Key Reflections
* Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contributed significantly to the Swedish and Finnish decisions to join NATO. Although both countries have worked very closely with NATO since the 1990s, they had remained outside of the alliance.
* Sweden and Finland have been cooperating with NATO for decades with the purpose of increasing military interoperability at the highest possible level, so that in case it became necessary to join, it could be attained without much delay.
* The Kremlin failed to anticipate that Sweden and Finland would choose to join NATO and demonstrated a huge misunderstanding of bilateral relations with both Nordic countries. Despite initial threats, Moscow has been powerless to halt Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accession.
* The aftermath of World War II resulted in Finland losing territory to the Soviet Union but avoiding occupation on the condition of neutrality. The period of Finlandization resulted in Soviet interests negatively impacting on Finland’s foreign and domestic policy.
* Finland has been prepared for potential Russian hostility for many years and has developed strong intelligence in this realm. Finland is aware of all the different clandestine tools the Kremlin adopts.
* There is a harmonisation between the Nordic and Baltic Sea security architecture. Finland and Sweden joining NATO is a game-changer for regional security.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
MA: Minna Ålander
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
In this episode we speak to Minna Ålander, who has served as a Researcher with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and also the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA). Mina’s research is focused on Nordic security and defence related issues. Her writings can be found in multiple international magazines and periodicals.
Minna Ålander, many thanks for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive
MA: Thanks a lot for having me.
SG: It’s our pleasure. Both Sweden and Finland are joining NATO. It’s a seismic shift for these two nations with a long history of wartime neutrality and staying out of military alliances. How much did Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contribute to Sweden and Finland deciding to join NATO?
MA: Well, that was obviously the trigger, there is no other explanation for, why it happened now, why it happened so fast. Obviously, both countries have been working very closely with NATO already since the ‘90s. So, in that sense, it didn’t come quite as out of the blue as many observers feel that it did. But of course, the trigger, why this decision was made now and not last year, or next year, is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
SG: Are we surprised as to how quickly that development of Sweden and Finland wanting to be part of NATO happened? Because if we had looked at this, say, at the start of 2022, and someone said that ‘well, NATO may have new members, and they could be Finland, and Sweden,’ I would have been shocked, I would have laughed, I would have thought that that person may have had a concussion. So, is this really something monumental?
MA: Well, I think it depends a bit on whether you look at Finland or at Sweden, because the cases are the same but different. So, for Finland, I have to say that as a Finn, this didn’t surprise me, really, because Finland has had this long-standing policy called the ‘NATO option.’ It was quite a curious part of the Finnish security and defence policy. Basically, what the ‘NATO option’ was about was to keep the option open of joining NATO, if the security environment changes in Finland’s vicinity. And of course, this was mainly in view of Russia. So, we have had this threat tradition from the Russian side towards Finland and Sweden, and Russia has been issuing these warnings towards two countries against joining NATO since at least 2016. And in a way this ‘NATO option’ played an important role as an answer to that. So, Russia had these threats it issued regularly and Finland could always play this NATO card and remind Russia, ‘well, okay, if you go too far, we may just join.’ and although the public support was very low in Finland for Finnish NATO membership, nevertheless, there was always this idea that it was conditional on the security environment staying stable. And it was very obvious already since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, that something was brewing. And basically, you could almost say that already back then it became clear that this is what will happen if Russia escalates.
So, in that sense, in the Finnish case, actually, there has been also on the Swedish side, if you look at the operational side, also in Sweden, Sweden has also been cooperating very closely with NATO, already since the ‘90s as I mentioned. Both countries have been NATO partners in this Partnership for Peace since the ‘90s, 1994 actually, to be exact. And since 2014, both have also been Enhanced Opportunity Partners. So, there has been this obvious and very deliberate aim of increasing the interoperability to the highest possible level with NATO, so that in case that it becomes necessary to join, it can go fast, that the countries don’t have to go through this membership action process anymore at that point, and so on. So, in the Swedish case, it was maybe a bit more surprising, not on this kind of operational or military side, but in the sense that for Sweden it was more of an identity crisis, let’s say. And in the Finnish case, it was a very pragmatic decision, the security environment changed, so then Finland reconsidered the options and what is the best way to maximise Finnish security, vis-a-vis Russia.
And in the Swedish case, it’s more linked to the foreign policy identity of Sweden, going back 200 years there’s this narrative of neutrality. Actually, to be exact Sweden hasn’t been neutral since it joined the EU in 1995 and even during the Cold War, Sweden wasn’t as neutral as it looked like because Sweden had secret security guarantees from the U.S. So, I always like to emphasise that even in the Swedish case, it was more a narrative than a reality. But nevertheless, that narrative was very important. And that’s why in Sweden, the public debate wasn’t so instantly clear that this is the way we will go, when Russia started the invasion in Ukraine, and this process was very much driven by Finland. So, Finland kind of dragged Sweden along to NATO, you could say that.
SG: Okay, so that’s very interesting. There’s a lot of important aspects to unpack in what you’ve been explaining. Russia, as you were talking about, strongly opposed the two states of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Do you think that the Kremlin could have ever anticipated that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine would result in both Finland and Sweden choosing to become part of NATO? Do you feel that the Russian threats that had often existed in the past were enough to deter it? Are they actually genuinely surprised as to what has transpired?
MA: Well, I mean, nobody can really see inside the Kremlin, I can just say that if they didn’t see this coming, that has been incredibly short sighted and a huge misunderstanding of the bilateral relations with these two countries and the whole security situation. Because as I said, for example, Finland has been quite clear about this ‘NATO option.’ It has always been this reminder, on the Finnish side, ‘we have our red lines too and if you cross them, then we will go for this option, we will kind of cash it in and that it’s real.’
And that’s why I do have, a little bit, the impression, especially when you look at the threats that have been issued all the time since 2016, at least as I said, very often, it was said from the Kremlin that, ‘if Finland joined NATO, then we definitely put some troops on the border.’ And what has actually happened is that troops have been withdrawn from the Finnish border, because they are needed elsewhere. So, actually, the opposite has happened so far, which actually shows two things. First of all, I think that even for the Kremlin and the Russian leadership, it was clear that there’s nothing they can do about this. There’s nothing they can do to stop Finland and Sweden joining. Because right after they submitted their applications, the rhetoric was totally toned down. Suddenly it was, like Lavrov said, ‘well, in fact this is not really a problem, because these countries were working so closely with NATO anyways, that they were already like part of NATO’s planning, and it doesn’t really change much,’ and this kind of thing. And Putin even said some time ago that Russia never threatened these countries, but this is anyways, just a domestic issue.
So, I think that there is this understanding that, especially in this situation, there’s nothing that Russia can really, reasonably do to stop this from happening. And I think it also pretty much debunks this smokescreen that the NATO expansion has been for the invasion of Ukraine as well.
SG: Absolutely. And as you mentioned, about the ‘NATO option’ that Finland had always kept in mind. And it’s worth pointing out that both Sweden and Finland, they actually effectively became partners of NATO in ‘94 and have since become major contributors to the alliance in various different capacities. They’ve taken part in NATO missions since the end of the Cold War. Despite all of this, the Russian foreign ministry had warned of consequences of Sweden and Finland wanting to join NATO. And you mentioned that they seem to be blowing hot and cold in a lot of different narratives that they issue. Is this bluster, then? Should we be concerned? Could we perhaps potentially expect a raft of say cyber-attacks or disinformation campaigns? Airspace violations that Russia is notorious for? And, for example, how they’ve tried to threaten Baltic States could Finland and Sweden expect perhaps something of similar nature down the road?
MA: Exactly this kind of stuff was expected in Finland at least. We had been preparing for everything, for this whole Russian repertoire, let’s say, as you just mentioned. Finland was prepared for at least airspace violations and cyber-attacks. For example, when Zelensky addressed the Finnish Parliament, there was an airspace violation and denial of service attack on the website of the Finnish ministry of defence and foreign affairs. So, stuff like that was expected. Other things that Finland was preparing for were, maybe this kind of like deliberate accidents that could happen somewhere up north in Lapland, like Russian playing somehow an emergency landing in Finnish territory, or maybe some kind of boat or ship accident at the Åland Islands or something like that.
Because we are very well aware of all these different methods that Russia has, we have a lot of good experience and history with these kinds of Russian provocations. But so far, nothing has happened. There have been absolutely no incidents. The only time was when the U.S. Navy was in Stockholm and there was one Russian plane that came to check it out, but that was it. So, we have been, this is a joke, but the Finns were almost disappointed, we have been preparing for everything and then just nothing happened. But of course, this is the exact idea of preparedness and foresight, that when you’re prepared beforehand, you neutralise the threats before they can be issued and made, because you’re prepared. And I think Russia knows that.
SG: So, as you say, Finland has a long experience of Russian statecraft and the agendas that they play, and even going back to the period of the Soviet Union. What I thought was interesting was that the decision for Sweden and Finland to join NATO looked like there was a lot of positive coordination between the two Prime Ministers of the respective countries, Magdalena Andersson of Sweden and Finland’s Sanna Marin. Let’s glean into the history for a moment, because that’s another thing that you had touched upon, which I thought was so important. I’m a student of history, so I always found the period of World War Two and the Cold War very important because it drew lines when it came to where countries stood. The Soviets had invaded Finland in late 1939, during World War Two, and for several months, the Finnish Army put up fierce resistance despite being heavily outnumbered. They avoided occupation, post-World War Two on the condition of neutrality, but as a result, also ended up losing 10% of their territory. It came about as a condition of peace imposed by the Soviet Union in 1948, I believe, in what was termed as a friendship agreement. It was seen at the time as a pragmatic way for Finland to survive and maintain its independence. That was generations ago, but does that history still resonate with the Finnish people today?
MA: Very much. First of all, two things here that you mentioned are very crucial for understanding Finnish attitude and approach towards Russia. First of all, it’s the spirit of the Winter War [First Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940]. It is quite an important part of Finnish identity this success in the sense that we managed to avoid our Baltic neighbours’ fate and we were able to retain independence. Of course, we also paid a price for it, as you mentioned, we lost territories in the East and we also went through this period of Finlandization as it’s called, which meant that Finland had to quite excessively consider the Soviet interest in its, especially foreign, policy. It also had some negative impacts on domestic policy, in the sense that there was some self-censorship, and it was a very mixed period of time, the general consensus, maybe that it was of two bad options, it was the lesser one and that it was a pragmatic way of dealing with this absolutely huge and aggressive neighbour. It was a necessary way of securing independence and in a sense, it worked because Finland was able to develop domestically to the point it is today, like the Nordic welfare state and everything like that wouldn’t have been possible if we didn’t avoid the fate of becoming a satellite state of the Soviet Union.
So, it had its justification, but it’s still not like a period very fondly remembered in Finland. And that’s why it was absolutely amazing to many Finns that Finlandization was fluctuated as an idea for Ukraine before the invasion, and also occasionally now again, because that is definitely not something that the Finns would wish for anyone. And also, because it just wouldn’t work in Ukraine’s case. Basically, why Finlandization worked for Finland was because Finland managed to avoid full occupation and through that, in a way, earn some form of minimum respect in the Soviet Union’s eyes. And I don’t think that Ukraine ever had any kind of that minimum amount of respect for its nation and statehood, in the current Russian regime’s perception for that kind of solution to ever work.
SG: I still remember growing up as a young boy towards the end of the Cold War and remembering that there would often be important meetings held in Helsinki between U.S. and Soviet leaders, because it was seen as that neutral place where they could actually converge. Now that Finland will be part of NATO, it’s going to result in the whole border that Finland shares with Russia as part of effectively a NATO border. And just to put that into numbers, I believe that is 1,340 kilometres or 830 miles. This has now effectively tripled NATO’s border with Russia, which was perhaps the very opposite of what Putin had ever wanted, and in many ways, somewhat resulted in his Ukraine adventure backfiring quite substantially when it comes to trying to undermine NATO itself. You were mentioning earlier that in many ways, Finns were prepared for some sort of Russian activity, nefarious role that they could play. And they were surprised that it didn’t happen. But is Finland going to have to be on this constant state of preparation now that their border is a NATO border? And very likely there will be military exercises with NATO allies on the border? So, does this change the psyche in Finland? And is it something that everyone is prepared for?
MA: Well, actually, it doesn’t change much in the sense that, of course, we have always been very painfully and acutely aware of this border. And basically, the whole Finnish defence policy and planning is geared to protecting that border. Because if Finland only had Norway, Sweden, and Estonia as neighbours, we wouldn’t really need defence forces. So, it has always been very clear that the threat is in the East, or potentially coming from the East. So that is the basis of Finnish defence planning. And in that sense, it doesn’t change the Finnish level of preparedness and preparation, because we already have a very high level. Actually, it’s been quite interesting that now—so in the beginning of 2000, there was this strategic analysis made of the likely challenges, security challenges and threats to Finland. And based on that analysis, most of the defence planning and procurement has been made in the past 20 years. And what it has resulted in is, for example, one of the strongest artilleries in Europe. And if you look at Ukraine, what they are currently struggling most with is the very strong Russian artillery fire at the front that is more than 1000 kilometres long. Then you look at Finland, we have more than 1000 kilometres border with Russia, and we have one of the strongest artillery. So, then you know why, where that comes from. So, in a sense, Finland has been always very prepared. And foresight is a very important part of Finnish defence policy. So, in that sense, it doesn’t change the overall approach to national defence that we now join NATO. It’s also very important for Finland that we don’t outsource our defence to NATO; that’s also not necessary, we have very capable defence forces ourselves.
What the NATO membership is about from the Finnish perspective is basically kind of like an insurance policy…that you want to make the threshold of any military action against Finland as high as possible. Like if you see that someone set your neighbour’s house on fire, then you want to have a higher insurance policy for your own house, in a way. But of course, that doesn’t mean that Finland is not ready to contribute or anything. Not at all. There are actually already a lot of exercises going on this year; we already had quite many planned. And I think they added something like eight more exercises with NATO partners only this year. So, there are almost constantly NATO troops in joint exercises in Finland right now.
So, because of this whole ‘NATO option’ policy and the deliberate kind of aim of reaching the highest possible interoperability with NATO forces, it would be very easy for Finland to just jump on board kind of, and the cooperation can start immediately. There will be an almost instant operational readiness on the Finnish side with NATO forces. And all these exercises contribute to that even more now during this period of time between applying and becoming a full member. So, I wouldn’t say that it changes much. And the Finns are very well-aware also what it means to have this border. And this is, I think…one of the things that Finland also brings to the table in NATO: we know how to deal with this border, we have a lot of experience with Russia, we have a lot of really good intel insights into also Russian defence capacities in the vicinity of our border, just looking at the Kola Peninsula or some other bases right next to Finland. So, in that sense, I think that there is a very good basis for a very well-functioning cooperation with NATO regarding this border and the whole Nordic, Baltic security.
SG: And that’s going to be absolutely critical in the years to come.
MA: Totally.
SG: If we pivot to Sweden—Sweden doesn’t share a land border with Russia, but it has very much felt concerned in recent years about its security with several airspace violations by Russian military aircraft. In 2014, a Russian submarine was travelling in the waters of the Stockholm archipelago. My impression in speaking with you is that Finland’s neutrality was a question of existence of the Finlandization that you were mentioning. Sweden’s neutrality, as you were also talking about, is different. It’s a mixture of identity, of ideology. Something to expand on in our discussion: is Sweden impacted by history, like Finland? Or are those factors varied, based on Sweden’s own unique experiences?
MA: Yes, I think it has quite a lot to do with Sweden’s own, basically, war history as well, that they had this period of like 200 years where Sweden wasn’t—since 1814—Sweden wasn’t a direct warring party in a war, in a conflict. Also, during the Cold War, this Social Democratic prime minister of Parliament [Tage Erlander, 1946-69] was a very notable figure in Europe, but also especially in Sweden—this idea of peace promotion, disarmament, and that was like the Swedish focus. And it was, in a way, the role that Sweden had in the Cold War constellation. But as I mentioned earlier, it was more narrative than reality, because Sweden did actually have security guarantees from the U.S., so they weren’t entirely neutral in fact. And I think what is very important in the Swedish case here and what explains why, although the Swedes may be like…the whole NATO debate this spring was more like a domestic political debate. It had a lot to do with party politics as well. For example, in Finland…it was entirely based on security policies and the security debate, it was about maximising Finland’s security, and everyone was very clear about the priorities. And in the Swedish case, I think that maybe without Finland going about it so quickly in this very fast pace…Swedes would have maybe needed some more time to debate more internally and so on.
But actually, the reason why also the Swedes nevertheless recognise the need for joining NATO now in this moment can be found maybe a bit further in Swedish history because the kingdom of Sweden—of which Finland used to be part for several hundreds of years, several centuries—was constantly in war, at war with Russia. So, Sweden also has a very long history of fighting the Russian Empire, or different Russian state formations at least once every century, up until the 19th century. So, this goes all the way back, let’s say, it’s a very deep kind of thing. And there is a long history as well for Sweden as well, like Finland was part of those wars against Russia as part of Sweden. So that also kind of explains why they went together about this and why the process was so closely coordinated. Finland and Sweden continue to be each other’s most important and closest partners internationally. And the security and defence cooperation has been significantly deepened, especially since 2014. And that’s also like one reason why they went together and applied together, because this security cooperation and defence cooperation is very important for both countries.
SG: This security and defence cooperation that you mentioned just demonstrates the close partnership, of course, between Finland and Sweden, and it’s also very fascinating hearing your own insight into the history of both countries. So, to conclude in a final part of our discussion, we know that already, Iceland, Norway, Denmark have been part of the NATO alliance. The Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia are also there. And now we have Sweden and Finland joining NATO as well. Are we looking at the end of Nordic neutrality?
MA: Definitely, for the time being, if there ever was any kind of neutrality really in the past, let’s say, in the post-Cold War period, at least. I think in Finland and Sweden, especially in Finland, there’s quite often irritation about this word “neutral,” because we weren’t really neutral since we joined the EU in 1995 and also because we have been cooperating so closely with NATO…non-aligned at best, or maybe non-allied, even. But yes, and that’s actually a major game-changer for Baltic Sea security, for Nordic security. There is kind of this Nordic dimension. And the Baltic Sea security dimension is actually a huge part and often overlooked part of the decision to join NATO for Finland and Sweden. And that was actually, I think, the argument that kind of prevailed in the Swedish debate, that Sweden can’t stay as the only Nordic country outside of NATO, if Finland is going kind of, because since 2009, there has been this Nordic Defence Cooperation called NORDEFCO. And it has been intensified massively since 2014. But there were some structural hurdles and limitations to it because of the different Euro-Atlantic integration decision. Some members of the EU, some of NATO, some like Denmark, being more involved, but having opt-outs in EU security and defence policy, and so on. So now what we observe is this kind of harmonisation of the Nordic and Baltic Sea security architecture, which will make a lot of things possible now, that were kind of difficult in the past because of these states. So, this is an absolute game-changer for the regional security. And the Baltics are also of course quite excited to welcome these two new members because they are in such a strategic position and will also make the defence of the Baltics way easier for NATO.
SG: Well, yes. And I would say that I think the whole NATO alliance is extremely happy to have Finland and Sweden as full members. I guess the last question I have for you, Minna, is what do you think we can expect down the road in 2022? We’re already at the halfway point of 2022. But what could we perhaps expect in terms of the security architecture that you mentioned, the challenges that Sweden and Finland may have to deal with, and what perhaps could that lead to as we go into 2023?
MA: Currently, it looks like this kind of feared period, this grey area and what it was called between the application and full membership, like before getting under the protection of the Article 5, there were quite some concerns about how difficult that period could turn out to be. But honestly, currently, it looks like…the situation isn’t as dire as expected. And it looks unlikely that Russia has simply the capacity to do much right now. It also looks like the ratification process is proceeding extremely fast. We have had ratifications every day, every working day, since the signing of the accession protocols one week ago on Tuesday. 11 members, NATO members, have already ratified, which is an unprecedented pace of ratification. So that’s a very good sign. So, this could be a very quick process. Turkey remains a question mark, but even there, I’m quite confident that it won’t take years. And so actually, it looks better than expected right now. And also, the fact that so many exercises have been planned in the region. I already mentioned so many extra exercises have been added with NATO members, for example, with the Finnish Defence Forces and so on. So, this is of course a way of showing on the non-NATO side that they already back this…the new members or prospective members, they already take their security seriously.
So, I am fairly confident right now that the Nordic region won’t be any kind of focus for Russia. I think it also shows…the fact that Russia has drawn away troops from the Finnish border, it just shows that Finland isn’t the priority. NATO membership perspective notwithstanding. So, I expect nothing major to happen until both countries become members of NATO, because Russia is simply too tied up in Ukraine. There’s just not much capacity left to intimidate these two. So, it looks good.
SG: It looks good. And that’s a very positive way to conclude. It’s been absolutely fascinating to get your perspectives on such an important issue and a key development in NATO, especially one of the biggest moments in the alliance’s history in the last 15 years. Minna Ålander, thank you so much for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive.
MA: Thanks a lot.
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.