Key Reflections
* Since the Taliban seized power, they have issued over a dozen decrees directly aimed at undermining women’s rights. Taliban leaders fear no consequences and should be sanctioned from travelling abroad.
* Women who were present in every sphere of Afghan society are now banned from working by the Taliban, who have once again turned Afghanistan into the worst country on earth for women.
* The Taliban’s repressive attitudes towards women are not native to Afghanistan, which has a rich history of female poets and artists. The Taliban are trying to reinvent the cultural role of women in society, including the type of clothing they should wear.
* As women’s rights collapse in Afghanistan, extremism will flourish with foreign terrorist fighters traveling to Afghanistan, motivated by state-sanctioned misogyny.
* The notion of the ‘moderate Taliban’ was initiated by Pakistan, who lobbied for the Taliban’s global legitimacy. The stark reality is that the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al-Qaeda cannot be separated, due to ideological ties and intermarriages.
* The Taliban have been financed through the trade of narcotics. Despite their assurances to stem the drugs trade, the Taliban are enabling the proliferation of heroin and methamphetamines. NATO DEEP’s publication, Narco-Insecurity Inc., details the social impact and wider security consequences of the Taliban’s ties to narcotics.
Transcript:
SG: Dr. Sajjan Gohel
LR: Lina Rozbih
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
In the second of a two-part series on how the decline of women’s rights in Afghanistan has global security ramifications, we speak with Lina Rozbih, a civil liberties activist and acclaimed award-winning journalist, writer and poet in the Dari language. Lina is also the author of The Promise of Paradise, which is a collection of poems depicting war, women’s rights issues and refugee life.
SG: Lina Rozbih, thank you for joining us on NATO DEEP Dive.
LR: Thank you so much for inviting me.
SG: It’s our pleasure. I’ve read your book of poems, The Promise of Paradise. It’s an incredible collection of over 140 poems, through which you chronicle the decades of conflict that the people of Afghanistan have had to endure. Many of these poems, they draw on your own life and the hardships as a refugee from Afghanistan, in Iran and Pakistan, and also the plight of women and girls over the past many years. I thought what was interesting was that each poem is, in many ways, a collection and responds to tragic events in Afghanistan, depicting scenes of suffering, and also the victimisation that Afghans have had to suffer from terrorism, poverty, and the culture of impunity. Your book of poems is eerily relevant today with the Taliban now in power in Afghanistan for the past nine months. My question is, is history repeating itself? Talk to me also, in relation to that, the power of poetry, and how it can help one process what is unfolding in Afghanistan.
LR: Well, unfortunately, yes, history and actually recent history, it’s not that we’re speaking about a few decades ago, it’s just over 20 years ago that Afghan women in Afghanistan did experience the rule of the Taliban. And now they’re, again, experiencing a government by the Taliban that put limiting women as their priority in their internal policies. And we can see in less than nine months, with almost 14 orders or decrees that they’ve issued against women—they took women from being ministers, being ambassadors, being present in every sphere of their society to almost nothing. So, the women are prevented from going to school, the women are prevented from working outside their homes, they have to be accompanied by a male chaperone when they go outside their house, they can’t travel on their own. So, it’s pretty much an unfortunate repeat of the recent history for women of Afghanistan.
And poetry to me, being an Afghan and being a journalist, I deal with the news from Afghanistan on a daily basis. And to be honest with you, sometimes I think that it would have helped me a lot if I was not a journalist, dealing with the news from Afghanistan, because I cannot sometimes distance myself as an Afghan woman from what’s happening in that country. So, emotionally, it affects me, it has impacted me in different ways. And to me poetry is almost something that helps me heal and deal with what I experience and what I hear and see from Afghanistan, particularly about women. And being a woman in a society that even before the Taliban was a very traditional society where it’s a man-dominated society where women did not really have the rights that our male counterpart did. And then the experience of 40 years of war and what the illiteracy and other outcomes of that war has done to the society. Unfortunately, I think we can say that Afghanistan right now is the only worst country on earth for women, because they absolutely…speaking of basic human rights, to the basic of being a human is taken away from women in Afghanistan. So, through my poems, I try to document that pain, I try to document what I experience as an Afghan woman, and I try to also extend and give a voice to those voiceless women who are suffering or actually first-hand experiencing these atrocities. And fortunately, I’ve received a lot of positive reactions from Afghan women exactly stating that, “Thank you for voicing our experiences in the format of poetry and literature.”
And my aim, once the Taliban regime was toppled in early 2000, I was hoping that eventually that I look into this poem as a distant history of Afghan women, that we will see better days…that women once again will be able to at least gradually gain the rights that were taken away from them. And we actually did witness that in the last 20 years. And I can say this with confidence, that the amount of advancement and the amount of achievement that Afghan women had in the two decades, coming from a place where they were not even allowed to leave their homes, it was inspiring. I mean, women were ministers, women were MPs. They were present in every sector of their society, although the critic would say that their presence was sort of symbolic, but still, women were there. But unfortunately, today, when I open that book, and I look at those poems, I see the same tragedy repeating itself once again. So, it’s no longer the past, but it’s very much the present reality of Afghan women’s lives in Afghanistan.
SG: So, history is unfortunately tragically repeating itself, perhaps even worse than before. As you said, it’s been nine months since the Taliban rule, and one thing you said that I thought was so important is that women had attained positions of influence. They became ministers, ambassadors, they were visible in every sector of society. I saw that myself over the years having visited Afghanistan on many occasions. What I think is so disturbing is the regression at the speed of light, with no fear of persecution on the Taliban’s actions whatsoever, that they can act with impunity. Much of this is being implemented by the Taliban’s Ministry of Vice and Virtue. This has replaced the former Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Is it fair to say that the Ministry of Vice and Virtue is basically the misogyny ministry?
LR: Well, so far, based on the decree and order that this ministry has issued and everything is focused on women, and also partially on media, I think it’s, yes, it’s safe to say that because first of all, when you dissolve the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and rename it as the Ministry of Vice and Virtue, and then the majority of activity of this ministry is focused only on women—the recent order, which required females in television and media to cover their faces was the last extreme order that this ministry has issued. So, I think, yes, it does. And the purpose of it seems to be exactly that, to sort of expedite that process of formalising the lack of presence of women in society by issuing these decrees on behalf of the Taliban government.
SG: It’s worth adding that when the Taliban shut down the Ministry of Women’s Affairs that they also closed down Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission. And also with the fact that the angle that often gets portrayed, as if this is somehow cultural, that what the Taliban are doing is Afghan, but if you look at Afghan women abroad, for example, they are thriving in all kinds of fields, whether it is journalism, or civil society, in governments as well, in sports, they are part of prestigious educational and research centres, they’re teaching, writing, singing. It’s important, don’t you think Lina, that we dispel this notion that somehow what the Taliban is doing is Afghan, that it’s part of Afghanistan’s culture and tradition, whereas in fact, it’s the very opposite of what they’re doing?
LR: Actually, what the Taliban do, especially as I said, the last order that requires women to cover their faces, that type of attire that they called niqab or hijab is not native to Afghanistan, or to Afghan women. I mean, if you take a look at Afghan women before the Russian invasion in the ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s, yes, we did burqa, some of the women in rural areas, and it was their own decision that they wanted to wear the burqa, but in the cities, the majority of women who preferred to wear hijab, hijab to us is wearing a scarf loosely around your head, something that we did see in Afghanistan in the last two decades. So, the format of the hijab, the format of a lifestyle that the Taliban are sort of implementing in Afghanistan and ordering the women to abide by it is not native to Afghan women. And if you also take a look at our history, we have prominent female figures like Rabia Balkhi, Makhfi Badakhshi, who were poets, who were painters, who were queens, very influential in terms of political decisions that were taken by the king, and who were side-by-side with males, although the numbers were not big, but we did have these prominent female personalities throughout our history in every sector.
The lifestyle and the orders and the type of role that the Taliban are trying to shape for women in our society in Afghanistan, whether in terms of what attire they need to wear, or what they can do and what they cannot, it’s not native to Afghans. It’s not part of our culture. It’s not even religious. The religious interpretation of some of the stuff, that they relayed that to Islam. So, that’s one of the reasons why they face huge protest and disagreement, particularly from women in Afghanistan, who put their lives on the line to go out on the streets in Kabul and other major cities to protest these decisions. And to my opinion, I don’t think they will be successful either, because these are not something that the women in Afghanistan are used to. The history and background of the country is proof to that, that women never wear that type of clothing, women were always present, maybe in a smaller percentage, but they were actively side-by-side by men in every decade or every change that came, except the civil war that took place in the ‘90s, the women were actively present. So, they cannot really accept what the Taliban are right now doing, and they’re calling it cultural and religious orders, which basically is their version of religion and their version of culture that they’re trying to bring to Afghanistan.
SG: Absolutely. I would like your take on, well, your own personal experience, on what is transpiring and how it compares to when you were growing up in Afghanistan, when you had to leave the country and live as a refugee in Iran and in Pakistan. What do you remember about that period? And how do you see it similar now in Afghanistan? Or do you see it potentially worse than it was when you had to leave the country?
LR: Well, when I left Afghanistan, I was very young. I was eight years old, and the Afghanistan that I remember, we left just almost four years after Russia invaded Afghanistan. So, I remember Afghanistan being a poor country, but being a civilised country. In Kabul, my mother was a teacher, she would dress like a Western woman, you know, jackets, skirts, pants, and you would see women who were wearing burqa, and you would see women who were wearing a scarf. And I really remember that on the streets of Kabul, any man wouldn’t even look at you twice. So yes, Afghanistan was a little awkward country, we were not a rich country, you know, compared to our neighbouring countries, as advanced as them, but we were a civilised country. People were partially educated; women had their basic human rights. There was that peace and harmony that you would experience even if you go to the rural areas of Afghanistan.
But unfortunately, the four decades of war, and the outcome of this lengthy period of war, which was, at certain points were the most violent…I mean, the news of suicide attacks, the different types of violence that took place in Afghanistan, took that privilege, took that civility out of society. And we also have a generation who did not have any access to education. So, when it comes to war, I always say that, yes, you drop a bomb, you destroy a building, you destroy a bridge, it may take 10 years, five years to rebuild that country. But when you take that culture, that foundation of a society away from that society, and you come up with a generation who lack education, and who know nothing but war, rebuilding that civilization will take decades and maybe centuries. So, to my belief, if I want to, I think if we want Afghanistan to go back to the ‘80s that we were living, you know, in that country, I think it will take centuries for us to go back to that mentality, where people were illiterate, but very civilised. And now in Afghanistan, unfortunately, we have youth who fall victim to this brainwashing of extremists and fundamentalist believers of Islamic fundamentalism. We have men who actually…they’re not Taliban, but they believe that the place of a woman is at home, that a woman needs to cover herself, etc. So, this mentality, unfortunately, is something that I think will take way longer than rebuilding Afghanistan to go away. And we may not see that Afghanistan that we experienced in the ‘70s and ‘80s for a long, long, long time from now.
SG: You raise a lot of important points there about this notion of extremism that can grow as a result of war, instability, and also the rule of misogynistic entities like the Taliban. Do you believe in the notion that as women’s rights collapse in Afghanistan, extremism will flourish, and that we will see foreign terrorist fighters travel to Afghanistan via Pakistan, motivated by the opportunity of state-sanctioned misogyny, effectively when women’s rights are strong, radicalization is reduced, and terrorism is kept in check? But conversely, when women’s rights suffer, extremism and terrorism will be on the rise, just like we saw in Afghanistan in the 1990s and we saw in Iraq and Syria, post-Arab Spring. Does that concern you that there is that correlation between impact of women’s rights decreasing, and then you have the rise of terrorism and extremism increasing?
LR: Absolutely. I think the very trademark of any terrorist group is limiting women. Once you see human rights in general, and women’s rights in particular, diminishing in a society, that itself tells you that there is a rise in extremism and Islamic fundamentalism in that society. Because these groups, I think, as I said, one of their trademarks is to create an environment where the women are pretty much absent from every sector of the society. And that’s one of the conditions that they believe that they [women] are immoral toward Islamic government, it’s sort of relied upon, and seeing women in a society is contradictory to their belief system. So, obviously, as soon as the Taliban started issuing these decrees, almost, I think, 14 of them to this day, it itself should concern the international community, that a group that can go to this extent to eliminate women from public life is capable of doing anything.
And also, once or twice, the analysts that I spoke to said exactly that, that some people believe that the Taliban are reformed, some believe this ideology…they preach this ideology, that there are good Taliban and bad Taliban, and that the Taliban are reformable. But we saw that as soon as, as I said, less than nine months since they came to power in Afghanistan, the first thing that they did was eliminate women altogether from society. And that itself should concern the international community that they’re taking the opportunity, particularly now that the international community is very concerned and busy with the war in Ukraine, to build that extremist fundamentalist type of government in Afghanistan, where they will eventually go ahead and take the next step, which is to take a stiff stance toward the West and others and pretty much go back to the Taliban that we experienced in the ‘90s.
SG: So, again, you’ve touched on some extremely important points, which I want to unpack a bit further, in two parts. First question I guess is that if we discuss the breakdown of the Taliban factions, where do we stand on their view on women’s rights? Who are the ones that are allegedly moderate? Who are the ones that are supposed to be the extremists? I got the impression from what you said just now that effectively they’re all virtually the same when it comes to women’s rights or lack of women’s rights, that it’s almost like a paradox to say moderate Taliban?
LR: Well, the idea of moderate Taliban, if you read the reports, was initiated by Pakistan when they tried to lobby for the Taliban in terms of gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. And when we speak about the Taliban’s regime, you are aware of the Haqqani leaders, Sirajuddin Haqqani serving as the interior minister and as a deputy to Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, who’s the supreme leader of the Taliban. And then the second person in rank is Mullah Yaqoob, who’s the son of Mullah Omar. And also mind you that Sirajuddin is much more extreme than his father, Jalaluddin Haqqani, when it comes to his stance toward different issues. And then the third deputy obviously is Mullah Baradar. So, by just looking at this cabal of officials and Taliban government, it should tell you what sort of government and what sort of mentality that this group has.
And second, when we speak about moderate Taliban or when we speak about good Taliban or bad Taliban, I think we need to remember this: that the Taliban are not a school of thought or a political…that we would say okay communism versus democracy or versus liberalism etc. They are a religious fundamentalist group. And religious fundamentalist groups have a few core beliefs that they need to stick to that. And if you drift away and start sort of so-called reforming yourself, that you will no longer be accepted by your groups. If, for example, based on their interpretation of Islam, that a woman shouldn’t work, and if a Taliban official standard [line] says, “I disagree, women need to work,” that Taliban official will no longer be part of that government, because the core beliefs that these groups have is exactly that, that the place of a woman is in her house, no education, etc. So, the religious fundamentalists are very much different than a political school of thought, that you think they’re able…they cannot even if they want, they cannot reform themselves, because they need to stick to that agenda and to their basic beliefs and elements that are the fundamental creation of those groups.
And the second thing or notion that exists is how we differentiate between Haqqani or Taliban and al-Qaeda. And this way of thought initially arose when the peace talks processes started with the Taliban, where some people argued, “Okay, we can talk to the Taliban, but we can keep al-Qaeda aside, or we can keep Haqqanis separated from that.” These groups’ core values that they have are the same. So, therefore, you cannot, for example, provide incentive to one group, provide support to one group and think that you can separate them from each other and that they would side with you and then leave their affiliation with the Haqqanis or al-Qaeda etc. And that notion is also proven wrong when the government of the Taliban was formed in Afghanistan, and as I said, the major member of the Haqqani Network…Sirajuddin Haqqani is on the list of the Most Wanted by the FBI. Jalaluddin [Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani], his uncle, is also on the UN Sanctions List—you have them as core members of the Taliban government, and the Taliban to this day did not denounce al-Qaeda publicly, nor did they admit to cutting ties with that group.
SG: So, Lina, again, you’ve touched upon some very vital dynamics when it comes to the Taliban composition and thank you for breaking that down so well. What do you make of the argument that some say in the West, that we have to now engage with the Haqqanis, and that by ignoring them, the people of Afghanistan suffer, and that by ignoring the Haqqanis, all it does is embolden terrorist groups like al-Qaeda to grow and proliferate? Because there are some in the West that believe that if we talk to the Haqqanis, somehow, we can moderate their points of view. And you’ve kind of answered it to some extent just now, but I’d be curious to get your perspective, because as you said, very rightly, Sirajuddin Haqqani is proscribed terrorist. He is on the FBI’s Most Wanted list. He has a bounty of 10 million dollars. But it’s interesting how some in the West feel that he should be spoken to or negotiated with, as if somehow that will change the agenda of the Haqqanis. What do you think?
LR: I was watching Christiane Amanpour’s [CNN] interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani recently in Kabul, where he said, “We no longer consider Americans our enemy.” So, at this moment where the Taliban joint government with the Haqqanis in Afghanistan is in desperate need of getting some sort of recognition from the international community, particularly the US and the key players, to my belief, I think they will accordingly go with what needs to be done to get that legitimacy. We remember during the peace talks process with the Taliban, they also played the same card that they would agree to forming an inclusive government in Afghanistan. They agreed to respect human rights, women’s rights, and we now see what they are doing in Afghanistan, that not only do they not feel they have to remain committed to what they promised the US, but they’re absolutely and openly without any fear of prosecution, they’re doing the opposite. So, I think the Haqqani Network will be the same scenario too. I mean, I’m not sure if any peace talks process with any terrorist group would lead to anything sustainable to the favour of the international community anywhere.
SG: One thing that the Haqqanis also engage in is criminal enterprise. They are not just a proscribed terrorist group, but they are involved in running human trafficking, drug trafficking, many front companies, they are very wealthy and prosperous. One thing that has blighted Afghanistan for many decades has been the proliferation of opium and heroin, which has been then exported, globally, for raising funds by the Taliban.
The Taliban say that they are against drugs, and that they want to clamp down on it. But what we’re seeing on the ground in the last few months is actually a spike in narcotics and the cultivation of it, not just heroin, but also methamphetamines, which comes from the ephedra shrub. Do you think the Taliban has any serious intention, or the Haqqanis have any serious intention, to clamp down on drug trafficking? Or do you think this will become one of their main avenues to earn money?
LR: Well, as you mentioned, this year, provinces in Afghanistan, for example, Kandahar and Helmand, had some of their biggest poppy harvests, this year, and Zabiullah Mujahid a few months ago, also publicly admitted that they’re not going to do anything with the farmers who are cultivating poppy in Afghanistan, because they do not have any alternative plans for them. But then when the international reaction toward this statement started, then Mullah Haibatullah issued a decree and said that ‘the cultivation of poppies is forbidden in Afghanistan.’
So, we’re speaking about a group, the Taliban, who financed their wars throughout these years, more than three decades of war, based on the trade of narcotics. That’s their only source of revenue for them. That’s the only thing they know how to get money from. And they’re used to the narco-economy. And given the condition of Afghanistan right now, with the financial situation, economic and downturn that they’re experiencing, I doubt that they will be able to prevent poppy cultivation. And I doubt that they themselves want to move away from this narcotic trade, because it’s the lucrative way, it’s a more than eight billion dollar per year industry. And it’s sort of free money, in a country like Afghanistan with rigid terrain, where there is no water.
And also, some of the alternatives that were successful during President Ghani’s era in replacing poppies are, right now, not active in any of the provinces. So, I doubt that they will walk away from this. And I don’t think that we would see anything—any reduction— in drug trades in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban in the near future.
SG: Yes, and what you say actually bears out in a report that two of my producers here for DEEP Dive, Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones, they were editors for the publication, Narco-Insecurity, Inc., which talks exactly about this very issue, about the history of Afghanistan and drug trafficking and how that is likely to continue under the Taliban and especially the Haqqanis. So, what you say is extremely important.
In terms of your concerns, what can be done to try and help the people of Afghanistan, because options are limited. Afghanistan, in many ways, is cut off. I often think about the comparison to Ukraine. Ukraine has suffered a lot from the Russian aggression. But Ukraine is lucky that it has good neighbours and good friends. Whereas unfortunately, Afghanistan doesn’t seem to have either. What are the options that are available, or what can be done that people don’t realise could help the people of Afghanistan?
LR: I think I will go back to the suggestion that many international organisations have—human rights organisations—and many of them requested the sanctions placed upon Afghanistan directly will impact the people, because they’re facing hunger, as I’ve said, acute hunger, the economic downfall and financial downfall also is not helping, and it’s obvious to everyone that a Taliban government is not capable of reviving the economy. So, any kind of general sanction will have a direct negative impact on the population, as opposed to the Taliban government. So, the solution to this issue would be, in my opinion, to sanction the Taliban leaders as suggested by many, take away their privilege to travel, they’re freely travelling right now to different countries.
So, any sort of action that targets the Taliban elite directly, as opposed to the people, I think will be effective. Because sanctions, or anything that impacts the population, I think will, indirectly, be to the benefit of the Taliban, because right now, they are using that image of hungry Afghan people to gain support from the word; to gain sympathy from the world; to encourage the world to engage with them. So, that’s actually to the benefit of the Taliban. But if directly, some sort of financial, or some sort of personal restrictions are placed on the Taliban elite, and that leadership portion of the Taliban, I think it will yield more results, as opposed to targeting the whole population.
SG: And tied to that, then, we are hearing about resistance movements that are emerging, showing signs of life in Afghanistan, challenging the Taliban. What resistance movements do you think are viable? And are women playing a role in helping to support those resistance movements?
LR: Well, with resistance movements, the only information that I have is based off the reports and interviews with them, with some of the individuals who are members of that movement. It’s a movement that is in the process of spreading to Afghanistan. It initially started in Panjshir, right now it’s in Baghlan, and it’s in Takhar, and there are reports that there’s some sort of resistance that took place in Khost and Nangarhar as well.
One thing that can be said about the resistance movement is that it’s definitely the only active resistance to Taliban rules in Afghanistan. The only threat—the only movement—that’s encouraging the Taliban to rethink its policies. They even requested the leaders of the resistance movement, and they brought them together in Iran a while ago, so they can go ahead and agree on an inclusive government because the resistance movement was putting pressure on the Taliban to change its format and government in Afghanistan. So, it is the only resistance movement against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and it is spreading, at the cost of a lot of human rights violations. There are war crimes being committed by the Taliban, by targeting the locals in those provinces and justifying it that they are actually targeting the members of the resistance movement while they’re [targeting] the regular locals who are living in those provinces.
How successful this resistance movement can be, is something that we need to just sit and watch, because it’s really hard to tell. The majority of resistance of this nature, can only last if they have the international support and the international financial or otherwise support with them. And as for women, yes, there are actually a few active members of this movement who are women and there are also different ethnicities of Afghans. When the resistance initially started, there were only locals from Panjshir, but now it’s expanded to include Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, they have different ethnicities, and women, who are part of it.
SG: So, there is potential for that to grow and for that to expand. Whenever we talk about Afghanistan, very often, the neighbour of Afghanistan, Pakistan, is mentioned. And there’s long been these concerns and accusations that Pakistan’s military helps sponsor, nurture the Taliban, the Haqqanis, and that they enabled the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan to take place. Do you believe that to be the case? And where does Pakistan stand now, on this situation? Because there seemed to be some tensions with some factions of the Taliban. There was that Pakistani military air strike, I believe in Khost, and a lot of children were killed. Is it possible that there are tensions now between the Taliban and Pakistan? Or is the relationship still strong?
LR: Well, I think the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan’s political arena and the support of terrorism is very obvious to everyone in the past 20 years or so. And report after report indicates that the terrorists’ safe haven, whether it’s Taliban, or it’s the Haqqani Network, is in tribal areas in Pakistan. And the ISI and the military elite of Pakistan have a direct connection to them.
The Taliban, as you said, one or two bombings that took place and Khost and Kunar, which led to the killing of civilians there, was simply condemned by the Taliban. But I think at this point in time, especially because the Tehreek-i-Taliban of Pakistan, or TTP, is gaining ground in conducting operations within Pakistan. And especially since Mr. Khan was replaced by the new prime minister in that country, Pakistan is now sort of fearing the overflow of terrorism into its own country, as a result of supporting these terrorist groups. And therefore, they are putting a lot of pressure on the Taliban, to target the TTP members that, according to them, reside inside Afghanistan, and they conduct operations on Pakistani soil. And they justify the bombing of the two provinces of Afghanistan as exactly a result of that, and it did happen exactly after one or two attacks, which led to the killing of military officials on Pakistani ground. So, they are aware of this now and they’re trying to use the Afghan Taliban to facilitate talks with the TTP and bring them to the negotiation table. Exactly the same scenario that happened in Afghanistan—a negotiation with the Taliban.
But these terrorist groups being used by Pakistan, or other neighbouring countries, as a policy instrument, in having influence over what’s happening in Afghanistan, is very much valid. And I don’t think it will stop anytime soon.
SG: What’s interesting is that you’ve mentioned that Imran Khan has been ousted as Prime Minister of Pakistan. He had the nickname, whether it was deserved or not, I guess time will tell, of ‘Taliban Khan’, that he was seen as very close to various Taliban factions. Now that he’s in opposition, he is trying to organise protests. He’s also talking about an unfounded conspiracy theory that somehow he was removed from power by the Biden administration.
Do you think that his [Imran Khan’s] administration contributed to the destabilisation of Afghanistan, because one thing that we used to keep hearing from Khan’s government was that if the Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan, it would lead to peace and stability, whereas the reality is the complete opposite has happened? And it’s even having a knock-on effect on Pakistan’s own security and stability?
LR: Well, I think Khan’s government, in a way, was very favourable towards the Taliban, once again because of the interest that Pakistan has in Afghanistan. The issue of Pakistan has been that they always think that if there is an independent government in Afghanistan then the role of India will become prominent in Afghanistan, and somehow that is not to the benefit of the interests of Pakistan in the region. And that fear seems to linger on despite how hard the Afghan government tried to give confidence to Pakistan that they would keep a neutral position when it comes to India and Pakistan in the region, and that they have no ill feeling toward Pakistan and that they are not planning to form this coalition with India against Pakistan in the region.
So, this fear is very much valid and it’s one of the main reasons that any government in Pakistan tries to use these extremist groups as a tool to have some form of influence over the government in Afghanistan. And through which they think that their interests will be served in the region, and that they will prevent India from penetrating into the Afghan political arena, and therefore [prevent] that country from turning against Pakistan.
I cannot say that Khan’s government has been extremely supportive of the Taliban or not, but pretty much every government in Pakistan follows the same policy and the same strategy, exactly because of this reason. That they see their interests being threatened in the region if a government in Afghanistan is not politically under their influence.
SG: The irony in all of that is that now that the government—the civilian elected democratic system—in Afghanistan is no more, that actually, it is the dictatorial Taliban that is potentially destabilising Pakistan more than any other entity had previously done in the previous 20 plus years.
Let’s recap Lina, on what we’ve been talking about. It’s nine months since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. Women’s rights have been completely derailed. Women have basically been made to disappear from society, from having jobs or employment. Many of them are the breadwinners of Afghanistan and that has had a knock-on effect with the economy then collapsing as a result. There is heavy censorship in the media. There are arrests, killings, and extrajudicial murders taking place. The ministries run by the Taliban are dysfunctional. And there are war crimes that the Taliban are committing,
especially in places like Panjshir, Baghlan, and Andarab. And then there’s also Pakistan and their role that we’ve been talking about. It all seems to be very depressing and very concerning. What can we expect for the rest of 2022 in Afghanistan?
LR: I think Afghanistan is a very unpredictable country. Who could predict that the government, a 20-some-year old government that was built—was created—with the support of the international community, and billions of dollars in aid, would collapse overnight? So, I think I’m too little to even predict what can happen in the future in Afghanistan, because to be honest with you, I give up predicting.
Afghanistan is very unpredictable, politically. We don’t know what will happen, but we can make assumptions based on what is happening right now, on the ground. As I said, the international community is very busy with the Ukraine war. And if the war in Ukraine continues, along with the negative economic impact that the COVID pandemic had on the world, [then] the economy of Europe, the economy of Western countries, will suffer greatly. And so, these countries will be very busy dealing with their internal issues and with the war in Ukraine to notice what the Taliban are actually doing on the ground.
And I think the Taliban are very much aware of that. And, as I said, decree after decree, or order after order that they’re issuing, in limiting women, is a sign that they are fully enjoying this lack of attention of the international community on what they are doing to their benefit. So, my fear would be that if this lack of attention and lack of action, such as sanctioning the Taliban leadership, continues, then the next step would be the empowerment of regional terrorist groups. Let’s remember that there are more than 20 terrorist groups that exist in that part of the world. So, we would probably see al-Qaeda coming back to life, we will probably see Daesh [ISIS] gaining ground in Afghanistan, we will probably see other groups gathering their strength and making the next move. And that would be, in my opinion, not only a catastrophe for the people of Afghanistan, but for the world.
So, my only concern and my only prediction that I have is exactly that. That if attention is not paid to what is happening in Afghanistan, we have to be ready, in the near future, to experience another catastrophic event that can impact Afghanistan, the region, and the international community.
SG: Well, it’s very disturbing what you’re saying and, unfortunately, it’s probably all too true as well. There was one thing you said that I thought was important and that you spoke about the potential rise and return of not just al-Qaeda, but IS-KP, which is the ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan. The thing I’ve noticed in the country is that, when it comes to the terrorists and the extremist groups, nothing is ever black and white, there are many shades of grey. And we often hear that IS-KP are the enemies of the Taliban. But then there are also some people that are saying that, actually, IS-KP has been infiltrated by the Haqqanis and that sometimes they will even work together for their own agenda, even if it means fighting other Taliban factions. What do you think is the answer to understanding IS-KP? Are they completely separate from the Taliban? Or are there elements that actually will cooperate with factions such as the Haqqanis?
LR: Well, I think with ISIS in Afghanistan, we have to keep in mind that the ISIS in Afghanistan is not the ISIS in Syria and Iraq. There are no Arabs, there are no other foreign nations who are involved in ISIS or the Khorasan branch of ISIS in Afghanistan. And it consists of former Taliban members. And, as you said, some of the Haqqani Network’s, members who created this group, and obviously former Taliban militants who left the Taliban are now fighting under the flag of ISIS in Afghanistan.
So, any kind of coalition between these groups, given the reality that they’re actually coming from members of the Taliban, members of Haqqani—creating their own groups and fighting against each other—of course, in any time, and any place where they think that their interests are served by getting back together again, then they would do that. So, the ISIS in Afghanistan, actually, to my opinion, is mostly rising to power as an opponent to the Taliban, as more of a power sharing type of deal that is going on with the Taliban.
And let’s also remember that there were reports of some sort of clashes between Haqqani cabinet members with the Taliban cabinet members over some of the decisions that they were taking in governing Afghanistan. And some recent proof of that is Stanikzai, Abbas Stanikzai’s opinion, about the hijab, where he disagreed with the decision of the Taliban government, for the Afghan women to cover their faces in the media.
So, they already have disagreements with themselves. And Haqqani probably can use ISIS as an option to the Taliban, if the Taliban does not agree with Haqqani in terms of what Haqqani wants to do in Afghanistan. So, they always want to keep an option open for themselves there.
SG: And those options are ultimately at the expense of the Afghan people who continue to suffer.
Well, Lina it’s been a real pleasure to talk to you and get your insights on Afghanistan, and especially the impact that this has on women in Afghanistan. And we all hope and pray that the situation can somehow improve for the Afghan people because if they suffer, eventually we will all suffer, because terrorists will find a home there, as they have done in the past. And it’s important to remember that Afghanistan is not just a local issue. It is an international issue. And I’m so glad that you’ve been able to spend the time with us to talk about this.
LR: Thank you.
SG: Thank you, Lina. And I hope you can join us again in the future.
LR: Sure. Thank you so much for having me. Thanks a lot.
SG: It’s been our pleasure.
We conclude this podcast with Lina reciting a poem she had written some years ago about when the Taliban first seized power in the 1990s and their subsequent brutal reign. Lina’s poem, entitled Buddha, is eerily relevant today and serves as a warning that the Taliban could once again erode Afghanistan’s proud history, heritage, and directly undermine the rights of women whilst spreading insecurity.
LR: Buddha,
Listen to my voice,
That rolls, reflects and echoes in the sad and broken valleys of your land,
Listen to my voice, as I murmur your pain that is closely woven into mine,
Buddha,
Listen to my tale of senseless and insane destruction of a civilization,
Bear with me, as I tell you the tales of terror, fear and horror of your land,
As I tell you the saga of helpless Afghans,
As I mourn the tragedy of your destruction, and the fall of a great nation,
Buddha,
Your ruins and my head both did not crunch the thirst of barbarians,
How ridiculous that your silent, peaceful existence and my spark of ideas and logic,
Posed a deadly threat to THEIR hollow, poisonous existence!
Buddha,
Your ashes and my beheaded body,
Went unnoticed and forgotten,
Just like the death of thousands before you and after me,
In the precious land, sadly ruled by ignorant unruly.
Your place is empty,
Like an eye drawn from its socket,
When my mother went blind,
As she sobbed herself to sleep each night with the vision of my beheaded body.
Buddha,
Your destruction will always remind mankind of the suffering,
Of women beaten, men beheaded, and children imprisoned.
Though your tenacious statue is no more,
We can declare with pride, honor, and glory,
That Buddha suffered alongside his people to ensure,
The world witnessed and will remember forever the agony of the Afghan nation.
Buddha,
They tell us You intended to fall in the land of lunies,
Not as a gesture of surrender and submission,
But as a rebellious voice of voiceless,
Against,
Oppression,
Tyranny,
Injustice,
Cruelty,
Ignorance,
And SHAME!
SG: Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive.
Disclaimer: Please note that the views, information, or opinions expressed in the DEEP Dive series are solely those of the individuals involved and do not necessarily represent those of NATO or DEEP.
This transcript has been edited for clarity.