that Jordan could be counted as one of them. They tried to open the Jaber-Nasib border crossing about a year before that, and after they did that there was a huge uptick in violent smuggling operations, and they pumped the brake on normalisation. A number of other countries like Saudi Arabia that had been much more cautious for normalisation also rushed to that process following the earthquake and following the March Chinese-brokered deal. And because of that, I think that that normalisation can be seen as intimately intertwined with normalisation with Syria and ongoing rapprochement talks.
SG: A lot of geopolitical moves right there. Sticking with the potential of building ties, the chances of Israel and Saudi Arabia having closer official engagement at a diplomatic level seems to have moved a step closer—we’ll have to watch this space—but how does that impact on the region? How does it also impact on a lot of the aspects that we’ve been talking about such as counter-narcotics cooperation? Where do you see the key strategic dynamics between Israel and Saudi Arabia emerging?
CR: Certainly. So, I think that this creates a new balancing act for Riyadh that we had not seen before. We’ve always heard Riyadh trying to diversify their foreign policy agenda and diversify their diplomatic relations. This does that. However, being able to juggle two parallel rapprochement processes with two of probably the most bitter regional rivals, Israel and Iran—that’s going to be a very delicate process for Riyadh to balance. And because of that, I think that we will see counter-narcotics, that agenda and that issue, elevated to the top of both normalisation processes. I think that’s also why we saw counter-narcotics so prominently featured with normalisation with Syria as well. And the reason for that is because it is less politically sensitive to many countries. It’s a newer subject. Not many people are even aware of what Captagon is. And even for law enforcement systems, there are processes and procedures in place.
Captagon counter-narcotics in general seems like an easy win and something that they can elevate to the top of the negotiation agenda because it’s easy to build momentum on. With Syria, it’s a bit more politically difficult and challenging, and because of that, I think there’s been a turn away from that recently. But when it comes to Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, I think it’s very likely that we’ll see this issue featured prominently in discussions. And when it comes to Israel especially, this is now a shared concern between Riyadh and their Israeli counterparts as well. Israel hasn’t been a hub of Captagon consumption, but they have seized Captagon along their border.
The IDF has now announced some regular seizures of what seems to be Captagon and other amphetamine-type stimulants. And as a lot of these Iran-aligned networks that are involved in Captagon smuggling, also production, inside of southern Syria, as they accumulate and as they proliferate their presence along their border with Israel. This could be something that Israel would seek dialogue and communication with Riyadh with regarding interdiction capacity, best practices, and just communication about and intelligence about the networks that are operating.
SG: A lot of important dynamics right there. A theme that’s been constant in our discussion has been this aspect of food insecurity, and very often, that is always there when it comes to narcotics. We’ve seen it in, for example, Afghanistan, where the growing of poppies has been seen as the alternative to growing normal crops because it’s easier, it’s less expensive, it’s weatherproof. Slightly different, I guess, when it comes to the aspect of Captagon, but are there strategies, are there goals, potential options to alleviate the food insecurity in the Middle East, which Captagon has benefited so much from?
CR: Absolutely, and I think it’s very important that when we talk about the timing of Captagon on the rise, when it really did explode in the Levant, it was exploiting food insecurity. It was exploiting economic insecurity in a country that had been ravaged by a civil war for years. And the actors that were actively involved in Captagon production, especially those on an industrial scale—this wasn’t necessarily about community-level development and using Captagon as an alternative revenue locally, but rather on a national scale, given the level of high-level regime-aligned officials, businessmen, and other magnates that have been involved in Captagon production and trafficking. Because of that, I think that when we look to solutions for food insecurity inside of Syria, this has been an ongoing discussion for a very long time throughout the civil war. That starts and ends with a political settlement, which unfortunately, at this point in the civil war, and even in the rapprochement process, does not look likely given the litany of non-starters for the Syrian regime, also their role in the diversion process with humanitarian aid and widespread corruption.
So, when we look to Captagon and its role in ongoing food insecurity, it’s very likely that the alternative revenue that’s being generated by this trade, it’s really not trickling into local communities. It is not bolstering local economic and employment opportunities or anything like that. While local community members, we believe, have been employed at some Captagon processing facilities and Captagon manufacturing facilities, it does not look like this is being used, for example, like crops have as means for local survival. It seems very concentrated in the hands of a few inside of Syrian regime-held territories.
SG: Well, you’ve helped provide so much detail and perspective on all the different dynamics to do with Captagon. And a final question, and I have to ask this one, especially as I teach at the LSE, like myself and our two producers of the NATO podcast, Marcus and Victoria, you too are an alum of LSE’s International History department. How much did your master’s degree there help you in your career path and what you’re researching now?
CR: I think that studying at the LSE and studying in their International History department gave me an incredibly strong foundation and a base of knowledge that allowed me to understand how states interact with each other, history of conflict, but then also history of diplomatic breakthroughs as well. And then also it exposed me to coursework, and it exposed me to classmates and faculty members that I’m still in touch with today that have been an incredible resource and also played an incredible role in my own professional development. And really, I’m extremely happy that I had that degree and had that time at LSE.
SG: I know everyone in the department is very proud of you and what you’re doing. And we wish you to continue your efforts because it’s so important the research that you’re doing. You’re another very timely reminder of why historians do make the best practitioners. So Caroline, let me thank you again for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive,and hope to have you back in the future.
CR: Thank you so much. Thank you so much for having me.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of NATO DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP). My producers are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the NATO DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.