Key Reflections
* The current period is ‘The Dangerous Decade’ of which the most consequential developments will stem from the Indo-Pacific region.
* The seas and shipping lanes are the arteries to history, geography and geopolitics and are so intrinsic to our lives.
* The Quad is growing in importance and will likely become a multilateral institution.
* China wants to build its military to the capacity of being able to take Taiwan before defence agreements and alliances grow between Western and Indo-Pacific nations.
* Afghanistan will serve as a platform for terrorism. The Taliban have not changed and will support terrorist groups and suppress the rights of women.
* China’s relationship with Pakistan and Afghanistan is part of its geo-strategic outlook.
TRANSCRIPT:
SG – Dr. Sajjan Gohel
TM – Tim Marshall
SG: Hello, and welcome to DEEP Dive, brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. I’m your host, Dr. Sajjan Gohel. Each episode, we speak to experts and practitioners in international security and defence, counter-terrorism, and geopolitical current events to gain insight into the most pressing matters of global affairs.
On today’s episode, we interview critically acclaimed author, journalist and practitioner Tim Marshall, whose books include Worth Dying For: The Power and Politics of Flags, as well as The Power of Geography and Prisoners of Geography. Tim, welcome to the very first episode of DEEP Dive.
TM: Thanks, and what an honour to be the first!
SG: We’re very privileged to have you. One thing that I found fascinating about your books is the methodology that was used. Why did you pick on specific countries and regions when it came to your research?
TM: In Prisoners of Geography, which was the first of the two, it was simply to try to get the big players in: the United States, India, China, Russia, etc. And then Latin America as a continent and Africa as a continent—well and Europe—because I just wanted to lay out that these are the big broad brush geographic factors of these big players. And this is how that has partially—and only partially—determined what has happened in those regions and then bring it up today and say, building on that and building on that history. When you see these players through that lens, it’s A) easier to understand why they’re doing what they’re doing at the moment and B) easier to make an educated guess—and that’s what it is about the future, always—about how they will behave in the future. And it seemed to strike a chord. So in The Power of Geography, I’ve gone through the same formula but just with perhaps second-tier nations if you like, like Ethiopia and Iran.
SG: Yes, I noticed that in The Power of Geography, you focused a lot on countries that have coastlines. Is that deliberate?
TM: Yes, insofar as, you know, I think about 85% of cargo still moves by water. And I do think that the action is still at sea. Very good example of course is the South China Sea at the moment. That’s what pushes and pulls so much. I mean, if China was busy being exceptionally forward looking, say in Mongolia, it really wouldn’t capture the world’s attention. But when it’s busy pushing out into the South China Sea and beyond and into the international sea lanes, that’s what catches our attention. Sorry, briefly Sajjan, going back to your first question about the sort of methodology, I do start from a country or a region or a conflict’s geography, strip it down—in which direction do these rivers flow? I mean, it seems perhaps obvious, almost banal, but flowing—no pun intended—from which direction the rivers flow, you can make a number of educated guesses about what would happen. Direction of trade and travel. Ditto let’s say mountain ranges and many other factors. And when you frame something like that, and then you go into the history, and then finally you get to the current affairs, and you build that on, I just think that that is a simple but effective formula.
SG: Very effective. In fact, what I would say, from my perspective, is that you kind of lay out the fact that the seas are the arteries to history, to geography and geopolitics, which is so intrinsic and important to our world today.
TM: Yeah, I’m not sure people realize still even to this day just how important the sea lanes are. I mean they don’t get that much attention, and it’s not to underestimate inland stuff obviously, the Eurasian Heartland being a very good example. But it’s just that most countries cannot really survive without the sea lanes. America is the only one really. America is the only power that could theoretically be self-sufficient, given what it’s got within its borders. Pretty much everybody else relies on trade and obviously, to a great extent, on seaborne trade.
SG: Why do you feel that there’s not enough attention on the sea lanes? Because what you say is very true, that they don’t necessarily get the attention they should—not just so much trade, but also you’ve got now defence related issues impacting.
TM: Well I think it is coming back into fashion, just as geography is coming back into fashion, but I think the concept of geopolitics went out of fashion, especially after World War Two, because the Nazis had a version of it. And the determinism factor of it. And so, it became unfashionable. Also, I do think there’s a lot of people that don’t like to think that certain things are deterministic—that we’re not actually in a prison, whereas I argue, in a loose sense, we are in a geographic prison; you can bend those bars and try and escape but you start from a prison of what you can and cannot do. So it became unfashionable.
And the whole idea of sea power became unfashionable, and then technology really kicked in. And people thought that technology would overcome geography, whereas all it does is change where you need to—which bits of geography you need to focus on. A cruise missile, people said, “Ah, well, that gets rid of geography.” Well, it doesn’t, because it has to be launched from somewhere, and it has to land somewhere, and it has to travel a certain distance between x and y. And there are other things to that. So you put all that together, and it just wasn’t part of people’s thinking. But I think increasingly, it is. And this year, we have a very good example, which is that people are seriously waking up to what’s going on in the South China Sea. And that is so much because of geography.
Two quick things: one, the first island chain that sits in front of China, which China sees as almost a wall blocking it from its destiny. If you take Taiwan out of that wall, there is a huge gap in it, and the whole concept of containment falls apart. And secondly, given that there are these competing parts of the South China Sea where Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, China all claim—sometimes overlapping claims—and right through this, other major international sea lanes of the world, which you want to be kept open and free. You don’t want them controlled by one country, particularly if it’s a one-party state dictatorship.
SG: Where do you see the situation heading in the South China Sea vis a vis China?
TM: But it doesn’t have to be war, does it? I mean, everyone’s currently talking about war and in fact, China and Taiwan are busy having a little war of words, but they’ve had those in the past.
It is a dangerous decade, because—I’ve started halfway through, let me start at the beginning.
We talked about the first island chain, talked about China wanting to break out of it. Then enters the Quad—which your audience will know what that is—which has been growing in importance year on year for the past five years, culminating this year in the leaders of the four Quad countries actually meeting in person.
You have to see the Aukus deal in that frame because it complements the Quad. And then you look at the increasing defence ties between Japan and Australia, and then India and Australia, on bilateral defence ties. Japan and Vietnam are increasingly warming to each other.
So you put all that together, and then China—pretty much only over the past two or three years—has suddenly realized it might run out of time. By which I mean, it might run out of time to build its military to the capacity of being able to take Taiwan before these burgeoning defence agreements, almost alliance—well, they are an alliance in a way—kick in and actually make them so strong that China wouldn’t gamble, because trying to get Taiwan is a gamble. And the stronger and more robust the defence against that, the greater the gamble it is. So to come to the end of that answer, that’s what I mean about “a dangerous decade,” because the Aukus deal doesn’t kick in for about ten years because of the subs being built. The defence ties are still relatively loose, and they are getting—they believe—closer to being militarily able to pull off an incredibly difficult military operation. which is an amphibious assault across 100 miles of rough sea.
SG: There are so many important dynamics that you’ve brought in. Let’s see if I can try and unpack some of them.
TM: That was a very long answer, forgive me.
SG: But a very important answer. Do you feel that for China, this is now, in some ways, a race against time? That they want to have the capability—doesn’t mean they necessarily will execute it—but they want the capability of potentially having a military option when it comes to Taiwan, and for them, it’s a race against time because of the fact that there is this Quad now that’s emerging and gaining ground?
TM: Yeah, and you probably noticed over the past few days, some US Marines showed up in Taiwan. Now, they’re only there to train, they’re not about to base themselves there. There’s a US Marine base near Darwin in Australia—that’s fine, the Chinese can live with that; they would not be able to live with a US Marine base in Taiwan. So they’re just there to train, but it just gives you the sign of the direction of travel, and that strategic ambiguity that the United States has— “would it, wouldn’t it” come to the defence of Taiwan now, in the wording of the understanding. A lot of it depends on whether Taiwan declares independence. In that case, the United States says it probably wouldn’t come to Taiwan’s assistance. In the event of an invasion, without a declaration of independence first by Taiwan, the wording is that they probably would. So, the Chinese as and when they think they are militarily ready and the experts now talk about 2025 to 2027, at that point, they have that massive, massive decision to make: do we risk this? So you’re risking a number of things.
Two of the main things: you’re risking losing. Well, first of all, you’re risking, will states—and people always say, “Will the Americans come to the rescue?” It’s not as simple as that—it’s “Will the Americans and the Japanese and the Australians and in fact, the Royal Dutch Navy—which you probably noticed was involved in the recent naval drills off of Japan—and the Canadian Navy? Are they really all going to ride to the rescue? Because if they are, the Chinese view of whether they can or can’t succeed in this— you’re seriously sowing doubt in their minds. And if you’ve done that, they then game out. If they’ve gamed out, we can do it in a breeze, it’s fine. If they game out that “We’re not sure, we might lose,” they then game out, “Well, what are the ramifications of that? Which are not only massive economic hits to the global economy, which of course hit them extremely hard, but also, given that it’s a cause Célèbre throughout China to regain this territory back to the motherland. If you fight and lose lots of young men, young Chinese soldiers, and you fail, the Chinese Communist Party is not necessarily destined to forever be in charge—you actually risk betting the farm and losing a lot.
SG: So we’re talking about a very high risk scenario developing over the next few years.
TM: Yeah, I mean some of the analysts in the American military call it “the dangerous decade.” And I think that’s fair—well I mean, every decade’s dangerous isn’t it? You know, there’s nothing new under the sun. This is why I don’t lose sleep about the state of world affairs because it was ever lost, but the sky hasn’t fallen yet, nor do I think it will. But in each decade, you look at which are the particular flashpoints, and there was a time where people thought India-Pakistan needed—and it did—acute attention. North Korea and South Korea, that rears its head again. But in this decade, the biggest potential flashpoint—and possibly the most dangerous one—is in the South China Sea.
SG: And would it be fair to say that the dangerous decade is ultimately the Indo-Pacific region—you said the South China Sea—but do we expand that across the Indo-Pacific region?
TM: Yeah, you’re right. And it’s funny you use that phrase, and we all now do. It was used 400 years ago. People in the region, especially the Japanese, thought of that region as a single region, “Indo-Pacific.” It’s actually in a speech made by a Japanese emperor or strategist, I forget which, 400 years ago. It was Abe, Abe Shinzo, the Japanese prime minister, a few years back, who really brought it back into fashion. And I think we’ve all now accepted it again. And Australia is the hinge between the two. And nowadays, I mean, I’ve got a map of the world in front of me on my desk. And it’s that classic Mercator map. And what’s bang in the middle? Plucky little Britain, bang in the middle of the world. Now of course there is no middle to something that’s round. Nevertheless, I think it’s a lot better, conceptually, if we now buy our maps, which put Indo-Pacific in the centre of the world, because in a sort of geopolitical sense, that’s where it is.
SG: Connecting to that, you mentioned the Quad, which is the United States, India, Australia and Japan. Do you see the quad developing further in terms of becoming an institution, an entity, with new members—how do you feel it’s going to develop in the years to come?
TM: I think it will develop as an institution, yes. I’m not sure about extra members. There’s already talk of “Quad Plus one,” by which people mean South Korea. I would gamble, I would bet, I would guess that because it’s so delicate for the South Koreans—despite hosting 30,000 US troops—they still do, for quite understandable reasons, hedge their bets. They have to keep on the right side of China. Look at the map, that tells you why. So I’m not convinced it will grow past the Quad in any way—you’d have to rename it. But I do think institutionally, yes. You’ve seen growth year on year, or closer ties, year on year, and I expect that to continue.
SG: These are, in many ways, important dynamics when it comes to being prepared militarily, strategically—also intelligence enhancements as well.
TM: Yeah, and Five Eyes—I remember a few years back, people used to say “Five Eyes” in hushed tones, and then there were sort of conspiracy theorists that that used to put five eyes up on websites to prove that they were in the know about this secret organization, not that it was secret at all. But it’s come roaring into consciousness, I think, public consciousness. And it is the preeminent intelligence sharing platform in the world, and there’s nothing close to it. It’s possible to extend and deepen that—well you can’t particularly deepen it amongst the five, but you can extend it, and there is already talk about—either as a full member, or as sort of an associate member—bringing Japan in. And I think that would make sense. There are other candidates to be brought in, people that the Five Eyes countries would absolutely trust with a degree of intelligence sharing. So that’s all part of the future.
SG: Choosing your partners being the key dynamic in all of this. So, you talked about the Five Eyes—which is the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—as being one of the most important relationships. Is that coincidental that they’re all English-speaking nations?
TM: I think you know the answer to that. No, I mean it’s to do with geography, insofar as the British Empire, the geography of that. And then building out from that, what subsequently happened in history. And this is because of their English-speaking ties and their affinity to each other, but the bit that’s often overlooked is that they’re also very advanced and flourishing liberal democracies. And so they have an awful lot in common. And of course it’s in each of their interests, given that they are all formidable advanced technological powers, to stick together. So that trust, it is built partly on culture, which is a sensitive, difficult subject, but it is built partly on culture. But in the 21st century, I think, hopefully we got past just that, and it’s actually built on shared values, where culture doesn’t really matter, because, for example, Japan is culturally somewhat different to the Five Eyes countries but is a democracy, which now has fairly deep roots and has values very, very similar. So I think values are now more important than that culture argument, which is where Five Eyes grew up.
I also think—this actually flows into what I think is an emerging Biden doctrine—which is that the advanced industrialized democracies have got so much in common, that that’s where the action is. It’s not a case of the West anymore. It’s a case of the world’s democracies coming together.
SG: So if the Indo-Pacific is a critical element of this decade and the importance of the Five Eyes is only going to grow further with more collaboration with other countries, potentially Japan, is Afghanistan now a past tense issue when it comes to geopolitics, defence, counter-terrorism?
TM: Well, for those people who are still looking in the rear-view mirror—and I don’t think there’s that many of them—it’s receding into the distance pretty fast, which might come as a surprise to people who thought it was the end of the world for the Americans. I mean, I thought it was a debacle, I thought it was a disgraceful exit. It was a betrayal, it was a whole bunch of things. You can make the case for leaving. You can make a strong case for leaving, in an orderly fashion, over a longer period, at the very minimum getting to the winter—you could have done it a different way. But it was done. And it’s a done deal, and it’s gone. People say “Saigon,” yes it was a Saigon moment. But the Americans got over Saigon, and they’ll get over Afghanistan. And there was much hilarity in Beijing and Moscow. I don’t know what the Mandarin for schadenfreude is, but I’m sure they have something. But once they’ve got over that smirking, they surely have drawn the conclusion that: “Now the Americans will begin to focus on what they were going to focus on 20 years ago before they got side-tracked and bought us 20 years. Now they’re going to focus on us.”
SG: What about the concern that Afghanistan could once again become a hub or a cesspool for terrorism, which will attract foreign terrorist fighters around the world?
TM: Well, it already was a cesspool of terrorists and foreign fighters. For the past 20 years. I mean, but that’s what the Taliban was, who had lots and lots of foreign fighters, Chechens and Uzbeks amongst them. So that argument only goes so far. Of course, now it’s probable the space will be opened up and they’ll be able to operate much more easily. And yeah, that’s an issue. Biden’s version of this is if they try anything, whack the hell out of them and go away again. Because whacking the hell out of them and staying didn’t work. So yeah, I think there’s every possibility that this will happen and it’s quite possible that in x years time there will be an incident, a terrible one, and we will trace it back and it will have been hatched there. But yeah so I mean that’s what I think, you said “what if?” I think that’s a price that certainly Biden thought was worth paying.
SG: One of the challenges is going to be, what we’ve been talking about, the geography of Afghanistan. Its landlocked, it has Iran and Pakistan on one side and it has the Central Asian republics in the north. Many of them are not necessarily going to be that inclined to allow the over the horizon counter-terrorism strategy that President Biden has been advocating, so then how does one have a policy to try and contain potential threats that may emerge from Afghanistan?
TM: It’s almost impossible, again, just look at the map, and then look at the history and the politics. I mean the Iranians are not about to allow an American base, the Pakistanis certainly aren’t. None of the ‘stans are, especially Tajikistan, because the Russians are busy building up their influence there again. So, over the horizon, well, that’s Qatar, apparently that’s 12 hours flying time for a drone. So, it can only be trying to pay off the Taliban to ensure that they don’t harbour groups that will then project their violence outwards. I’m not convinced about that, because people say “the Taliban are rational,” yes they are. People say, “the Taliban don’t want to expand their ideology outside the borders,” and I think there’s an element of truth in that. But that’s in the broad brush, when you get into the detail, well the Taliban are true believers, I mean that’s not irrational, to be a true believer. And already, you’re seeing elements within the Taliban that are the Tajiks, the Tajik Taliban, I don’t mean the Tajikistan Taliban, but the ethnically Tajik Taliban, of which there are—it’s a minority—but there are some. They are already up there at the border, already fomenting problems, and already making their ties with the Tajik Taliban-types, who are actually from Tajikistan. So I think it’s going to be extremely bumpy and I don’t think there is a robust policy against it. Try and bribe the Taliban, maybe by giving them the money that is being held, subject to agreements and promises that they make, keep your drones 12 hours away, and invest in intelligence.
SG: Another dynamic tied to Afghanistan is of course, Pakistan. Many people believe that you can’t talk about Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan. Now, the assumption was that Pakistan had scored a strategic victory with the return of the Taliban, but in some ways it seems the spotlight has also fallen on Pakistan’s role over the last 20 years, that it wasn’t necessarily playing the role of an ally, but was hedging its bets in every way possible.
TM: At best. This is one of your many areas of real expertise Sajjan, so you know, please do push back on the bits that I get wrong. But, you know, I thought the game was up on Pakistan when they were found, essentially, to have been harbouring Osama bin Laden. The curtain was pulled to one side. I don’t actually think it is a strategic victory for them, because most Pakistanis are not from the same ethnicity as the Taliban are, the Pashtun. We saw at their height what they were able to do, which was to join with the Pakistan Taliban in the Pashtun regions essentially form one area, and Pakistan was on the verge—what was it 10 years ago—of losing a significant part of its territory. It could not control the North-West Frontier. So, I don’t see how that’s a strategic victory, given that there is the potential for that to happen again. You know, it’s a bit like the Saudis in their role in helping to create the Mujahideen, you know that tiger that they rode eventually turned around and bit them, in the form of people trying to overthrow the Saudi state.
SG: Well it’s interesting that we’re seeing an increase in attacks in Pakistan by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the theory that the Pakistani military had in the past was that if they can have a secure Afghanistan with the Taliban, then that would reduce the TTP attacks, but on the contrary what we’re actually seeing is a rise in those particular incidents.
TM: This is what I mean about rationality. And then also I do think that in many parts of the world, and this isn’t true of the Pakistanis, but it is true of many—certainly people in Western countries—a complete lack of understanding about religion, a lack of understanding that when people say something they mean it. They are doing God’s work. And so what you think are your rational arguments, does not impact upon their rationality. And so if it’s not only God’s will to do this work, but also at a more mundane human level, your ethnic nationalism, that the Pashtuns should be joined as one people, then it would follow that, if Pakistan has done its bit to strengthen the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, it will inevitably strengthen the violent jihadist Pashtuns in the North-West Frontier. I mean I’m not talking about all Pashtuns of course because most of them, you know, don’t like the Taliban, don’t like that form of a belief system, but you’ve got to understand that the system, both at the ethnic level, and at the religious level.
SG: Do you feel that Pakistan also strategically, globally is also going to be left in the rear mirror, just like Afghanistan could be?
TM: Well, that’s an interesting one, isn’t it, because, you know, the world is upside down because Pakistan was close to the Americans in the previous century and is pretty far away now. And is now cuddling up to China, in a huge way economically, militarily, you name it. So, I think they are in danger of losing friends because China isn’t really their friend. And in fact you look at the game, look around at the map and you think “who are Pakistan’s friends?” and they haven’t got any really. So, yes, I just think they have made a mistake here.
SG: If China is not an ally of Pakistan, how would you define the relationship?
TM: Well it’s not a vassal state either, because Pakistan is a regional power. But, you know, in their relationship there is absolutely no question of who is the dominant power. And China is busy buying up parts of Pakistan. You know, the Gwadar Port that they developed as part of the ‘Belt and Road,’ the Karakoram highway. I believe that as an alternative to Gwadar, they’re going to redevelop Karachi, as a port as well. So, they are busy buying into Pakistan big time, which of course is reasonably good for the Pakistani economy. But there’s no question about who is the boss and who will call the shots. And you can make an argument for that because after all, lots of countries have a similar relationship with the United States of America. But again you know, China is not a benevolent source of goodness in the world I don’t think.
SG: If we tie all of this together. You’re looking at a China-Pakistan relationship that could also be played out in Afghanistan as well, because it seems that the Chinese have expressed an interest in what’s going on in Afghanistan, they’ve been in talks with the Taliban, can that relationship be sustainable?
TM: Only if there’s a degree of stability. And I think, you know, that’s questionable if Afghanistan becomes a stable country at that point, yeah, China is interested in the rare earth materials and other things that they can get, mostly in the north, you know. They do have a border with Afghanistan. If they can get the promises—well they’ve already got the promises from the Taliban—that the Taliban will not encourage problems on their border. I mean it’s a very, very rough terrain border there’s not many people who can cross that. But it is a potential route to help the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang province and the Taliban have said they won’t do that. So if there’s stability, I think the Chinese are well positioned to get economic benefits from it, but they are very much hanging back at the moment, you know, they don’t want to invest hundreds of millions of dollars just to see it all go up, literally, in smoke. The last little bit about that is that, and this is to Pakistan’s advantage now, there is the potential for the Kashmir region. For the people to funnel up through Afghanistan, and help to destabilize Kashmir vis-à-vis the Indians. That is to Pakistan’s advantage because, as you know, that is perhaps the cause célèbre in the Pakistani-Indian relationship.
SG: So another dynamic that could definitely cause further tensions in the region. There was an interesting and disturbing development that happened in Afghanistan, just a few days ago with a suicide bombing at a mosque, which was a Hazara Shiite mosque. And it turned out that the suicide bomber was actually a Uyghur. Do you think that that dynamic also will be a concern to China because of the fact that they want the Taliban to rein in any Uyghur presence, but at the same time you’re seeing Uyghur militants being used as suicide bombers?
TM: Well, I’ve been following your work on sort of this including the papers you’ve been writing about what the Taliban is and isn’t so I’m actually going to turn it around because you know, a podcast being a conversation. I would guess—I mean I was aware of that event, yes. I didn’t even know it was a Uyghur—I would guess that’s a coincidence. I mean, you know, “which handy suicide bomber have we got who’s prepared to die today? Oh, he’ll do.” But I could be wrong on that so actually I’d be grateful if you could tell me your thoughts on that, is this a conveyor belt of cannon fodder for them?
SG: The situation in Afghanistan is, as you know, having been there, is never black and white. It’s often many shades of grey and what you could find is one actor that may end up being an enemy of another group could actually then the next day cooperate, for strategic and tactical purposes. So one concern that the international community keeps talking about is the ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan, IS-KP. Where I think, often the mistake that has been made is to draw a direct separation from the Taliban, because IS-KP are ethnically Pashtun predominantly. And you’ve got IS-KP fighters that are married into Taliban fighters’ families and vice versa. So, sometimes they can end up murdering each other in one day, and then cooperate the next day, which is this very odd scenario that we’re seeing in Afghanistan.
TM: Yeah. Yeah. They grew out of the Taliban, didn’t they? Going back to this Uyghur chap, so do you think it was an ISIS-K [IS-KP] attack on the Hazara mosque?
SG: Well certainly IS-KP have claimed responsibility for it. The worry that I have is that IS-KP does have a very murky relationship with the Haqqani Network, which is a prominent faction within the Taliban regime where you’ve got a proscribed terrorist Sirajuddin Haqqani as the Interior Minister. And it seems the Haqqanis can potentially use these different groups against their own people, and also to undermine the other Taliban factions.
TM: Yeah which may have been what happened at the airport, in the airport bombing. I don’t think people have got to the bottom of that. Again while I’ve got you Sajjan, how much do you think the Iranians will operate inside Afghanistan to protect their Shiite brothers and sisters?
SG: Well I was going to ask you the same question too, so it’d be good to exchange perspectives on this. Iran has hedged its bets, to use that term again, they saw a potential opportunity to work with elements of the Taliban, in particular, Mullah Yaqoob, who is the son of the founder of the Taliban Mullah Omar. But the Taliban have been, now, once again going back to their sectarian politics and systematically undermining the Hazaras, the Shiite, in Afghanistan and that has concerned the Iranians considerably, who have been watching with alarm. So what perhaps some countries thought about a Taliban takeover prior to it happening, they are now erring on the side of caution and the Iranians won’t necessarily just allow this to continue without having some diplomatic avenue to pursue, or even potentially you could see the mobilization of troops on the border as we had seen back in the 1990s, especially when the Taliban murdered, Iranian diplomats but I would be curious for your perspective.
TM: Well yeah it’s pretty much that. I mean I don’t know about a cross border incursion, but you know if the Iranians were willing to round up various Hazaras and ship them off to Syria to fight, I’m sure they can help to organise militia within Afghanistan, if they believe it is going to be necessary, if there is a sustained persecution of that minority. I also think they will operate inside at an intelligence level. I know they came up against the Americans several times in Afghanistan, some of their intelligence units—armed undercover intelligence units—came up against the Americans a few times, so they will operate like that as well. Can the Taliban help themselves from this opportunity to kill more of what they regard as apostates? What is it, they killed 30,000 or something, in Mazar-i-Sharif, in the ‘90s. You know, we pray that they are no longer like that, but I think within that network, and certainly within ISIS-K [IS-KP], I think if I was a Hazara I would be worried.
SG: I fear, not just for the Hazaras, but for the rights of women too.
TM: You probably saw this about six weeks ago with people talking about ‘Taliban 2.0.’ Its a nonsense. The only ‘Taliban 2.0’ is the one that took a PR course when it was in Qatar to learn how to fool the silly foreigners. That’s ‘Taliban 2.0.’ They said a few good things in the press conferences and some people seemed to believe them. And just about every single thing that’s happened since has been the opposite: girls are now not going to be going to school past twelve, they’re busy cutting the budgets for female professors and the training schemes for women teachers. It’s only going backwards.
SG: Very depressing, seeing all the hard earned gains for women’s rights and civil liberties being eroded within a matter of just days. My concern is that when you see the rights of women collapse extremism tends to increase. The two are often interconnected that way.
TM: “‘Twas ever thus all over the world.” Hemingway wrote short stories called “Men Without Women” and the basic underlying premise was that men without women tend to behave badly.
SG: Indeed. One last question. It’s a general question about how you approached your reporting as a journalist, but also your writing. How did you look at every dynamic in terms of—you’re not just someone who talks about issues from afar, you’ve been to a lot of these places. What was your approach when you would visit them? Especially some of the more hostile parts of the world?
TM: Well hopefully many of the places that you’d go to, you already had a basic handle on it. And journeying there, which could sometimes take two or three days, you know I would devour whichever articles I had cut out and a couple of books I had bought at the airport or whatever. And then when you get there, you have to look and listen, which seems pretty obvious, but you’d be going around a roundabout in Baghdad and there would be a statue of someone and you would say “who’s that?” And they would tell you who that person was and you start then to understand the emotional buttons that can be pressed in a people and why?
You know, it’s a bit like coming to Britain and seeing the statue of Boudicca in central London and asking that and then getting a feel of what Boudicca means to the British people, which I’m not saying it means a huge amount, but it’s just one of those touchstones of “oh yeah you know, very early Britain.” Or, and of Churchill, a much more obvious one, but then the ones in between, and that’s just the statues. And you just soak it up and you start to realise.
One of the most—just seems like a lightbulb going off once. It was in Kosovo and I was with some Serb friends and we were driving down and my friend said “See that satellite dish?” I said “yeah?” on the side of a house, he said “Which way is it pointing?” I forget whichever way. He said “And what’s in that direction? I said “Albania.” He said “Yeah, that’s what they’re watching. Albanian television, therefore?” “Therefore that’s a Kosovo-Albanian house.” And then he’d say “See that house?” Satellite dish is pointing the other way. It’s just little things like that and then you suddenly realise that a lot are getting all their information and views and this, that, and the other from them and that division. So when you learn something like that—I remember taking that to Baghdad and saying to a friend of mine, who, the day I got there after the statue fell, said “Tim, al-Sunnah [the Sunni] will never allow the Shiite to take over and we are going to have a civil war.” And he pointed at all the satellite dishes in this direction and that direction.
Little things like that, that tell you so much.
SG: Well these nuances are reflected in your writings and your books. It’s always a question I actually wanted to ask you, so I’m glad I had this opportunity because you’ve provided such fascinating insight during this podcast and I’m very grateful for you making the time for it.
TM: I’m grateful for the invitation, thank you and I wish you well with the podcast, it’s not before time and I look forward to subscribing.
SG: Well thank you Tim Marshall for joining us on DEEP Dive and we look forward to having you back one day.
Thank you for listening to this episode of DEEP Dive. I’m your host Dr Sajjan Gohel. DEEP Dive is brought to you by NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. The production and research team are Marcus Andreopoulos and Victoria Jones. For additional content, including full transcripts of each episode, please visit: deepportal.hq.nato.int/deepdive
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