Key Reflections
* The U.S. Helsinki Commission was established on 3 June 1976 as part of détente during the Cold War, to monitor human rights conditions in Europe. It is based on the idea that human rights within a given country was a subject of legitimate scrutiny for all countries.
* The commission is a bipartisan, independent agency, which operates like a congressional committee, holding hearings, issuing statements, going on international travel, and engaging in inquiries.
* In the United States Congress, there is a sense of bipartisan and bicameral backing when it comes to the issue of Ukraine. Discussions focus on Putin’s malign influence internationally as well as the moral element of the war itself and what it represents in principle.
* Active collection of evidence to document Russia’s war crimes and human rights abuses in Ukraine is ongoing. The need for an official genocide resolution is important, both symbolically and practically.
* The Wagner Group is known to carry out nefarious activity both in Ukraine as well as in other theatres, such as Mali and Syria. There is bipartisan support in the U.S. to label the entity as a terrorist organisation.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
AT: Alex Tiersky
MC: Michael Cecire
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
In this episode, we speak with Alex Tiersky and Michael Hikari Cecire who both work at The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, which is an independent commission of the U.S. Federal Government.
Alex serves as the Commission’s Global Security and Political-Military Affairs Advisor. He also is the host of the Commission’s podcast series, Helsinki on the Hill. A former Specialist in Foreign Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, Alex was Director for the Defence and Security Committee at NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly.
Michael focuses on the South Caucasus and Black Sea regional affairs, as a senior policy advisor. Previously, he was an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, as well as being a policy advisor and researcher on Eurasia issues supporting the Department of Defense and other U.S. Governmental agencies.
Alex and Michael, a warm welcome to NATO DEEP Dive.
AT: Sajjan, it’s really great to be here. Thanks for inviting us on the show.
MC: Thanks so much, I really appreciate it.
SG: It’s our pleasure. Let’s talk about the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which is also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission. I’m a historian, so I’ve always been very intrigued by names that are grounded in history. Where does the name of the U.S. Helsinki Commission derive from Alex?
AT: Sajjan, it’s a great question and something I find myself answering frequently from grandparents and cousins and friends and explaining that, ‘no, we’re not located in Finland, we don’t do restaurant recommendations for Helsinki.’ The history of the commission is actually a really interesting one. Your listeners might be familiar with a major diplomatic negotiation and agreement that was reached in the 70s, during the period of detente between the East and the West. It was called the Helsinki Final Act, named for the city in which it was signed. And the Helsinki Final Act essentially established a set of principles, by which security across the Soviet and Western blocs was going to be at least discussed.
What was really ground-breaking, from our perspective, in the Helsinki Final Act principles, was that for the first time, there was an explicit linkage made between the security internal to a state and inter-ethnic tensions that might lead to conflict within a state, and how that might contribute to conflict between different states. So, interstate conflict. And as a kind of segue from that principle that was agreed, again by the east and the west, was the idea that human rights within a given country was, therefore, a subject of legitimate scrutiny for all of the countries. Again, the ground-breaking element here was really that the human rights situation in any given country could be questioned by governments outside of the country.
And so the signature of the Helsinki Final Act again goes back to 1975 and the signature was between the heads of heads of state of these various countries. But of course, Michael and I work for members of the United States Congress, and we know well that the United States Congress likes to get involved in some of these conversations, and that was just as true then as it is now. As the Helsinki Final Act was being finalised, there was a delegation of members of the United States Congress travelling in Europe and in the East, and they met with dissidents from the Soviet Union, who recognised this ground-breaking principle of human rights being open to legitimate scrutiny, from the outside.
These human rights activists took the opportunity to talk to the members of Congress, including this this one fascinating woman, Millicent Fenwick, who really in a sense, is kind of the mother of the Helsinki Commission, and explained look, ‘this agreement allows you, the outside world, the United States Congress, to hold our government to account for the abuses they’re inflicting on us [and] on our society. Let us give you the evidence of these human rights violations and then you can use this agreement, the Helsinki Final Act, to hold the governments to account and hopefully improve conditions for us.’
So, Millicent Fenwick came back to Washington very inspired by these dissidents, in the Soviet Union, and said, ‘you know what? We agree that the Helsinki Final Act is absolutely ground-breaking, but we’re not confident, necessarily, that our most senior executive branch authorities will continue to hold the Soviets to account for their violations of human rights. We need to create an institution that will in a sense, be the conscience of the United States government, and of the broader signatories to the Helsinki Final Act, to make sure that this is top of the agenda every time that there’s a bilateral discussion. Let us create a commission that will monitor the commitments made under the Helsinki Final Act and primarily on human rights.’
So, she drafted legislation and, one thing leads to another as they say, on 3 June 1976, the Helsinki Commission, formerly known as the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was created. So, that’s how we get from the Helsinki Final Act to the Helsinki Commission. Again, the formal name being the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
SG: That’s very interesting, indeed. And it’s grounded in Cold War history. Looking at, of course, the role, the dynamics of the Soviet Union which no longer exists. But in many ways the current manifestation that is Russia comes up a lot. So, with that in mind, what is the nature and the role of the U.S. Helsinki Commission today?
MC: Yeah, I can jump in here. I should apologise to your listeners ahead of time, given I seem to have a frog in my throat, I’m battling a bit of a cold, but hopefully that doesn’t slow us down too much.
In terms of the Helsinki Commission’s structure and role, the thing that we think is very important to understand, and is a point of pride for us, is that we are a bicameral, bipartisan, independent agency and I’m throwing a lot of words in there, but what that essentially means is that we have leadership that come from both chambers of Congress, from both the Senate and the House. We have 18 commissioners, nine from each of the two chambers. And we also have a toe in the executive branch as well, statutorily. We have 21 commissioners in total, including one from each of the Department of Defence, Department of State, and Department of Commerce.
But because of our overwhelmingly congressional leadership, we tend to be seen as, and are sometimes recognised as, being something of a legislative branch entity, although technically we’re not, we’re technically an independent agency. We have this foot in the executive branch and in the legislative branch because of our leadership, but we’re actually on, for those who care about these sorts of things, on the State Department’s appropriations line. So, it’s a little bit of fun trivia.
But what that means in practicality is that we can operate in a lot of ways like a congressional commission, or even in some ways like a congressional committee, in that our congressional leadership will hold hearings, they will issue statements, they will go on international travel and engage in inquiry. And so we work a lot to support our bipartisan, bicameral congressional leadership. And it also means that we have the ability, if our leadership is so interested, to do things like develop legislation in response to a problem. So, that history that Alex was speaking to a moment ago really is not only about platforming and elevating issues and topics of concern, although that’s a big part of it, but also identifying potential remedies. And sometimes the remedy really is about elevating and shedding light on a problem. But sometimes the remedy is truly a matter of policy tweaking and that can be our leadership writing letters to the president, to secretaries of executive branch agencies, but also developing legislation itself to fix whatever the problem is that we’ve identified.
SG: It’s a very important aspect that you raise, Michael. Alex, do you want to add something?
AT: I do, thanks, Michael gave a terrific overview. I would just add one key element that is pretty poorly understood, I think, outside of those of us who work in this domain. [It] is the role that our members play in a field called parliamentary diplomacy, it’s come to be known as parliamentary diplomacy. So, where our members, of course, are very active here in the United States, as Michael suggested, in writing legislation, and here, I would point for instance, your listeners may well have heard of the Magnitsky sanctions, that’s something that we’re quite proud originated here with the Helsinki Commission and our leadership really driving this forward through the Congress, very consequentially.
But also as they travel, as Michael suggested, frequently they’re participating in both informal bilateral meetings, with heads of state or ministers of various countries, whether it’s in those countries or in their offices here in Washington, and of course, we support all of those activities. But also they’re part of a formal organisation, focused on this field of parliamentary diplomacy, called the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. And this is a standing body that meets regularly to discuss issues under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which again comes back to where we started, that organisation founded on exactly the same set of principles that the Helsinki Commission was founded to monitor. And in that Parliamentary Assembly, the senators and members of the House that we work for, will travel and engage in dialogue directly, whether it’s on the Ukraine aggression, with the Russians, either participating or not, the conversations with the Ukrainians, but also their German and French counterparts are there, all of the Central Asian states participate, and all of the so-called ‘neutral’ European states are also a part of this 57 participating state organisation.
So, that can be a very fruitful forum for our members to both generate consensus, for example, on the support of Ukraine, in the current situation, as they face Russian aggression, but also to promulgate best practices in various fields, for instance, on combating the trafficking of human beings.
SG: So, you mentioned Russian aggression, this naturally leads us to a broader discussion on the role of the U.S. Congress in foreign policy. What are the congressional views when it comes to supporting Ukraine as well as dealing with the Russian aggression in the Ukraine itself, led by the Kremlin?
MC: Well, I would say, first of all, that as a disclaimer we can’t really portray a full on congressional view, but I would say the dominant view, and certainly a view that is shared in strong part by our commission leadership, has been one of robust, enduring, and strong support to Ukraine, to Ukraine’s independence, to its fight for its survival, and very much against Russia’s—I would say it’s and we would say it’s—genocidal war of conquest there. And so, I think we’ve seen expressions of that quite clearly in Congress over the past 10 months or so, since the full-scale invasion started. Not only expressed through these large appropriations that have been—these drawdowns—to provide Ukraine with humanitarian and economic and military aid during these trying times, but also in a raft of other measures of support that demonstrate just how clearly this is an affront to our principles, and how clearly we see this as an attack, not just on Ukraine, but on European security more generally, and an attack on global peace more broadly.
So, it’s something that I think we in the Helsinki Commission, feel very intimately and we think about constantly, and we sometimes say that we’re in something of a wartime footing and so much of what we do, and so much of that history that Alex talked about before, really does put into sharp relief what is being abrogated by this invasion, conducted by the Kremlin, in Ukraine. Ukraine’s sovereignty and the right of its people is very much enough, I would say, but we see a much bigger narrative of play here too, in the sense that since the agreement was forged, in 1975, there has never been a clear demonstration of an incineration, or an attempted incineration, of these principles, as we’re seeing in Russia’s war in Ukraine right now.
And so, it becomes this thing where we have to think about certainly the moral urgency with regard to Ukraine itself, but also the fragile, and interdependent nature of the European security architecture, and the ways by which preserving that architecture, preserving our ability to take for granted the idea that one country just can’t roll into another and take what it wants and destroy what it wants at will. And the way that is connected to our ability to advocate for human rights, to promote democracy, to enable exchange internationally, not just in Europe, and the exchange of ideas, certainly, but also of basic economic commerce, is so much dependent on this this notion that we have taken for granted and we should want to take for granted, that one country cannot just attack another because it decides that that’s somehow it’s right or convenience.
So, I think we all know what’s at stake here. And I think Congress as a whole has responded quite powerfully in various ways, certainly in the provision of aid and material supply to Ukraine, but also supporting the moral aspects of this conflict, the moral aspects of our role here, and defending what we see as the importance of the European security architecture for Ukraine, for Europe’s security, for our national security, which I think is quite closely intertwined with that, and for global stability writ large. And I think one little slice of that [which] we can see is quite evident, is in the way this war has disrupted food security across the world. And again, that’s a very small straw that we’re looking at, as impactful as that is. And so, you can see what the implications are more broadly, if Russia is allowed to get away with everything that’s been doing in Ukraine.
SG: Alex, please.
AT: Thanks. Again, I think Michael’s response was completely spot on. I think the only thing I would add is I would describe the members of the United States Helsinki Commission, the senators and the members of the House that we work with most closely, really as the vanguard of what is a really broad cross-section of bipartisan, bicameral support for Ukraine and in opposition to the Kremlin and Putin’s malign influence across the entire region and the broader world. Our commissioners are continually looking for ways to do more, faster, better to support Ukraine and to thwart some of Putin’s aggressive actions and the tools that are available to him.
But I also think it’s important to underline two other things: the commissioners who we work for are not new to this issue. In part, through their engagement through the Helsinki Commission, through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, they’ve been in direct conversation on the challenges Ukraine faces from Russia for decades but especially since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. They’ve been intimately involved in the conversations over the setting up of a mission of international monitors on the border of Ukraine, the border observation mission that the Russians have vetoed, as well as a broader special monitoring mission that the OSCE has launched. So they’ve been quite familiar with how Russia has been violating every principle under the Helsinki Final Act in its aggression against Ukraine, at a minimum since 2014, but long since before as well.
As a second part, because you asked, “How does the Congress feel about Ukraine?” I think we have to acknowledge that there are voices that are very limited in number that are amplified in the media megaphone that have expressed some scepticism about assistance to Ukraine. I think it’s absolutely fair to say that the members of Congress who we work for are quite confident that the bipartisan, bicameral consensus will absolutely hold going forward. And to the extent that there are questions about, for instance, accountability for the assistance that’s being provided, those are questions I think that our Ukrainian friends welcome entirely and are not inappropriate from the perspective of providing accountability to the taxpayer who’s funding a significant support. I think our members would tell you that it behoves all of the leaders in the political system of the United States to continue to make the case on why this assistance is necessary, which of course our commissioners believe that it is, and how it will be accountable to the taxpayer and their representatives. And again, it really is our sense and the sense of our leaders that that consensus is not in any danger.
SG: Well, that’s very encouraging to hear, especially about the bipartisan support for Ukraine. Essential, in fact. Both of you said very important things. Alex, you talked about Putin’s malign influence, and Michael, you talked about Russia’s genocidal conquest. You both are also working on two very important legislative initiatives. Let’s look at those. Michael, I’d like to talk to you first about what you’re working on, and that is explicitly naming Russian aggression as genocide. What’s happening on this front?
MC: Yeah, happy to talk about that. So in terms of what’s happening, as a commission, we’ve worked on a resolution text that was introduced in the House by our co-chairman, Representative Steve Cohen and our ranking member, Representative Joe Wilson, and a version of that, a companion bill with very similar text was introduced in the Senate by Senator Jim Risch, as well as co-sponsored by our chairman, Senator Ben Cardin, as well as our Senate ranking member, Senator Roger Wicker. So the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has actually passed unanimously Senate Resolution 713. And we hope and expect for it to pass in the wider Senate in this Congress, so before the year is up, and so that’s something that we’re very excited about.
In the House [of Representatives], we haven’t seen quite as much movement there. There is quite a number of members who have expressed strong support for this, and there seems to be a great deal of interest in it, but sometimes, that’s the way these things go. I think we still have hope that we can get something through in this Congress, but if not, I think there’s a real opportunity in the next Congress as well. And I think that, again, speaks to the bipartisan nature of the work that we’re doing.
More broadly, I think what is important about these resolutions—and I’m often asked, “What’s so important about a non-binding resolution?” which they are, and “Why does this matter?” And it’s always interesting to me because when we speak to our Ukrainian friends, both government officials from Kyiv, parliament members, civil society members, and even people from the front lines, they’ll tell us their kind of wish lists for aid and arms. They’ll talk about the material needs in the country more generally. And then they’ll say something interesting: they will almost always say “Also a genocide resolution. Also, a genocide resolution.” And I think that speaks to just how powerfully that notion resonates with Ukrainian society…the idea that the world, and particularly the United States in this regard, sees what they are enduring…that we understand what it is they’re going through and that we’re willing to speak out and call it by its name. And what we’re trying to do with these resolutions is separate out the legal adjudicative process, which we know is important, which we know has authority, but also needs time.
It needs patience, and it rises and falls on technicalities, and we’ve seen this in other contexts as well. It could be years, maybe even many years, before any kind of a full-blown adjudicative process is able to be completed for a genocide declaration to be made on that basis. But based on the evidence that we have in front of us, which is overwhelming and compounding, and based in the spirit of the 1948 Genocide Convention, that spirit of prevention that really animates it, we felt it was very important to have a political declaration. And we’re not the first to do that. Ukraine has done one in their parliament, but also the Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic, and our friends in Canada and Ireland as well. So we see that there’s a great opportunity here to really speak out and provide a little bit of added leadership in the world on this issue that is so important, and to provide that political declaration.
The thing is, for our part, we look at the criteria laid out in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention in terms of intent and pattern of action. And it’s so plain and clear to us what Russia is doing. Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin himself, have expressly stated on multiple occasions in print, as well as vocally, this idea that Ukraine should not exist and have intimated, in some cases actually directly said, you know, called for its physical destruction, to use the Genocide Convention term, “in whole or in part,” and we say that that’s absolutely the case here. In terms of intent, it’s quite clear. And in terms of pattern of action, it’s also very clear, and one of the saddest things about this job has been collecting this sort of evidence and compiling it together. So we have this kind of compendium, and you can’t just put it all down and be done with it because that list expands every day.
Every day brings some fresh new horror to the floor. We learn about new mass graves every day, new torture chambers that are that are installed and employed on a systematic basis, mass instances of rape and abuse, even these cases of torture chambers that are created explicitly for children, things like that, mass deportations and kidnapping through camps that essentially are meant to enforce Russification or for those who can’t be, they’re basically disposed of. So, it’s a truly horrific time, and the words I have really don’t do justice to the enormity of the scale of what is being perpetrated against the Ukrainian people. And so for us and for our leadership, this is quite evident, that genocide is happening. And we appreciate the complexity and the loaded legal nature of that term, but in consultation with some of the top experts in the world, we’ve been quite reassured that not only is it justifiable for us to engage in a political declaration, but it’s absolutely important because in the spirit of prevention, as demanded by the 1948 convention to which we are a party and Russia is a party and is actually in U.S. code, but also in terms of being able to continue to build that case for the legal side as well. So the political declaration actually feeds into, in a lot of ways, the legal case.
I would also say there are also tangible aspects of this that are very important to us. So for example, being able to say clearly on a matter of such moral urgency as this is a real morale booster for Ukrainians who I would say are enduring and continue to endure the unendurable. And Ukraine isn’t winning this war because they are materially superior or because they have more of something than Russia—except for more of heart, more of morale, more of a sense of purpose. And so we can absolutely continue to feed into that. I think being able to speak to what is happening there and call it for what it is makes a big difference in this regard. It also helps further isolate the Kremlin internationally. And I think it nudges the fence sitters a little bit further—that this is not just another conflict, that this is something that is extraordinary in many ways.
Not that mass atrocities themselves are extraordinary, sadly, but one state doing this to another state and attempting to change the borders of a country, or to eliminate a country entirely as essentially is the case made here, and in doing so, uses genocide as a part of the concept of operations which is, quite clearly what is happening here in Ukraine, is extraordinary and needs to be fought against and needs to be isolated. And I think it also sends a signal domestically that this is what we’re fighting for. This is what we’re fighting against, that this truly is a test of principle and moral urgency. I think people respond to that, and they understand that. And I think that’s partially why we have such strong bipartisan support for these resolutions. And I think it’s also why we have such strong bipartisan support for Ukraine more generally.
SG: Well, Michael, you’ve brought in so many important dynamics in that and some very disturbing aspects as well as to the egregious actions that Russia is committing in Ukraine. And one thing that stood out was you mentioned about how even there is specific targeting of children who are being tortured, and that just demonstrates the challenges that do need to be addressed and highlighted, and I’m very glad that you’re part of this process to bring the notion of genocide into legislation, which is very important. Let me come to you, Alex, as well, because you’re also looking at some very important legislative initiative, and that is naming the Wagner Group, which is a Russian private military company, as a foreign terrorist organisation. Many in Europe have been calling for that. Is there a similar demand in the U.S., and how far away are we from this becoming a reality?
AT: Sajjan, thanks. There absolutely is a demand for this in the United States. I don’t think there’s any question about that. Your listeners are likely aware that the Wagner Group is essentially a group of mercenaries…a network of mercenaries that are both for-profit and at the beck and call of the Russian state, although Putin denies any formal linkage to the institutions of the Russian government with Wagner. I think your listeners may also know that the Wagner forces in Ukraine have been implicated in many of the most gruesome and horrific acts that Michael described that would contribute to this definition of genocide. The Wagner operatives have been kind of the pointy end of the spear, both as a warfighting force, but also as a force that uses terror, fear, violence to political ends. And I would say, in addition to that, it’s quite clear that the Wagner Group is not only a malign actor in Russia, but also elsewhere in the world as well. Wagner was implicated in some of the worst human rights abuses in Syria, in Mali, in the Central African Republic, where they’re also conducting predatory behaviour on some of the economic assets of those countries.
We are seeing Wagner’s malign influence really spread in some ways. And a group of members that we work for really coalesced around this idea that we should call things what they are and address this particular element of the threat head-on. And the best manner to do so would be to designate it formally as a foreign terrorist organisation, which is what a bill that they’ve introduced called the Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act or the HARM Act would accomplish. Essentially, the designation as a foreign terrorist organisation would be designed to, first of all, again, be clear that if you’re signing up to be an operative within the Wagner Group, the world will consider you to be a terrorist. The United States will not allow you to get a visa, but also much more, I think, crucially in the short-term is a provision that would allow the executive branch of the United States, but also the court system and the legal system here, to go after those who are providing material support to Wagner of any type. So logistics, funding, all of these things that Wagner and its broader network rely on.
So again, the HARM Act would really be designed to get after what is one of the most noxious tools of criminal influence, both in Ukraine, but also more broadly. And then of course, there’s the broader conversation of whether this is some element of a broader designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terror. But this bill does not address that question; this bill really is specific to the Wagner Group itself. Again, I credit the members who introduced this bill, Senators Wicker and Cardin, a Republican and a Democrat in the Senate. In the House, we had four members introduce a bill led by our co-chairman, Congressman Steve Cohen, but joined by a Republican, Mr. Joe Wilson, another Republican, Mr. Richard Hudson, and a Democrat, Congressman Veasey of Texas. These six members came together and decided this was absolutely something that was in the interest of the United States and something that needed to happen.
SG: Well, the Wagner Group is an entity that we have seen has committed terrible acts of human rights abuses in Syria, in sub-Saharan Africa. They seem to hold no qualms about their actions against civilians and even who they recruit. So it is, again, a very important piece of legislation, Alex, that you’re working on, in terms of proscribing them because it needs to be dealt with quite urgently, especially with what’s also unfolding in Ukraine as we speak.
AT: Agreed.
SG: Unfortunately, as always is the case with a podcast, we are short of time. It’s our enemy, just like other enemies we have to face. But let me thank you both, Alex and Michael, for spending the time to talk with us about the important legislative work that you’re doing. It’s so important, it could have massive, positive ramifications in not just bringing countries together, but also dealing with threats and protecting lives as well. And I wish you both the best of luck in your endeavours and hope that 2023 can continue to be a successful time for both of you in what you try to achieve.
AT: Thank you Sajjan. It was a real delight to be with you on the podcast today. Thanks for inviting us.
MC: Thank you, I really appreciate it.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.